Chapter II
United States' Security Agenda

II.1 A Broad Glance at Modern US Foreign Policy

After World War II and the "total war" experienced with it, the United States organized and oriented its national security policy in an unprecedented way. The Cold War began as part of an ideological conflict that was reinforced by the immediate threat of nuclear weapons[1] and Soviet expansionism. The world had become undoubtedly bi-polar, and the United States was faced against an evident adversary, which in turn facilitated the creation of foreign and defense policies to confront a clearly defined threat: the USSR.

The Cold War environment generated a marked boost in the number and size of US agencies destined to conduct security policy. A new tendency of government organization was born with the National Security Act of 1947: "Under the act, a national military establishment was created. Within it were grouped the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the War Council, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. These were in addition to the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the newly created Air Force."[2] The NSA'47 became the backbone of US security policy, and even though this structure has been altered through the years with subsequent amendments, it has remained at the core of US foreign policy.

New alliances were created, along with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a complex network of military bases spread throughout the world to confront and deter Soviet military expansion. A huge military budget was spent during the Cold War and the Arms Race between both major powers contributed to the

[1] Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning, (Washington DC: The CSIS Press, 1998) p.34
[2] Ibid, p. 43

development of a wide array of long and short range weapons. The Korean and Vietnam wars where fought, relations with China sought, and many other actions and interventions in Central and South America where undertaken in order to contain Soviet expansion. The United States "engaged in countless other activities—including even financing domestic education and highway construction—all in the name of outbidding, outmaneuvering or outlasting Soviet sponsored communism."[3]

II.1.1 Post-Cold War Issues

With the demise of the soviet block and the end of the Cold War the international arena changed dramatically for the United States: The world was no longer bi-polar, there was no clearly defined adversary and question arose about the need to reassess American foreign policy. But even though it was clear that a re-examination of American foreign policy, and in particular security policy, was needed, there was no clear consensus on the direction it should take. A debate was born among both scholars and policy-makers on whether the US should take one direction or another.

Francis Fukuyama, for example, argued that American open market economy and liberal democracy would become the model that other countries would seek to emulate, and since communism had demonstrated to be a disappointment, US foreign policymakers had no reason to doubt that argument. "With the end of communism, there was no conceptual alternative…the global economy's forces were irresistible…Free

[3] Theodore Sorensen, "Rethinking National Security" (in Foreign Affairs, (Summer 90, Vol. 69 Issue 3)) p. 4

trade, markets, and capital flows would democratize virtually every country in the world."[4] Moreover:

> When the Cold War ended, the era of struggle was supposed to end with it, and the period of peace and prosperity was to begin…The attractiveness of American society to others—a form of what the political scientist Joseph S. Nye, Jr. calls 'soft power'—was also a force for peace.[5]

The United States had a varied array of strategies from which to choose for its future post-Cold War foreign policy, the difficulty was in deciding which to choose. We can identify three major trends that where followed at one time or another, without becoming the last word in US grand strategy for policymaking: 1) a values-centered focus, based on the promotion of freedom and democracy amongst other "American" values; 2) a materially/commercially oriented policy, which sought to promote free trade and commerce to enhance US prosperity; 3) and last but not least a security based strategy, which without a major international foe, such as the USSR, became centered on regional "rogue" states and terrorism. However, there is no clear trend as to what a clear US grand strategy could finally be composed of since no firm priorities between these three issues were established; as Murdock summarizes, "[a] defining feature of the post-Cold War era, of course, is that there is no compelling threat to force the prioritization of America's many grand strategies."[6]

President George Bush's administration inaugurated the Post-Cold War era, and began to adapt US foreign policy to the new challenges and conditions of global affairs. He stressed the importance of economic ties and started negotiating what would later

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[4] Charles William Maynes, "Squandering Triumph: the West Botched the Post-Cold War World" (in Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 99, Vol. 78 Issue 1)) p. 16

[5] Ibid

[6] Clark A. Murdock, Improving the Practice of National Security Strategy: A New Apporach for the Post-Cold War World. (Washington DC: The CSIS Press, 2004) pp.40-41

become the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as a free-trade agreement with Chile, and promoted US economic interests with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group.[7]

However, there existed additional imperative US interests other than commerce that could not be addressed as easily. Without an evident opponent such as the USSR it became harder for the United States' policy makers to validate an aggressive contention of regional power in the Middle East, a region overflowing with vital US interests such as access to oil; a geostrategic position both for America and its allies; defense of Israel; etc. It wasn't until the Iraqui invasion of Kuwait that the United States had a new opportunity to reassert its dominance in the region.[8]

The Persian Gulf War had a major impact in world politics and US foreign policy in the modern era. The defeat of Iraq by the United States, with the approval and support of the international community, shed new light on the possibility of a World Order in which conflict resolution could be managed by the strengthening of UN mechanisms and alliances of the Free World countries, under the leadership of the United States.

With the end of Cold War hostilities and the United States' victory over Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, the first Bush Administration promoted a new foreign policy strategy based on "a global vision as the basis for the next stage of international politics. The slogan for this vision (was) the 'new world order,' proclaimed by President Bush during the early stages of the gulf crisis."[9] If it is true that from the beginning this

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[7] Robert B. A Zoellick, "Republican Foreign Policy" (in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000, Volume 79 No.1)) pp. 63-64

[8] Phyllis Bennis, Before & After: US Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis (New York: Olive Branch Press, 2003) p.59

[9] Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World" (in Foreign Affairs (America and the World 1991/92)) URL:http://www.foreignaffairs.org

vision of a new world order roused the skepticism of some foreign policy scholars, with the passing of time the notion of a new world order within US foreign policy strategy became one of the legacies of the first Bush Administration.

However, George Bush Sr. did not fare very successfully at home and lost his reelection to Democrat William Clinton. Bill Clinton's policies were very similar to those of the former administration in its final years, concentrating on domestic reform at a high cost for foreign policy. While important transformations where occurring both within the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the United States' position was that of giving advice and not aid.[10]

> In no field is the good of the nation as a whole so evidently paramount as it is to those who hold high office in the country's foreign and defense establishments. And in none is the accountability to the citizenry more crucial. The Office of the President, and the positions of the president's relevant cabinet officers, are in possession of the necessary constitutional power to conduct the nation's security affairs. Officials in these posts have the obligation to use those offices to lead the citizens to see their interests less in terms of singular functional affiliations and more in the multiplicity of interests shared with fellow citizens. [11]

Later President Clinton, when faced with the imminence of international conflicts and the need for an active foreign policy, sought to combine the factions concerned with issues and interests respectively into "a national security policy that would command majority support, if not serve as the basis for a national consensus."[12] Having a Republican majority at congress, Clinton had to find the correct balance to persuade both the policymakers concerned with promoting values and fighting for democracy and freedom and those whom, based on a political realism, where mainly concerned about defending

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[10] Maynes, "Squandering Triumph," p. 16
[11] Cambone, A New Structure for National Security, p. 3
[12] Ibid, p. 25

US interests abroad. In the end, Clinton's foreign policy did lean further towards an issues approach to national security and foreign policy:

> In his policies of muscular multilateralism, engagement and enlargement, and cooperative threat reduction; in his decision to create an under secretary of state for global affairs; in his insistence that the State Department take on environmental issues as a key element of its approach to other nations; in his determination to favor multilateral and multinational approaches to problem solving; and in reserving the right to act unilaterally '"only when we must," the president has done more than any individual to embed the issues-based approach in U.S. security policy. So insistent has he been on this point that his foreign policy has been characterized by a leading foreign affairs expert as "international social work.[13]

During the Clinton Administration the US became engaged in peacebuilding missions abroad that turned to be failures for American foreign policy. US military intervention in the Post-Cold War era was put in perspective after the disenchantment of the intervention in Somalia. Former defense secretary Les Aspin examined three categories of circumstances in which US military intervention would be justified, and defined them as protecting security, protecting interests, and protecting values.[14]

However, Clinton's commitment to "assertive multilateralism" remained more rhetorical than factual since his administration was more committed to "the appearance of leading a global coalition than to any real consultation, let alone power-sharing, in global decision-making." The reality was that, during the two periods of Bill Clinton's presidency, many treaties ranging from the rights of children to the International Criminal Court to the prohibition of anti-personnel land mines were rejected.[15] During this time, Security Councils decision-making was circumvented, the UN Charter was constantly

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[13] Ibid
[14] Johnston, Foreign Policy into the 21st Century, pp. 4-5
[15] All of these where strongly supported and in many cases under the leadership of Canada, which was launching its human security agenda and promoting its image of the world's peacekeeper.

violated[16] and the US kept an indirect control over the international organism through the billions of dollars in dues that it dispensed or denied according to its interests.

The United States during the Clinton era proved to be highly uncertain on how to exercise its power, "frequently hesitating, then overcommitting, and regularly failing to match means with ends."[17] This failure to attach to a coherent foreign policy resulted in diminishing any real initiatives to resolve humanitarian and ethnic conflict with military intervention. As aforementioned, the failure in Somalia was expensive for the United States not only in terms of human resources lost to the conflict, but also in terms of America's loss of reputation and confidence when it came to dealing with such problems successfully.[18]

> U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has had the appearance of being shaped ad hoc by a myriad of competing and sometimes contradictory objectives. As the United States gropes to find its bearings in the post-Cold War era, one reality remains inescapable: an internationally engaged America is absolutely essential to world stability and security.[19]

The United States role in the international arena as the major super power remained crucial for stability and defense, but without a clear foreign policy strategy its leadership began to shift to other powers in Europe and elsewhere that had initiatives of their own to deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War era.

II.2 9/11 and the End of a New World Order

After the 9/11 attack and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, the war on terrorism made US foreign policy take a new approach. Just as when engaged in the Cold War, the

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[16] Bennis, Before & After, pp. 1-2
[17] Zoellick, "Republican Foreign Policy," p. 67
[18] Ibid, p. 67
[19] Johnston, Foreign Policy into the 21st Century, pp. 3

US found a credible adversary against which it could direct its security policies and a way to rationalize a hardening of foreign policy. The US invaded Iraq practically unilaterally, without any regard to the opinions of its allies and especially without attaining the support of the United Nations through a Security Council resolution.

Fourteen years after the Persian Gulf War, a second confrontation with Iraq provided the much needed opportunity to reassess US foreign policy. Secretary of State Colin Powell argued that "President George W. Bush does have a vision of a better world. And he also has a strategy for translating that vision into reality...the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS)[is]...an integrated strategy that is broad and deep, far ranging and forward looking, attuned as much to opportunities for the United States as to the dangers it faces."[20] But the voices that speak the contrary are many, or as Powell himself acknowledges, "our foreign policy strategy is so often misunderstood by both domestic and foreign observers".

What makes the issue so controversial is the fact that there seem to be—again—so many contradictions in the making and executing of foreign policy; contradictions among the policies pursued in the past as well as contradictions within the current Bush Administration. For instance, the National Security Strategy of the White House, 2002, asserts that "today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the same side." This discourse in itself sounds no different than Bush Senior's vision of a new world order. At the same time, however, the neo-conservatives

[20] Collin L. Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships" (in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004)) URL http://www.foreignaffairs.org)

in George W. Bush's Administration have been criticized because of their disengagement with the international community under the pretext that it may be limiting to their freedom of action.

> Neo-conservatives correctly believe that the United States has a remarkably powerful military. They believe that there has never been a state on earth that has as much relative military power as the Untied States has today. And very importantly, they believe that America can use its power to reshape the world to suit its interests. In short, they believe in big-stick diplomacy, which is why the Bush doctrine privileges military power over diplomacy. [21]

With the NSS and the war against terrorism, the new Bush Doctrine has sought to justify the invasion to Iraq. "The Bush Doctrine identifies three threat agents: terrorist organizations with global reach, weak states that harbor and assist such terrorist organizations, and rogue states (of which) the key attributes are regime aggressiveness and the search for WMD, especially nuclear weapons...This definition of rogue states seems to be modeled on Iraq, although...North Korea...is believed to have already acquired nuclear weapons capacity."[22]

But the application of this doctrine is far from consistent. The prosecution of rogue states seems to have left North Korea behind, and even though Powell argues that the US "still (has) a long way to go in dealing with North Korea's dangerous nuclear weapons program," it has also been stated that the US has "no intention of invading or attacking North Korea...we want peace, not war, and we want security, not fear, to

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[21] John Mearsheimer, Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: realism vesis neo-conservatism, (Open Democracy website, URL http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp) p.1

[22] Jeffrey Record, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq" (in Parameters (Spring, 2003)) URL http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/

envelop the Korean Peninsula and its neighbors."[23] When compared to the Iraqi case, as Record suggests, "The Bush Administration apparently credits North Korea with relatively benign intentions; in the case of Iraq, however, it has come very close to equating capabilities and intentions."

> The Bush Doctrine has sparked great controversy at home and abroad. Some critics see it as further testimony to American unilateralism and arrogance...Still others see the doctrine as simply a construct to justify an attack on Iraq. Proponents of the Bush Doctrine contend that a threat revolution is under way which requires new approaches to using force. The 9/11 tragedy, they argue was a warning of worse...things to come if the United States remains in the reactive posture it assumed during the Cold War.[24]

The alleged actual foreign policy strategy of Bush Jr. according to the NSS document seems to be no different than the previous Bush Administration's idea of international cooperation and conflict resolution: "Above all, the president's strategy is one of partnerships that strongly affirms the vital role of NATO and other U.S. alliances—including the UN."[25] Still, by acting unilaterally and invading Iraq against the international community's wishes, the US seems to be self contradictory yet once again.

Not only has the Bush Administration been unilateral abroad, but domestically we have been witnesses to a strong presidentialism that is by no means new in US foreign policymaking: "…through one administration after another, presidents sought means and methods by which they could be more flexible and agile in dealing with the issues before them…and inspire a faster response from agencies during periods of quiet as well as

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[23] Collin L. Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships" (in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004)) URL http://www.foreignaffairs.org)

[24] Jeffrey Record, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq" (in Parameters (Spring, 2003)) URL http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/

[25] Collin L. Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships" (in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004)) URL http://www.foreignaffairs.org)

crisis. The result is that the history of the security apparatus is studded with examples of ad hoc arrangements created by presidents to get around the very organization created to provide them with the assets to fight the Cold War."[26] This characteristic remains true even now that the Cold War has ended and the era of the War Against Terrorism has begun.

It is not strange that there exist similarities in US foreign policy in the two mentioned periods. "All of Bush's major foreign policy advisers…had earned their political stripes fighting or analyzing the Cold War. That group…[was] a seasoned, experienced team, and they agreed on one fundamental point: that post-Cold War US hegemony on a global scale unprecedented by any previous empire was not only possible, but fitting. They agreed that for the US, might really does make right, that American values, interests and directions were inherently good, simply because they were American.[…] With that broad political agreement, however, there was a serious strategic divide over just how that US domination could best be maintained."[27] The group in question, also referred to as the "hawks", had been long waiting for an opportunity to justify a hardening of US foreign policy and a toughening of national security.

> Powell envisioned a US-dominated international consensus, however artificial or coerced it might be, in whose name US policies could be imposed on the world. On the other side was what the US media quickly dubbed the "Wolfowitz cabal," grouped around the deputy secretary and the semi-official Defense Policy Board made up of hard-line Pentagon hawks. This group saw a unilateral assertion of US power, especially military power, as the first choice option. And their belief in the perks due an unchallenged superpower led to the conviction that the US need pay little attention to the views of its allies.[28]

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[26] Cambone, A New Structure for National Security, p. 44
[27] Bennis, Before & After, pp. 4
[28] Ibid, p. 5

US national security strategy identifies WMD proliferation and terrorism as the foremost threats not just for the US but for the international community. "…the U.S. government also views WMD proliferation as a dominant contemporary threat, believing that 'rogue' state and nonstate actors will show no mercy when and if they have WMD at their disposal. It was precisely according to this rationale that the United States justified the preemptive war against Iraq."[29] And it is through this rationale that the US expects to achieve at least enough international support to further its military interventions. While many have shunned US actions in Iraq, there were US allies like Great Britain, which did collaborate in Bush's "Coalition of the Willing", providing a certain amount of legitimization to US actions, even if they weren't sanctioned by the UN or the Security Council.

Within the United States there exist different points of view on how foreign policy should be conducted. President Bush's detractors consider that "issues of human rights, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and so forth that ought to form the basis of the nation's security policy." His supporters, however, argue that "the end of the Cold War did not alter the nature of man or of nations and states and, therefore, it is the nation's interests—defined in terms of military threats and access to labor, capital, and resources—that ought to animate policy."[30] Even if these two points of view seem to be hard to meld, it is clear that there's still a need to define a credible US foreign policy that provide for both factions as well as for the American citizens. As Johnston expresses, "[it] is nevertheless essential that U.S. foreign policy follow a path consistent with U.S.

[29] Shen , "Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats?," p. 169
[30] Cambone, A New Structure for National Security, p., 3

interests that the American public can both understand and support. The need for consensus, at least on the broader goals, has been made amply clear…"[31]

II.2.1 US Actions and Reactions Post-9/11

For the international community, different views of the threat arose, as expressed on disagreements over the war against Iraq. Even though the 9-11 attack gave the US a legitimate sense of insecurity, there were many who still questioned whether its unilateral actions against the Saddam Hussein Regime where legitimate or not.[32] How ever, for the United States support was expected to come from old alliances, and it was deemed as the only legitimization required to keep going. NATO members had previously aided the US in the military action against the Taliban regime. NATO was considered as "the most reliable strategic asset to respond effectively, not only based on its record in responding to terrorist threats so far…but on its record in responding to other post-Cold War security threats." Just a few years earlier, in 1999 the "Strategic Concept of the Alliance" was approved, redefining NATO's mission to respond to a "broad spectrum of possible threats," making its application as a common defense providing alliance. However, there was some refusal to participate in the Iraq war due to the argument that it was been carried on under the concept of preemption. "This argument confuses the purpose of an alliance as a legitimate agreement among nations on collective defense for an illegitimate one on collective offensive action."[33] Further more:

> International law, however, also prohibits foreign forces from taking such preemptive action against the national sovereignty of a state without UN authorization. Therefore, declaring a war on Iraq on the grounds that it was a state sponsor of terrorism was not only a

[31] Johnston, Foreign Policy into the 21st Century, pp. 3
[32] Shen , "Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats?," p. 166
[33] Ibid, p. 168

> significant departure from the facts but was also illegitimate under international law and in no way obligated NATO members to fighting the war in Iraq because of their professed commitment to combating terrorism.[34]

Therefore, NATO allies such as France and Germany decided not only to refrain from supporting US intervention in Iraq, but publicly disagreed with the United States not only on the war but on the employment of NATO. Their argument was that the alliance provided for defense, not offense, whether it was legitimate or illegitimate, and thus "Operation Iraqui Freedom" was a contradiction to the origin and mission of the alliance itself.[35]

Preemption, as the "anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack" was by no means a new concept, and had been somewhat accepted as legitimate and appropriate under certain circumstances in international law. However, the United States' new National Security Strategy, the term has been broadened enough to include preventive war, which means that "force may be used even without evidence of an imminent attack to ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not 'gather' or grow over time." The NSS has increased preemption's importance and has placed it at the core of current foreign policy.[36]

> Elevating the preemptive option to a policy doctrine can have serious negative consequences. For one, it reinforces the image of the United States as to quick to use military force and to do so outside the bounds of international law and legitimacy…Elevating preemption to the level of a formal doctrine may also increase the administration's inclination to reach for the military lever quickly, when other tools still have a good chance of working.[37]

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[34] Ibid
[35] Ibid, p. 169
[36] Michael O'Hanlon, Et al. "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption" (in The Brookings Institution Policy Brief, (December 2002, No. 113)) p.1
[37] Ibid, p. 2

The Bush Administration, however, argues that "deterrence" as was used during the Cold War against the USSR is useless to stop rogue states and terrorists from developing, buying and using weapons of mass destruction "not as weapons of last resort but as weapons of choice."[38] And even though countries such as Germany and France condemned US actions in Iraq, there was no sustained effort to balance against the United States, because even though the nature of US strategy in the post 9/11 environment is aggressive and engages a huge military capability[39] it is also "highly selective and not broadly threatening."[40]

II.3 Changes in US policy towards Canada after 9/11

Since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, Canada-US relations in terms of defense evolved in a distinct "continental defense relationship" that was thought to be everlasting. Nevertheless, after the 9/11 attacks Canada's position towards the war on terrorism has not been defined completely in terms that the US finds completely acceptable. Canada had been long "investing" on its image as a peacekeeper and had been pursuing since the 1990s a clearly defined "human security" agenda as the center of its foreign policy.

For the Bush Administration human security was useful as long as it gave grounds for military intervention, but by no means more important than national security. Thus, the US government saw the need to demand further actions form the Canadian government on behalf of the war on terrorism. As Bercuson points out, "the post-11 September period

[38] Ibid, p. 3
[39] By 2004, US expenditures ascended to 455.91 billion dollars, which entailed a 3.9% of its GDP, and 41% of the world total. See Annex I and II
[40] Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back" (in International Security (Summer 2005, Vol. 30 No1)) p. 133

saw an immediate upswing in US pressure—in public by the US ambassador to Canada and in private by a wide range of government officials, political leaders, and influential private citizens—on Canada to beef up the Canadian military for both continental defence and offshore operations."[41]

Canada's position is important for the US regardless of the evident decline in Canadian resources, and US policymakers consider that Canada should be ready to support and collaborate with US-led multilateral operations designed to fight the war against terrorism. "Canadian participation in US-led operations overseas lets Washington know that Canada's security concerns extend beyond ensuring that the border remains open for trade. Sending forces overseas tells the American people, and just as importantly the Canadian people, that Canada takes America's global security obligations seriously and sympathizes with the problems and dilemmas that the Untied States faces in seeking to secure its own (and by extension, its allies') interests. While potential Canadian military contributions might not unfairly be described as tokens to the US, they have largely been welcome tokens."[42]

From the moment when the US declared the Global War on Terror the idea of North American defense seemingly returned to Cold War days. The United States became greatly concerned on its northern defenses and its relationship with Canada on terms of deploying strategic defense once again became relevant. Just as against the soviets a

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[41] David Bercuson, "Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September" (in Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, David Carment et al, eds. Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.123

[42] Joseph T. Jockel, and Joel J. Sokolsky, "A New Continental Consensus? The Bush Doctrine, the War on Terrorism and the Future of US-Canada Security Relations " (in Canada Among Nations 2005: Split Images, Cooper, Andrew and Dane Rowlands, Eds. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.) p.71

defense against ballistic missiles was sought, for the defense of the North American territory in the age of terror the Northern Command was created.[43]

However, Canada was not as ready to fully collaborate without questioning US actions as Washington would have liked. Ottawa was not clear about its participation in the missile defense system (NMD) proposed by the US, and later, Prime Minister Paul Martin admitted that the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, which expired in May 2006, was still doubtful. This was in part connected to the historical Canadian need to differentiate themselves from their southern neighbor, as well as to the need to keep an image both domestically and abroad.

> There is some danger in believing that Canada's bilateral defence relationship will be immune to a Canadian decision not to participate in NMD. Canadian co-operation with regard to the non-NMD elements of Homeland Defense is important to the US. However, it is not as important as it was during the Cold War, when Canadian geography provided a significant degree of leverage and influence for Canada on US policy…Canada´s geographic importance has largely diminished with the end of the Cold War. Certainly, Canadian support and participation in co-operation with the US on Homeland Defense would be useful to the United States, but it is not essential, as most of the elements of NMD could be deployed without having to use Canadian geographical assets at all.[44]

Even if Canada had been able in the past to go against the United States on important foreign policy issues such as the anti-landmines treaty or the implementation of the Criminal Court of Justice, American commitment to the war on terror made extremely difficult for their bilateral defense relationship to remain unscathed if Canada decided not to participate in NMD. This would be not because geographically Canada was

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[43] Ibid, p. 72

[44] James Fergusson, "National Missile Defense, Homeland Defense, and Outer Space: Policy Dilemmas in the Canada-US Relationship" (in Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy, Fen Osler Hampson et al, eds. Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.239

indispensable for NMD, but because having its northern neighbor and traditional ally contradicting the US is something that would clearly make Washington react.

The "argument about Canada's irrelevance suggests that anti-Americanism might be an expensive luxury after 11 September. Up until then, it was possible for Canada to parade as the world's great multilateralist, a stance pleasing to a national ego proud of being un-American, while in fact living an existence as a resolutely North American country, increasingly dependent economically and militarily on the United States. The terrorist attacks made the Americans no longer tolerant of lax Canadian security and military policies."[45]

The United States has placed different exigencies and pressures on terrorism issues towards Canada. Anti-terrorism cooperation with Canada has been deep in several levels and involves issues other than common defense, such as border security, and for some still "stands as a model of how the US and another nation can work together on terrorism issues."[46] This relationship has fructified into the creation of the US-Canadian Bilateral Consultative Group on Counterterrorism Cooperation, an organism which helps coordinate counterterrorist efforts and plans ways to intensify cooperation between both countries.

Even before September 11 there had been concern in the US over the presence of terrorists in Canadian ground and the easiness with which they could mover around and cross into the United States; concern which had been somewhat haunting the bilateral relation. By 1998 Canadian government officials had to forcibly admit that the Counter-

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[45] Norman Hillmer, David Carment and Fen Osler Hampson. "Introduction: Is Canada Now Irrelevant?" (in Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, David Carment et al, eds. Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.10

[46] Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2001 URL http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/www.usis.usemb.se/terror/rpt2001/northamerica.html

Terrorism Branch of CSIS had approximately 350 individual terrorist targets.[47] Canada's lax regulations on refugees had also been previously criticized because they contributed to make Canada attractive for terrorist groups.

> Despite all of this information about the extensive presence of international terrorists in Canada, the federal government's response after 11 September was to deny that Canada had a serious problem in this regard which could pose a significant threat to the United States. Ottawa's position in fact was that the notion that our country was a haven for terrorists was a case of urban mythology.[48]

After the 9/11 attacks US security agenda and its war against terrorism became present in all aspects of the North American integration process. One area that was greatly affected was that of the flow of both goods and people between the three countries. Homeland Security Secretary, Tom Ridge, expressed at an event in Mexico City in early 2004, that"[a]ny sovereign country has both the right and the responsibility if it feels it's in peril to monitor and regulate the flow of traffic across the borders."[49] Thus, since 9/11 and with the hardening posture of its southern neighbor, Canada was forced to collaborate in different ways to help the US fight its war against terrorism within the North American Community, while at the same time alleviating its toll on the much needed flow of goods and people of the NAFTA partners.

The flow of goods and people has acquired then a double importance: in terms of economic growth and as a potential mobilization factor for terrorism. The possibilities of terrorist groups tapping into any of these flows to access the US became a grim possibility:

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[47] Martin Collacot, Terrorism, Refugees and Homeland Security (Distinguished Speakers Series in Political Geography, Royal Military College of Canada, 2002) p.1
[48] Ibid, p. 2
[49] Transcript of Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge (AMCHAM-ITAM Event, Mexico City, February 19, 2004) Available On-Line URL http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/texts/et040219Ridge.html

> The North American agenda is shaped by international terrorism. Reports by both the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) have underlined the need for a common and tighter security approach, at least on the home front.[…] Washington's interest in Canada and the border is unmistakable, and sometimes uncomfortably so for Canadians. The administration has, through a variety of private and public channels, been pressing Ottawa hard to spend more on defence. […]More is doubtless coming. The US seems intent on a common North American Security zone covering land, air, sea and even outer space.[50]

For the United States security became the most important topic in the bilateral relationship, but for Canada commerce—and obstacles placed on commerce due to the tightening of the borders—was the issue at sake. In order to keep the goods flowing, Canada had to cooperate with US security measures. The Smart Border Agreement signed with Canada (as well as with Mexico), has specific measures to deal with security in terms of goods and people movement across borders, such as the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology (US-VISIT).

The C-TPAT program seeks to encourage the participation of the private business sector in secure trade issues, which would ensure not just the safety of the final product, but of all the productivity chain by keeping a record of secure businesses under specific security standards. "To date, over 6,500 companies are partnering with CBP. C-TPAT is the largest, most successful government-private sector partnership to arise out of 9-11."[51]

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[50] Hillmer et al, . "Introduction: Is Canada Now Irrelevant?," p. 11

[51] Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism, (U.S. Customs and Border Protection Website) URL http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/cbp.xml

The FAST initiative is closely related to C-TPAT, as it allows for registered C-TPAT businesses' shipments to access lanes at the border crossings where check ups will not be conducted, thus allowing for a "fast" entry into the US, avoiding bottlenecks and delivery delays which generate additional costs. This initiative serves as an incentive for businesses to participate and thus facilitate the verification of shipments before they arrive to the entry port by the use of advance technology such as x-ray machines and GPS tracking devices,[52] but most importantly, it is a useful resource in making shipments secure and terrorist free without hindering trade.

The US has signed an additional agreement with Canada which allows the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to "target, screen and examine rail shipments headed to the U.S.…agencies from Canada and the U.S. have joined together to form fourteen Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET). Covering [the]entire mutual border…these teams are used to target cross-border smuggling…"[53] both initiatives help detect and deter terrorist activities before they get to cross the border.

Despite the achievements made in terms of North American response to terrorism, there are still some who believe that some problems are unavoidable and that there's still a need to undertake stronger policies towards the flow of goods and people. According to these hard-liners, "[a]s long as [US] land borders with Mexico and Canada remain as open as they now are, terrorists can enter the U.S. as easily as any of the hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens who regularly shred…land border security." They also identify

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[52] CSIS Mexico Project U.S.-Mexico Border Security and the Evolving Security Relationship Recommendations for Policymakers: A Report of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Council Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) April 2004

[53] Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism, (U.S. Customs and Border Protection Website) URL http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/cbp.xml

other problems within the internal factors of each country, such as the extensive coastlines that are practically unguarded both in the US and Canada.[54]

At the beginning of the Cold War, Canada designed a foreign policy that helped defend their sovereignty from potential US incursions by guaranteeing that Americans perceived that Canda was performing as much as their financial and military resources would permit to defend North America. It was feared that if Canada did not prove to act sufficiently or failed to act at all would make Washington push their sovereignty away and act on their own, without letting Canadians participate.[55]

In the Post-Cold War era, Canada found a way to carve a special place in the international arena through multilateralism and the promotion of its human security agenda, and the self-confidence obtained helped them stand up against the United States on several issues which contributed to create a series of self-images about Canada that placed them in a different context than their southern neighbor. However, "many of the key self-images built up in Canada—either through a long historical process or through their association with the recent orders—have been challenged and overturned. No longer was it deemed a positive attribute in the post 9/11 context to talk about the longest undefended border with the United States. Nor, in the post-post-Cold War era could Canada depict itself as possessing a special relationship with

[54] Peter K. Nunez "Preventing the Entry of Terrorists into the United States" Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights URL http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/108/nun021304.

[55] Bercuson, "Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September," p. 127

the US."[56] The post 9/11 world brought about changes that returned Canadian policymakers to the uncertainties of dealing with a powerful neighbor committed to an all-out war.

[56] Andrew F. Cooper, and Dave Rowlands, "A State of Disconnects-The Fracturing of Canadian Foreign Policy." In Canada Among Nations 2005: Split Images, (Cooper, Andrew and Dane Rowlands, Eds. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005) p.5