

Chapter I. An Overview of Migration.

Human history has been the history of migration. It is important to start to analyse migration as a *whole* to understand the widespread phenomena. Maurice Davie distinguishes four types of movement viz. migration, to which the terms *invasion*, *conquest*, *colonization*, and *immigration* have been applied. In this study we will only look at immigration because, historically, it is the most recent type of population movement. The author said that this phenomenon was conditioned by the Commercial Revolution which introduced rapid, easy, and inexpensive means of transportation. It may be established as a rule that the volume of immigration is determined, in part, by the cost and the degree of hardship involved in transit. Immigration is a movement of people, individually or in families, acting on their own personal initiative and responsibility; it is conditioned by individual freedom to migrate.¹

Despite the differences in types of migration, in the last analysis all early forms of it have this motive, as Davie says: the insatiable desire to get more land, which is “earth hunger”. Since all means of subsistence are derived ultimately from land, more land has meant better conditions of life, as Maurice Davie said:

The contact of peoples has also furthered cultural development by introducing divergent standards and practices, new ideas and methods, with the selection of those most expedient. Migration has thus been at the very base of the development of the human race and human culture.²

Ethnicity is the origin of *meztisage*³ by the processes of syncretism. Paraphrasing William H. Durham, ethnicity is also a matter of strategy, of the active use of a cultural system or style by its adherents. Ethnicity is both an identity and an instrument. At the same time, it is a statement of cultural membership and a tool or weapon through which members attempt to negotiate improved standing within a social system. Ethnicity flourishes in conflict situations, migrations bring into daily contact two different and unfamiliar cultural systems. As the author says, once the “other” is identified as a “threat,” ethnic identity becomes a logical and strategic response.⁴ By appeal to a common cultural

¹ Maurice Davie, *World Migration. With Special Reference to the United States*. (USA: New York Press, 1949), 1-5.

² *Ibid*, 2.

³ Mixture of people.

⁴ William Durham, “Conflict, Migration and Ethnicity” in Nancie Gonzalez and Carolyn McCommon. *Conflict, Migration, and the Expression of Ethnicity* (London: Westview Press, 1989), 138-140.

heritage, ethnicity helps to legitimise responsive action. As a declaration of cultural difference, it provides an opportunity to accentuate distinctions and promote categorical “we/they” thinking.

Ethnicity also helps to organize a response. From those appeals, as the author said, to salient cultural symbols and parallel historical threats, group leaders can use ethnic affiliation to build social cohesion and allegiance to a cause. However, once unified, activated, and organized via ethnicity, rivals may then appear to be more of a threat; this, of course, may serve to stimulate further response, additional threat, and so on. The potential for feedback is endless.⁵ In this way, the immigration restrictions can provoke a dangerous reactions founded in ethnicity.

Today, the search for a better life is what drives human beings to move. There is a large empirical and theoretical literature on the causes of migration, which cannot be reviewed here. As Fairchild says,

[m]odern immigration is essentially an economic phenomenon. Religious and political causes have played the leading part in the past, and still enter is as contributory factors in many cases. But the one prevailing reason why the immigrant of the to-day leaves his native village is that he is dissatisfied with his economic lot, as compared with what it might be in the new world.⁶

In his analyses, the same author indicates that there are three principal sources from which this stimulation or encouragement to immigration emanates: the transportation companies, the labour agents, and the previous emigrants. Every large flow of migration must have its origin in a few people, who are the first of their region to break ties with their homeland, and who go to seek their fortune in a new land. Their success depends upon whether others from the same district shall follow their steps, and in this way conform to a migration network.⁷ Migration occurs when people’s income disparities are massive at the same time, as movement also becomes a possibility when the pressure to move is intense. Moreover, migration becomes much stronger as unemployment rises.

People do not automatically migrate when income is higher in one place than another, but their desire to migrate depends on comparative wage levels (actual and expected), comparative unemployment rates and unemployment benefits, the availability of

⁵ Ibid, 138-140.

⁶ Pratt Henry Fairchild, *Immigration. A World Movement and its American Significance*. (New York, 1925), 148.

⁷ Ibid, 148-149.

housing, and the cost of migration, which includes travel cost and the psychic cost of leaving one's culture, friends, and relations.⁸ When explaining the causes of international migration, N. Federici proposes that there are differences between population growth and economic development that cause differential "population pressures." That population pressures

refers, in its static meaning, to the relationship between population and economic resources (the 'subsistence level' of classic economic theories); and in its dynamic sense, the relationship between rate of population increase and rate of economic development. Two different territories with diverse numerical values in this relationship will present an imbalance which may be considered the cause of population transfer.⁹

In this way, international labour movements are often explained in the context of unequal wage zones within global division of labour, which are replicated within economic sectors and throughout labour markets. That means a market segmentation that provokes a population transfer from the zones under higher population pressure or lower wage towards one with lower demographic pressure and higher wage.

This explanation is similar to the 'Economic Maximization Theory', postulated by De Jong, which says "difference in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are postulated to be the main cause of migration."¹⁰ This theory also pays attention to the relation between wage difference and migration increase. In his chapter about the motivations for migration De Jong appoints many motives, models and theories that try to find a reason why people move. For example, the economic motive for migration is individual cost-benefit calculation, as migration is seen as a personal investment. In addition, the social mobility migration motive is where aspirations of higher social status are the principal motive to move.¹¹

There is another theory of the dynamic migration networks suggested by Douglas Massey where size of migration flows between two countries does not have a strong relation with differences in wage or in unemployment rates. They have a stronger relation with the networks made by the precedent migrants, by the elaboration of networks

⁸ Richard Layard, *East-West Migration. The Alternatives*. (London: England, 1992), 21.

⁹ Federici, 'Causes of International Migration' in Appleyard, Reginald. *The Impact of International Migration on Developing Countries*. (Paris: OECD, 1987), 48-49.

¹⁰ Gordon De Jong, "Motivation for Migration: An Assessment and a Value-Expectancy Research Model" in Gordon De Jong, *Migration Decision Making*. (USA: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981), 22.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 23-24.

migrations becomes independent from the factors that they originate in the beginning. Migration networks can be defined as sets of interpersonal relations that link migrants or returned migrants with relatives, friends or fellow countrymen at home.¹² With the network they convey information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and give support in various forms. In so doing, they reduce the cost of migration and facilitate it. Massey also suggests that these networks tend to grow ever larger and denser, as every move constitutes a resource for those who stay back, and facilitate further moves, which in turn widen the networks and the probability of their expansion.

In this chapter of this study, we are looking to understand migration as a phenomenon, therefore, we will not attempt to deeply comprehend the cause of migration but to be aware of the

clear need to view migration as a function of multiple motives. Even where economic motives are dominant, they do not reflect the total context of the decision to move; they may also be quite inadequate for distinguishing movers from stayers. As noted by Pryor (1975a: 5) “There is a danger in assuming that migration is always economically purposive behavior, and while relating migration to economic variables in macro-studies, overlooking the significant proportion of migrants who move for social, idiosyncratic and particularly multiply reasons”¹³

This study captures that for the most part, motivations for migration are economic, and therefore, it is on these that we will focus. We will also see that economic motivations are also the most related to the hypothesis.

Linda Bach explains that a migration community is rendered “transnational” by the process through which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. She calls these processes ‘transnationalism’ to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. She calls “transmigrants” those immigrants who develop and maintain multiple, familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political relationships that span borders.¹⁴ For those immigrants an essential element of transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies.

¹² Quoted by Graciela Malgesini, *Cruzando Fronteras. Migraciones en el Sistema Mundial*. (Barcelona: Fundación Hogar del Empleado, 1998), 26.

¹³ Gordon De Jong, *Migration Decision Making*. (USA: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981), 16-17.

¹⁴ Linda Bach, *Nations Unbound. Transnational Project Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation -States*. (Luxembourg: Gordon and Breach Science Publisher, 1990), 7.

It is interesting to point out that Linda Bach said that *new* diasporas and consequential identities of migrant populations continue to be rooted in nation-states, and as part of this “reinscription of space”, both the political leaderships of sending nations and immigrants from these nations are coming to perceive these states as “deterritorialized.” In contrast to the past, when nation states were defined in terms of people sharing a common culture within a bounded territory, this new concept of nation-state includes as citizens those who live physically dispersed within the boundaries of many other states, but who remain socially, politically, culturally, and economically part of it.¹⁵ This new concept of transmigrants is interesting because migrants find themselves part of the host societies but do not break ties with home. Such migration could act slowly in reducing the income gap, by remittances and skill transfer to homeland.

Fairchild, in a chapter about the problem of assimilation, said that in order to avoid this confrontation the governments have tried to adopt politics of assimilation as the “melting pot”, that is an act or process of conformity or bringing one identity. In other words, the act or process of making or becoming like or identical, is the process by which the state wants a homogenisation of their population.¹⁶ *The problem comes, however, when the complete assimilation involves identity.* Other states uses the term of integration, which respects the identity of origin, but the states, do not prefer this one because in the long term it can cause hostilities by the difference. It is for that reason that this transformation, in assimilation direction, is fundamental in the acceptance of the immigrants. Fairchild said:

Races can be mixed or blended, but nationalities will not mix. This was the great fallacy in the figure of the melting pot. The qualities of nationality are virtually absolute. They must be one thing or the other. There is no such thing as composite language, a blended religion, or a mixed moral code. True, language may borrow from each other, religions may import foreign dogmas or forms, and moral codes may be influenced each other. But one form or type always remains dominant.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibid, 8.

¹⁶ Pratt Henry Fairchild, *Immigration. A World Movement and its American Significance.* (New York, 1925), 408-412.

¹⁷ Ibid, 412.

For that reason when national qualities or ethnic identity of immigrants remains dominant, common cultural heritage becomes an obstacle for assimilation. We can point out another view over assimilation

[a]ccording to the most important social theorist of the 1920s, Professor Robert E. Park of Chicago, all interethnic relations go through an invariable and irreversible four-stage succession of contact, competition, accommodation, and assimilation.¹⁸

This is a different view because in the end it gives more space to assimilation but it is too global. Gordon suggests the follow stages of assimilation:

Cultural assimilation; the acceptance of the dominant culture
Marital assimilation; interracial marriage occurring in large numbers
Prejudice-free assimilation; the disappearance of belief in racial or ethnic superiority.
The final stage of assimilation, according to Gordon, is civic assimilation, which occurs when special racial or ethnic demands or interests disappear.¹⁹

This model is more realistic, but the last stage is too difficult for the real world. Another case, that limits assimilation, is when migrants become only “members” rather than “citizens,” because being a member of a society and having the moral claims of a member is not dependent upon having the formal status of a citizen. Indeed, one of the ways through which any state may act unjustly is by denying citizenship to people who are members of it. This form of acting limits the assimilation and integration intentions to which the state pretends, and can produce an overreaction on the part of immigrants based on common cultural heritage. The problem of assimilation is more profound in that it involves a liberal precept of universalism, that means a certain homogenisation; the true liberal spirit I propose needs to be founded in cosmopolitan perspective, that means to respect the individuality of culture.

I.I. Migration Typology

¹⁸ William Petersen, *Concepts of Ethnicity*. (USA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 13.

¹⁹ Carter A Wilson, *Racism. From Slavery to Advanced Capitalism*. (USA: Sage Publication, 1996), 2.

Appleyard made a classification of different types of migrants: refugees, contract labour migration, transient professional workers and illegal and undocumented migration.²⁰ The first has been the refugees,

narrowly defined in international law, is a person with a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, who is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to return. The term is often popularly understood in far broader terms, however, encompassing persons fleeing war, civil strife, famine, and environmental disasters. [...] Although the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution," the meaning of "to enjoy" is rather vague. Governments grant asylum; individuals "enjoy" it. The refugee's right to enjoy asylum is therefore limited by the willingness of the government to proffer it. So, although states are prohibited under international law from *returning* refugees to persecution, they are not required to take them in. A UN conference convened in 1977 to draft a Convention on Territorial Asylum that would require states to provide asylum to refugees failed. Instead, it came up with a declaration that states "shall endeavor" to grant asylum on their territory to eligible persons.²¹

Many migrants have been asylum seekers, claiming in face of foreign governments or embassy to be refugees. Curiously, as Appleyard points out, the main flows of refugees since World War II have been between developing countries. He exposes us to the main inflows, for example in the Partition of India and Pakistan, almost 7 million Hindus moved from Pakistan to India, and nearly the same number of Moslems moved from the opposite direction; and 60,000 Tibetans moved to India. 4 million South Koreans moved to North Korea during the 1950s. In Africa, there was an approximate inflow of 5 million in 1987.²² Today the statistics have not changed radically, but they have suffered a diminution, that means that there are less asylum seekers or that there has been augmentation in the rejection of refugees.

²⁰ Reginald Appleyard, *The Impact of International Migration on Developing Countries*. (Paris: OECD, 1987), 27-33.

²¹ U.S. Committee for Refugees: Evolution of the Term 'Refugee' available from http://www.refugees.org/news/fact_sheets/refugee_definition.htm

²² Reginald Appleyard, *The Impact of International Migration on Developing Countries*. (Paris: OECD, 1987), 27.

Table 1.

Estimated Number of Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR - 1st Jan 2004	
Asia	6,187,800
Africa	4,285,100
Europe	4,268,000
Latin America & Caribbean	1,316,400
Northern America	962,000
Oceania	74,100
TOTAL	17,093,400

Source: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees available in <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics>

The second type of migrant that Appleyard distinguished is the contract labour migration, which his main characteristic in that is only temporary. One of the major examples, as he points out, was the flow of labour from Southern to Northern Europe in the post-war period when the labour scarcity prevented economic growth. He explains as follow:

This flow can be largely explained by the economic evolution hypothesis [...]: workers from countries with lower per capita incomes and rates of economic growth responded to opportunities for employment provided by labor-short countries at higher levels of economic development.²³

Indeed, he said that “[t]here is a general consensus among the scholars of international migration that administering a successful guest-worker programme is an elusive goal.”²⁴ It obviously results in the fact that many countries prefer to adopt such policies, in this way they avoid the difficult application of assimilation or integration policies and resolve the labour shortage. It involves the application of selective emigration from the part of the receiving countries, provoking an impact in the structure of family relations. Appleyard explains, for example, that in the nucleus of families it suffers a pressure by the absence of a male over long periods, and in other cases when women emigrate, the loss to the rural sector where they are an important part of the production represents a loss in rural production.²⁵

²³ Reginald Appleyard, *The Impact of International Migration on Developing Countries*. (Paris: OECD, 1987), 28.

²⁴ Reginald Appleyard, *The Impact of International Migration on Developing Countries*. (Paris: OECD, 1987), 28.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 32.

Transient professional workers are another kind of migrant, as Appleyard mentioned they are characterized by their highly-skilled or professional profile that is required by their employers. The same author points out that this migration is not too important in number, but that it represents an important transfer of technology, which is reflected in the way of improving skill levels and rates of economic growth.²⁶ Castles also mention this kind of migration, and he point out that they “move within the internal labour markets of transnational corporations and international organizations[...] Many countries welcome such migrants and have special ‘skilled and business migration’ programmes to encourage them to come.”²⁷ In this way we can related this kind of migration to the concept of ‘brain drain’. That involves a selective emigration that can affect the sending countries by creating gaps in determinate sector activities. Nevertheless, there is always the hope of return, and contribute with the skilled acquired to the development of homeland country. If there is one constant in the history of migrations, however, it is that many temporary stays become permanent.

The last and one of the most important kinds of migration for this thesis is illegal and undocumented migration because it represents the contradiction to liberal principles that in theory governments adopt. In practice they adopt restriction policies that they be tolerant with illegal immigrants because this implies economic benefit. This means the acceptance by the national governments of an underground economy where the political rights are questionably respected. Undocumented or irregular migration usually eludes statistical accounting. Obviously, “[u]ndocumented migration is an inherent effect of any type of restrictive immigration policy.”²⁸ In response, many governments think it can be controlled in the same way as it is restricted. But only an overview of illegal migrants can tell us that hardness restrictions can not make much difference. Tapinos tells us that apart from those who enter illegally to the country there are others who enter legally, overstay, take employment and become illegal migrants.²⁹ He distinguishes that when the asylum

²⁶ Ibid, 32.

²⁷ Stephen Castles, “International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Global Trends and Issues”, *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 52 Issue 165(Sep2000), 270.

²⁸ Stöbbe Holk, *Undocumented Migration in the USA and Germany: Undocumented Migration in the USA and Germany*. Working Paper, February, 2000(University of California), 5: available in <http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg4.PDF>

²⁹ Georges Tapinos, “Illegal immigrants and the labour market.” *OECD Observer*: available in <http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid=190>

seekers were refused or the seasonal workers stayed after their contract finished they become illegal migrants. Tapinos coincides with Holk in that

Where illegal migration begins and ends is a matter for each sovereign state to define. And it is through the rule of law – with its gaps – that the state imposes restrictions on entering and leaving a country, and establishes the legal conditions governing access to the labour market. There can be no such thing as illegal immigration unless restrictions and a degree of tolerance exist simultaneously.³⁰

It is what happens in the real world, that is a contradiction, a paradox, and is in the same time a restriction and a degree of tolerance that cannot exist in coherence. The aptitude of the governments not only becomes incoherent; when they refuse to accept that the clandestine migrants have become a significant component of the work force; but also hypocritical because they overlap the employer's privileges that oppress the illegal migrants. Employers will benefit from the desperate figures of the illegal migrants who will accept poor pay, below local norms and the employers will not need to pay the welfare contribution to the state. Illegal workers are vulnerable to exploitation and deportation.

As Castles points out “immigration countries tacitly permit such migration since it allows mobilization of labour in response to employer demands without social cost or measures for protection of migrants.”³¹ We can support that national economies benefit from the illegal workers as in the case of the United States as we can see in the article “The Value of Undocumented Workers.”³² Where there is recognition of illegal workers in the support of current rate of production there is also a proposal to create a new legalization program, nearly half of all undocumented workers could be eligible for legal status. One of the reasons could be that

[s]urprisingly, The Urban Institute also found that undocumented immigrants contributed a national total of \$2.7 billion to Social Security and another \$168 million to unemployment insurance taxes, both programs they will be unable to access because of their legal status.³³

The agriculture sector estimates that it will require approximately a half a million workers over the next decade to maintain its current rate of production³⁴, if the United States do not want to stay in the paradox or continue to be incoherent they need to adopt it.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Stephen Castles, “International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Global Trends and Issues”, *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 52 Issue 165(Sep2000), 270.

³² “The Value of Undocumented Workers.” *The American Immigration Law Foundation*: available in http://www.aifl.org/ipc/policy_reports_2002_value.asp

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

In the same way many other governments need to accept that the illegal migrants contribute to their underground economies, but they can change in a way where national governments can be more coherent with their own liberal predicaments. Perhaps in accepting transient migrants under special programs, they can resolve the paradox. Illegal migration is an evil since it produces a class of unassimilated migrants and hostility among nationals, an even greater evil is the government who produces it. In this context, also the second paradox emerge, the contradiction between the market and the rights based in liberal principles.

There are other authors that made many other classifications over migrants and migration; making typologies. De Jong makes a review of different typologies as made by Gould and Prothero, which can be the rural-urban spatial relationship, and time spans of mobility (circular or more permanent migration).³⁵ Others like J.M. Nelson whose basic categories were: “seasonal migrants, sporadic short-term migrants, target migrants, cyclic migrants, working-life migrants, and permanent migrants and for each one different motivation may be adduced.”³⁶ In general, such typologies centres in subject such as

boundaries crossed (internal-external), areal units involved (communities, countries, states, nations, cultures), time (permanent-temporary), numbers invoved (individuals, groups), the distance (short, long) and other based on their social organization, the political climate for migration (voluntary or involuntary), and the socio economic causes.³⁷

Through those typologies the migration phenomena tries to find a pattern of migration causes.

There is another important type of migration; the return migration. Demetrios Papademetrio points out that

³⁵ Gordon De Jong, *Migration Decision Making*. (USA: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981), 15.

³⁶ Ibid, 16.

³⁷ Ibid, 16-17.

Unplanned returns- such as those associated with mass expulsion, changes in immigration laws, plant closing, or protracted economic recession in the host society- are the least likely to lead to lasting positive consequences for the migrant, his or her household, and the broader community. Voluntary returns after relatively short periods abroad, motivated by family considerations and/or the inability to the new environment, are also likely to be largely inconsequential to home country. It is thus the long-term and more successful migrants, who choose to return for a combination of reasons- including special repatriation inducements and programs and success in reaching human capital enhancement and savings' goals abroad, and/or investment goals at home- that carry the greatest potential for personal success upon return and possible community and larger social gains.³⁸

In this manner, return migration contributes to the development of the sending country, as they bring with them capital, skills and experience useful for economic development and it helps as a factor against brain drain, firstly because valued, educated people come back, and secondly, with development that implies better conditions the emigration can be broken in some measure. Return migration also implies a technological transfer and skill transfer that support a development in the sending country. All these tell us that it can work as a medium to the equalization of the income in the long run.

In a global panorama, Kritz points out that,

[t]he rapidly increasing international movement of people, accompanied by rising flows of capital and goods, has been facilitated by technological advances in communication and transportation and by the growing number and scale of transnational institutions which organize production, co-operation, and exchange across countries. Underlying those transnational exchanges and interactions are a range of political systems and disharmonious levels, rates, and strategies of economic and demographic growth that encourage people to migrate. In the context of an increasingly interconnected world, international population movements can naturally be seen as complements to other flows and exchanges taking place between countries. Indeed, international migration does not occur randomly but takes place usually between countries that have close historical, cultural, or economic ties. Moreover, migrants are increasingly moving due to networks of earlier migrants, labor recruiters, corporations, travel agents, or even development agencies.³⁹

It is possible to find support to the first paradox of our hypothesis. In one way, that international migration is interconnected to international inflows of all sorts across the borders and that those exchanges encourage people to migrate; and in another way, migration complements other flows and exchanges creating a circle that will not stop no matter how hard the restrictions that are imposed by the states are.

Migrations are not random, and we can find remarkable systematic approaches to the study of international migration that Mary Kriz and Hania Zlotnik made to locate all the variables. They propose that as a minimum a migration system needs to include at least two

³⁸Demetrios Papademetriou G., *Reflections on the Relationship between Migration and Development*. Paper for the seminar on International Migration and Development in Central America, Mexico City, May 21 -22, 1998, 11.

³⁹Mary Kritz and Lin Lean. *International Migration Systems*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 1-2.

countries, but ideally, one must include all countries linked by large migration flows. Such flows occur within a national context whose policy, as well as economic, technological, and social dimensions are constantly changing, partly in response to the feedbacks and adjustments that stem from migration flow itself. Furthermore, population exchange works in both directions. Not only are there permanent immigrants, but the most diverse exchanges are those of short-term movements. As Mary Kriz and Hania Zlotnik say, countries with higher wages and better welfare conditions are usually at the receiving end of substantial migrant inflows, be they for permanent settlement, temporary work abroad, or asylum. Sending countries are generally characterized by lower wages and poorer welfare conditions.

They also point out that increasingly, labour markets may be expanding beyond the boundaries of the nation state, with both companies and governments looking for qualified employees. In addition, thanks to the demographic shortages, unskilled labour is required. Migration policies of industrial democracies have themselves contributed to the evolution of migration systems by giving priority to close family ties in selecting migrants for admission. In consequence, they have formed the pattern of a migration chain.⁴⁰ This expansion of the labour markets and their demands explains the actual immigration.

We must say that state position toward migration has not always been the same. For example, during the mercantilist era, under conditions of slow population growth, states competed for labour. Thus, they imposed strict prohibitions on emigration to prevent population loss and they engaged in rapacious procurement of population from other states. Emigrations to the colonies were encouraged, but competition for labour by the colonies with the metropole was not.⁴¹

In the century, between 1820 and 1924, the United States received 36 million aliens from Europe and about 70 percent stayed in new communities overseas in the new land. This exchange was provoked by the transfer from the agricultural economy to the industrial and more global and interconnected nation's economies and also by the rise of agricultural

⁴⁰ Ibid, 3-4.

⁴¹ See Pratt Henry Fairchild, *Immigration. A World Movement and its American Significance*. (New York, 1925), 30-67 and Standing, Guy. *Population Mobility and Productive Relations*. (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1984), 14-16.

productivity by new techniques, which was indispensable for economic growth.⁴² So the redistribution of labour across the Atlantic changed “[t]he movement of population and capital from countries where they were relative abundant to countries where they relative scarce was a necessary condition of expansion of international economy.”⁴³

Hollifield, tells us that the Great Depression was the event that provoked the first wave of international labour migration between the 1920s and 1930s. Surely, the end of *Pax Britannica* that was marked by the collapse of the international economic order was what provoked the emigration of the workers. In the post-World War period under a new world order the second wave of international migration took place, which began as an emigration of refugees from Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1950’s the emergence of the Cold War stimulated the South-North migration.⁴⁴ In 1995 there were approximately 125 million migrants, of those some 25 million were contract workers outside their homelands, over one million short-term skilled and professional workers, 22 millions of refugees, 4 million returnees and 3.5 million others of concern and 5.4 asylum seekers. The problem is that the number of illegal migrants, especially those in developing countries is particularly difficult to assess but it is estimated that around 30 million are in a clandestine situation.⁴⁵

International migration is expected to remain high during the 21st century. For example according to the ILO’s estimates and projections, into the two decades from 1990 to 2010, the economically-active population of less developed world increased by 41.2percent, or some 733 million people. By comparison, the economically-active population of more developed countries increased by only 8.6% or 50 million people.⁴⁶ Other calculations project an increase in the world population to approximately 9 billion by 2050, to include some 230 million migrants.

⁴² Thomas Brinley, *International Migration and Economic Development*. (Italy: UNESCO, 1960), 9.

⁴³ Ibid, 10.


⁴⁴ F. James Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States*. (USA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 30.

⁴⁵ UN, *Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, Aid and Migration*. (Geneva: UN Press, 1996), 5.

⁴⁶ Sharon Stanton, *International Migration and International Trade*. World Bank Discussion Papers, 160, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., (May 1992), 6.

Table 2.

World Population – Non-Migrants and Migrants (Stock Figures), 1965-2050



Source: United Nations Population Division (2002), IOM (2000), MPRP calculations. In *World Migration 2003* (Switzerland: IOM, International Organization for Migration, 2003), 5.

Conflicts are generating millions of refugees and displaced persons. Those are pressures inducing increasing potential for international migrations. The more developed regions are expected to continue being net receivers of international migrants, with an average gain of about 2 million per year over the next 50 years.⁴⁷ Today, many developed countries already rely on international migration for their modest population growth. Although fertility may rebound in the coming decades, few believe that fertility in most developed countries will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Because of their very low fertility, international migration has a significant impact on population growth in the more developed regions.

Most affluent countries including the United States, Canada, Japan and most of the countries of Western Europe will face serious labour shortages, particularly shortages in skilled labour, over the next few decades.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the populations of the Central American and the Malghrebian countries are growing very rapidly, and face high levels of poverty and unemployment and very limited economic opportunities. A consequence of this can be encouraged emigration. The probable situation is one in which

⁴⁷ Joseph Chamie, *World Population in the 21st Century* (Brazil: United Nations, 2001), 23.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 24.

the interests of citizens of the rich countries and the perspectives of immigrants from the poor ones appear to coincide. Both can benefit from immigration.

Of all the demographic processes, immigration is perhaps the process most capable of making an impact on a nation's economic and social structure. As Fairchild says,

[o]ne of the commonest errors of the writes on sociological topics is to allow too little time for the action of social forces. We are inclined to think that the effects of a certain social phenomenon, which we are able to detect in our lifetime. Are the permanent and final effects. We forget that these matters may require many generations to work themselves out.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Pratt Henry Fairchild, *Immigration. A World Movement and its American Significance*. (New York, 1925), 166.