CHAPTER 2

Global Citizenship and the Democratic Process for Constructing ‘Global’ Political Boundaries

Today’s globalisation is not a gradual emergence of a world society under the leadership of interstate politics, but is a highly contradictory and highly fragmented process in which politics has lost its leading role.¹

The idea of a bounded nation-state community appears problematic within the context of a heightened globalised world, particularly with the concept of the nation-state community at the evidence of the increasing porosity of national borders. This is relevant to IR theory, especially when traditional concepts of citizenship and sovereignty have come under pressure from the combined challenge of globalisation and subnational politics.² It is also worth lending attention since spatial outlines (in other words, boundaries) of the political community—as IR theory has traced mainly around the confines of the nation-state—have been de facto transformed. For example, these transformations are seen as transnational and global movements such as social interactions, the cutting edge of communication and technology, transnational migration, asylees’ and refugees’ movements, or even the role of global civil society on addressing diverse global issues. These have also fostered interconnections between individuals and other political spaces which are not exclusively enclosed in the nation-state. The question takes its form not only in the awareness of these transformations but where and how political ‘borders’ are to be established. This stems from my central hypothesis: citizenship may be practiced and envisioned in different

political spaces that can diverge from that of the nation-state. Social, political and economic interactions and exchanges have taken predominance in the citizenship debate that may require re-definition, or at least analytical revision, of how the borders of the political community are to be set up.

The notion of global citizenship is directly entrenched in how political boundaries are defined, responding in the process to conflicting notions of the good and, therefore, the legitimacy of delimiting political boundaries. It is my hope in this chapter to shed some light on how global citizenship is defined through the construction of de-territorialised-democratic political boundaries. I argue that global citizenship requires a political community to be performed—and to the extent this exists it is defined by the sense of commonality and pursuit of the common good are relevant to define the limits of citizenship. However, the concept of global citizenship—as developed in the mainstream of liberal cosmopolitanism—may entail practical deficiencies on democratic practice and politics which may lead to problems in constructing meaningful political boundaries. A plausible view of global citizenship, therefore, could only be imagined and performed, I contend, through democratic processes of political delimitation of existing de-territorialised polities. Several theoretical approaches in IR have been developed to bring possible answers of the question on how political boundaries are to be re-defined.3 Nevertheless, I

will concentrate on moral and democratic cosmopolitanism and the model of deliberative democracy to give the scope that a functional view of global citizenship requires. I claim here that this rests fundamentally on the concept of ‘global' as all-inclusive participation at multi-level scales, in contrast with, predominantly, the modern liberal notion of political community.

I first address the notion of the modern-liberal community, its boundedness nature in the nation-state as national sovereignty, its relation with democracy and why these have been altered by global transformations—as these elements are crucial for conceiving global citizenship in political communities other than the nation-state. Moral and democratic cosmopolitan approaches are posited next as the predominant theoretical grounds on which recent concepts of global citizenship have been built. I then launch a central argument of this thesis that the approach of liberal cosmopolitanism is neither fully theoretically adequate nor ethically appropriate to address global citizenship, since it seems to lengthen the thin idea of modern liberal citizenship envisioned at a global scale. As cosmopolitanism is still a form of thin citizenship—as passive and sometimes dispiriting—it may therefore also find it difficult to appeal to or even motivate practice of global citizenship. I present instead a deliberative democratic approach that I argue fills many of the gaps that moral and democratic cosmopolitanism fails to pad out in the construction of a plausible concept and practice of global citizenship. I finally articulate some elements of moral and democratic cosmopolitanism, and from the model of deliberative democracy, to set up the kind of democratic practices that can influence how we can construct the boundaries of a more plausible view of global citizenship. This can be accomplished by showing how a view of global popular sovereignty reinforces the persuasiveness of this notion of global citizenship.
1. Re-assessing the Modern-Liberal Notion of Political Community

The political community and its relation to national sovereignty (or national self-determination) and individual autonomy (as individual basic rights) are central questions of modern-liberal political theory on the nature of the political community. The concept of community within this line considers aspects such as political development, stability, democratic state-building, public participation, and their relation to the inclusion-exclusion of various groups regarding the equality of rights and obligations. This vision of political community differs from other active communities in that its legitimate authority makes the most binding and inclusive decisions, generally, for a given territory. Here it makes sense to return to some of the positions reviewed in chapter one. In the foundations of modern-liberal thought, Locke presented the social contract as a means to liberty under a government whose sovereignty rested on its fulfilment of a mandate to protect the life, liberty, and property of its subjects. He introduced the classic liberal vision of the political community, or the ‘commonwealth,’ which consisted of ‘civil society’ composed of citizens as propertied rights holders. The government, in Locke’s view, was the representation of legitimacy which depends on its fulfilment of the purpose of the political community (commonwealth) and whose main rationale consists on the protection of individual rights: life, liberty, and property. But it also founded the notion of the political community embedded in a particular territory for the liberal theory to develop, in the 19th century, the principle of national self-determination under the control of legitimate government.

The nation became the ‘unitary’ body in which sovereignty resided, and nationalism aimed “to overcome local ethno-cultural diversity and to produce standardised citizens whose loyalties to the nation [and its state] would be unchallenged by extra-societal allegiances.”7 The modern state thus became the focal arena for political participation through the core institutions of the state in order to attain their own objectives.8 The state integrated society into the limits of the nation-state rather than the local, regional, transnational or other political spaces to shape society according to its own objectives. The components of sovereignty, democracy and legitimacy remain embedded, in this vision, within the territory of the nation-state. The demos, or the citizenry, were defined as the sum of legally equal citizens and, therefore, the formation of the concept of ‘popular sovereignty’ in which the individual is enabled to exercise her or his capacity for self-rule. In this form, democracy was founded on the assumption of the capacity of individuals as citizens to govern themselves who determine their collective life. In sum, the liberal conceptualization of ‘popular sovereignty’ was centred in the relation between the notion of self-determination as the capacity of the individual to govern herself or himself, and the capacity of individuals as citizens to govern themselves as a political community.

In order to accomplish individual and popular sovereignty, democratic rule is to be exercised in the sovereign, territorial nation-state. For Bhikhu Parekh the nation-state is constituted in terms of six characteristics.

First, it should be territorially distinct, possess a single source of sovereignty, and enjoy legally unlimited authority within its boundary. Second, it should rest on a single set of constitutional principles and exhibit a singular and unambiguous identity... Third ... [it] represents a homogeneous legal space within which its members move about freely, carrying with them a more or less identical basket of rights and obligations. Fourth ... all citizens are directly and identically related to

the state, not differentially or through their membership of intermediate communities. Fifth, members of the state are deemed to constitute a single and united people . . . Sixth and finally, if the state is federally constituted, its component units should all enjoy the same rights and powers.  

Here Parekh conflates the state into a unitary institutional concept that gives us the idea of how the political community is bounded into the territory of the nation-state. We may identify some problems that modern-liberal notion of citizenship may entail. Two aspects that this notion denotes are worth distinguishing: first, political communities are exclusive communities constituted by a *demos* and are held together by a common bond—a kind of commonality that distinguish its members from the non-members. Second, it implies a demarcated territorial space in which citizens, the members of the *demos*, pursue and further their affairs to common purposes, and whose boundaries are predominantly envisioned within the space of the nation-state. This concept implies a sense of exclusive membership from a bordered space, as Rawls argues. It entails a life-long political membership and this to be what distinguishes the citizen as the member and the ‘other’ as a non-member of that particular community.

[A] democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed . . . in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death . . . Thus, we are not seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life.  

Rawls gives a model of a closed society and gives no conditions for new members for entry or exit into the political community. He assumed that the state-centric model would continue to be so – as closed and with well-guarded borders. Further, Rawls assimilates the global perspective into his theory of justice and formulates citizenship,  

10 These may be of security, welfare, stability, reinforcing national identity.  
within the global context, as an extension of the role of ordinary citizens within a liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{12} He therefore still views \textit{the law of peoples} to be exercised within a national setting.

An important role of a people’s government, however arbitrary a society’s boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to be the representative and effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and its environment integrity, as well as for the size of their population.\textsuperscript{13}

Rawls does not involve, or attempt to consider, the normative qualifications of ingoing or outgoing individuals and their membership into the political community. This results in a fictional perspective of allegedly hermetic liberal societies which may not correspond to reality but may rather cause problems for conceiving citizenship out of the national borders.

On one hand, the problem deriving from the modern-liberal idea of citizenship lies in the question of where the boundaries of the political community start or end in reality, and especially whether citizenship is conceived or not as by the membership of a political community centred in the nation-state and only within which this political space citizenship can be performed. On the other hand, the thin vision of modern-liberal citizenship in the passive principle of birth, in both \textit{ius sanguinis} and \textit{ius soli}, encounters potential problems from the democratic point of view. It undermines the democratic premises of active participation in political decision-making. And, in terms of space, it does not consider that citizenship could be performed in multilayered arenas different from that of the nation-state.

What can, therefore, be concluded at this point is that citizenship—as the exclusive form of belonging in modern polities demarcating their citizenry in a territorial basis—represents an endogenous and passive concept which may well turn out to be inappropriate

to cope with global transformations that challenge national political allegiance of citizens. It brings, in this way, theoretical and practical problems with regard to the liberal principle of individual and collective self-determination in the construction of legitimate political boundaries. These problems are translated to the constitutive dilemma between sovereign self-determination and the principles of human rights in the practice of extra-territorial political membership. Instead, contemporary theoretical approaches—I analyse moral and democratic cosmopolitanism and deliberative democracy—can be used as alternatives that bring possible views on how citizenship should or should be not delimited and how political boundaries are viewed or constructed.

2. The Cosmopolitan Moral and Democratic Global Citizenship

The idea of a bounded community specifically limited to the nation-state, as mentioned before, appears problematic within the context of an increasingly globalised world. We need to make clear first what globalisation can potentially affect in the process of building political boundaries. If globalisation is seen to reinforce individualistic and instrumentalist ethos, especially in a neoliberal fashion, globalisation in this form may undermine the notion of collectivism and democracy that underpins the political community. This is particularly the case of global capitalism, which creates jurisdictional spaces over and beyond democratic controls – as new forms of “multinational zones of sovereignty” in the form to attract global capital.\(^\text{14}\) Robert Nozick is one proponent who advocates, or perhaps justifies the implications of, global economic and social freedom without barriers at the right extreme of moral libertarianism.\(^\text{15}\) Processes of globalisation may obliterate

---


boundaries if seen as uncontrolled phenomena. The elements I want to highlight here, therefore, are the essential components to consider in building (or transferring) the notion of a political community, even within a context of intense globalisation. These are the sense of collectivities which are bound together by common bonds and which participation is based on shared practices so as to constitute and delimit the good which may be contested by all.

The formation of political communities in the context of globalisation is possible, despite the conflicting notions of the good where they may be derived. In this sense, globalisation is characterised of heightened differences from more complex societies but rather than dividing them it, can also foster unity. However, it is necessary to conceive, in this context, the collective identification and membership that the community presupposes—who is part of it and who is not, who participates in the community affairs and who does not. If this assumption is true, political communities need boundaries or frontiers of some sort but they do not necessarily have to be nation-state ones.

The process of setting boundaries is, at the same time, for delimiting and separating the members of the community from others. Mouffe explains that the political community implies collective identification and membership, membership in and identification with the ‘common,’ which necessarily involves distinguishing a ‘them,’ “a difference which both conditions the emergence of the collectivity and concretizes its commonality.”\(^\text{16}\) It also involves a bond, a consciousness of collectivity which holds the members of the community together. This bond entails a notion of the good, in contrast with the individual will and pursuit of private interests as in the Lockean sense, which can be theorised as a

horizon within which members of the community inscribe their demands.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, if we consider that as a democratic practice, citizenship as well, requires a delimited political community: a \textit{demos}. And, if we see that boundaries are challenged by globalisation, then globalisation also challenges the boundaries within which democracy and citizenship are practiced. The task, therefore, rests on how the concept of the political community may transcend the \textit{political} boundaries once they are formally established by and around the nation-state. This task, however, is not simple and it becomes more complex when we subscribe democratic elements of legitimacy in the boundary-building process.

It is clear, at this point, that the modern-liberal concept of political community conflicts with any new and different forms of boundary-setting. Yet, as I have argued, at least on their own, thin liberal forms of citizenship are no longer flexible or substantive enough to fully express political forms of belonging in a globalised world. It would seem, therefore, that a plausible replacement needs to be more sensitive to such new and different perceptions of boundaries to the political community. Yet doing so brings other questions. If the notion of citizenship is problematic because of its exclusive nature then, is it rather possible to conceive a global, all-inclusive community? If democratic citizenship is only attained through the demarcation of an ‘exclusive’ political community, is it imaginable to speak of democracy if this is not bounded to the national political community? The liberal-universalistic thought that underpins cosmopolitanism gives a possibility in answering these questions, although partially, in the re-configuration of the political community side-by-side with global transformations. The political community would then be demarcated by the globe whose citizens are to be conceived as global citizens—citizens of human kind. But before detailing some of the potentialities and weaknesses that cosmopolitanism can

\textsuperscript{17} Mouffe, \textit{The Return of the Political}. 
provide for the notion and scope of democratic global citizenship, the very basic components of cosmopolitan citizenship in the formation of a concept of global citizenship should be set out.

The contemporary cosmopolitan notion of global citizenship can be understood in theory and practice in two distinct ways.\(^{18}\) The first consists in *moral cosmopolitanism* which is mainly developed by one of its key proponents: Martha Nussbaum. The second refers to the notion of *cosmopolitan democracy* developed by David Held, who brings the most extensive approach within this scope to fill the democratic gaps that moral cosmopolitanism may entail. Nussbaum aligns herself with the Kantian and Stoic legacy of the world republic as well as the view of cosmopolitan law, to articulate the potentialities of the globalised world with cosmopolitan (moral) theory. She believes that national boundaries are “morally arbitrary” since their distribution among individuals does not follow any clear criteria of moral achievement and moral compensation. That is, “the boundary of the nation has a deep and formative role in our deliberations, we seem depriving ourselves of any principled way of arguing to citizens that they should in fact join hands” across the “boundaries of ethnicity and class and gender and race.”\(^{19}\) Additionally, in her seminal text, she argues to not place the affairs and concerns of one’s immediate community, or the privileged commitment to a specific territorially bounded national

\(^{18}\) It should be noted, however, that both scopes are based on the Kantian theory on cosmopolitanism brought in depth in his two seminal works on the subject. Concretely on his idea of a cosmopolitan order by extending the concept of a ‘constitution’ from the national to the global level, in a way that “international” law is transformed into “cosmopolitan” law as a law of individuals and these in members of a political constituted world society; and his idea of cosmopolitan condition to be conceived only in terms of “world republic” as an association of peaceable and sovereign states where the sovereignty of the people is indivisible. Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals, Part One: The Metaphysics Elements of Right” and “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, Part Two: On the Agreement between Politics and Morality According to the Transcendental Concept of Public Right,” in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H. S. Reiss and trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 [1785]).

community which cannot trump the obligations generated by a universalistic morality. A cosmopolitan for Nussbaum, therefore, is someone “whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world” and who “give [her or his] first allegiance to what is morally good – and that which, being good, [she or he] can commend as such to all human beings.” However, she makes clear that cosmopolitanism entails not so much a political practice but a moral attitude:

Nussbaum’s understanding of cosmopolitanism may be valuable in the moral attitude that lies at the core of moral universalism where she positions the human being to be treated as equal as any human. Further, moral cosmopolitanism, in its strict sense, seeks to defend basic rights or alleviate human suffering simply because the violation of human rights is wrong (because affects human dignity) or because suffering is bad and should be avoided. This notion presupposes that moral obligations arise from, as Nussbaum points out, a shared worldwide community of human beings. It also may lead, for example, to Rawlsian notions of “egalitarian individualism” that theorists as Charles Beitz and Thomas

---

Pogge support in their theory of global justice: to live by shared rules and that within these spheres of interaction those who cause harm to others must be accountable.26 The moral realm, therefore, in which moral cosmopolitanism is placed is in between “our own self interest and the reality of another person’s good or ill.”27

This kind of argument suggests a compassionate character among every human being which looks outward rather than a parochial allegiance of a restricted political community. For example, the debate regarding the participation of the Muslim Council of Britain in the annual Holocaust commemoration day in the UK in 2007 was centred on whether the Muslim position would have reversed the Council’s controversial decision to stay away from the Holocaust Memorial Day or not. The controversy was based on whether to consider in their decision their Jew-Muslim historic-conflict background, or rather to act differently from past years deeming the memorial day as commemoration of ‘acts of genocide.’28 Yet such controversy, at the end of the day, remained enmeshed in the crossroads of national politics.

Nussbaum’s assumption of ‘the compassionate character,’ however, provides no strong bond or allegiance to her notion of a worldwide human political community. It is so because human sentiments may appear too weak (or even naïve) to construct strong political bonds in order to attain her vision of moral motives of respect to provide powerful incentives to fulfill the “moral law.” Nevertheless, Nussbaum makes clear that she does not intend to formulate any reference of political practice but rather the normative basis to

26 This includes causing direct harm as well as participating in, and benefiting from, unjust social structures that cause harm. See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); and David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
27 Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” xi.
conduct our political will. She asks us to give our first allegiance to what is morally good for all human beings while not recognising that individuals may have different, or perhaps conflictual, notions of the good. This is particularly the case when it is too often assumed that the natural bond between humans in the moral balance of universal reason, like Kant’s view, is conceived as the central element that bind individuals into a human community. Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan perspective of citizenship may appear to be fruitful in two respects: first, in the way it regards the equal moral value of every human as central to conceiving citizenship; and second, in that it conceives citizenship within a moral framework that extends its wider, non-territorial, global dimension. But, in my view, it still remains too thin and therefore subject to some of the criticisms levelled at the liberal model.

This would lead us back to the analysis in chapter one on thin citizenship\(^29\) that moral cosmopolitanism also shares. On one hand, it largely downplays or even discourages meaningful political participation in the public sphere. It also emphasises the (liberal) intrinsic value of ‘negative freedom,’ which only avoids harming anyone else but only respect for their individual rights. On the other, the universalistic view of moral cosmopolitanism undermines plurality of conceptions of the good because it still focuses on the pursuit of freedom at the private sphere of life in securing the private freedoms of all (whatever different concepts of the good these entail) in a way that respects the equal rights of all. So there is little effort to create strong bonds to the human community but which only rests on ‘good will’ and respect to other human beings.

So, in sum, moral cosmopolitanism does have a point in regarding humans as ultimate equal units of concern in its substance of sharing something in common. At the

\(^{29}\) See chapter one on the analysis of ‘thin’ citizenship in this thesis.
same time, it also helps understand how a conception of citizenship might be disaggregated from a parochial sense of boundedness. Yet my position is that it still remains insufficient to encourage and practice politics that are indeed necessary for global citizenship to be accomplished. Motivation and democracy, I argue, are necessary to create the bonds of meaningful citizenship if it transcends beyond the borders of the nation-state’s political boundaries. It is clear that the view of global citizenship underpinned by moral cosmopolitanism does not give democracy and institutional building an important role for putting into practice a plausible citizenship. In this way, if global citizenship is ever conceived as an un-democratic framework or even a naïve vision of citizenship when we are asked to have primary allegiance to the global human community, David Held, for his part, gives a conceptual alternative to cosmopolitanism in order to offset the practical and democratic gaps that moral cosmopolitanism entails.

Held gives a more practical perspective of cosmopolitanism in asserting that the problems confronting citizenship in the light of globalisation must be addressed through an alternative to global or cosmopolitan citizenship—through cosmopolitan democracy. He conceives global citizenship as an all-inclusive activity, practiced in international fora and institutions. \(^{30}\) The democratic component proposed by Held in his concept of citizenship is based on the principle of *autonomy*, the notion of a *democratic legal state*, and the concept of *global citizenship*. He reads autonomy as “the capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and self-determining…[and] involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different possible courses of action in private as well as in public life, bearing the democratic good in mind.” \(^{31}\) Held tries to conciliate, as in his

\(^{30}\) Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*.

\(^{31}\) Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, 146.
words, the democratic elements of deliberation, action, the democratic good, and the liberal elements of self-determination from reasoning into the concept of autonomy.

He places special attention to his concept of autonomy by giving an individualistic notion of the global citizen. This is set though by the principle of affectedness rather than the republican principle of membership. The point of global democratic institutions, as cosmopolitan democrats believe, is to uphold the autonomy of each and every individual, especially when norms potentially affect them if they have not given them their free and informed consent. For cosmopolitan democrats, the principle of autonomy—centring on the individual as the core moral agent—is the most appropriate democratic ordering principle “in a world of complex interdependence.” The cosmopolitan democracy view dwells more on a theory that aims to restrain the un-democratic forces of neoliberal economic globalisation where borders of all kinds appear to be fraying. I argue, however, that some sort of enclosure is necessary for considering active and meaningful democratic participation—elements which cosmopolitan democrats may not well endorse. It remains unclear, therefore, how the form of global democracy is imagined where there is no strong sense of commonality to one or various political communities. If Held’s principle of autonomy trumps other forms of political identity(ies) and, hence, political action, how can his concept of global citizenship be achieved (and tenable) in more complex and different political spaces if a strong commitment to political practice is not thoroughly addressed?

---


It could be possible to conceive this approach, as Held presupposes, by understanding democratic autonomy—via the idea of self-determining, free and equal individuals, and limited government—as a concept of thin, procedural citizenship which could be achieved only through a global democratic legal state. In an interesting way, Held brings into his concept of global democracy a spatial extension of the liberal concept of citizenship specified by individual rights and obligations for the empowerment of citizens as autonomous agents, democratic public law as the common structure of political action and through which, at the same time, the principle of autonomy is enhanced. His theory of global democracy may allude to a sense of “non-necessary” strong political allegiances to a singular political community. Yet the attribution he makes to autonomy in the form of empowering rights biases his global democratic theory towards a rather individualistic account of political life.

Held understands cosmopolitan democracy in procedural terms that should be created through a deliberative process in line with the empowerment rights that he claims to pursue. But in true liberal fashion, Held emphasizes that the legal framework should be neutral constituting the common structure of political action. According to Held, on one hand, this world legal framework would be in the institutionalisation of world politics toward all-inclusive participation, where “more and more communities and agencies affiliate to new democratic order” and, in consequence, “the rights and responsibilities of people qua citizens and qua subjects of cosmopolitan law could coincide.” On the other, the deliberative process on decision-making would be guided by cosmopolitan principles, demarcating different levels of governance as existing local, sub-national, regional and
national polities.\footnote{Held, “Cosmopolitanism: Globalisation Tamed?,” 475.} Entangling both conceptions, citizenship could become “a truly universal status.”\footnote{Held, \textit{Democracy and the Global Order}, 232-33.} Both the neutral legal framework where autonomous beings can act freely, and the universality of cosmopolitan law resembles to a large extent what Kant conceived as ‘constitution’: it translates international law into cosmopolitan law only through the existence of a federation of republics. It seems, in Held’s view, that only this kind of provision could render a conception of both global and cosmopolitan citizenship theoretically coherent as well as practically valid. But to assess Held’s view any further requires a deeper look at its grounds.

The grounds on which Held develops his conception of deliberative (cosmopolitan) democracy for conceiving global citizenship are interesting and developed further later in this thesis. Held strongly relies on a conception of democratic deliberation as a \textit{reason-giving} process which is prerequisite for deliberative democracy. First, rationality would ensure (institutional) procedures to be fair, impartial and legitimate. Second, this model of democracy assumes that rational deliberation resolves disagreements and leads to consensus on the rules of democratic cooperation. These become for Held the “practical idea of an ideal of deliberative discourse.”\footnote{Held, \textit{Democracy and the Global Order}, 222.} First, I want to highlight here that equality and freedom, as Held argues, in the determination of the conditions of the individuals’ lives, following the principle of autonomy, will bring a free and equal basis for deliberation in the discussion about matters of public concern.\footnote{Held, \textit{Democracy and the Global Order}, 155.} And second, the principles he gives of \textit{inclusiveness} and \textit{subsidiary} are pioneering in recent theories of global governance, where
deliberation is achieved at multi-level polities.\textsuperscript{39} The principle of autonomy and democratic participation, as all-inclusive participation in procedures or as basic rights to procedural participation, give the idea of universal dimension attributed to global citizenship. Nevertheless, he is unclear as to how this autonomy—which he defines as “the capacity of human beings to reason self consciously, to be self reflective and self determining”\textsuperscript{40}–and his principles of inclusiveness and subsidiary, refer to the collectivity and not to the individual. In other words, how can global citizens be encouraged to politically participate in global public fora—if we accept that all individuals have access to them—if a thin conception of political thrust is attributed to this sense of global citizenship? This account of deliberation leaves no room for an ethical-ontological perspective to the political community. The missing “we” in the account associated with cosmopolitan global citizenship lacks two basic elements that help to define a meaningful collective identity: a collective continuity over time; and collective differentiation from others.\textsuperscript{41} Since there are no boundaries to make the “global collectivity” something different than an aggregation of individual global citizens pursuing their own determination of their individual life, the cosmopolitan citizenship is, in my view, problematic at best.

Held’s conception of autonomy and empowering rights do not require strong delimitations (and allegiances) to any political community. It remains unclear how these basic-empowering rights can potentially take on the political function of citizenship. If procedural democracy assures a consensual form of citizenship, in Held’s view, which

\textsuperscript{39} Held argues that these principles helps to command widespread agreement and, hence, to be generated in stakeholder process of consensus-building involving states, IGOs, INGOs, citizen groups and social movements. In other words, these principles would allow to create a “global process of consultation and deliberation, organized at diverse levels, represents the best hope of creating a legitimate framework for accountable and sustainable global governance.” See Held, “Cosmopolitanism: Globalisation Tamed?,” 477.

\textsuperscript{40} Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 146.

assumes a pre-political consensus of how the global legal framework should be delimited, the problem I see is that cosmopolitan global citizenship would leave no room for the kind of politics that is necessary to develop and perform citizenship. First, citizenship implies some sort of commonality to the political community, within which entitlements to rights and duties are accorded by its members. Second, some kind of motivation is needed to participate in, this case, multi-tier polities. And third, democracy requires boundaries within which the people of the political community can establish the rules and institutions ‘they see fit’.

So the question then becomes, how can citizenship, taking into account the challenges which processes of globalisation pose to it while ensuring we do not undermine democratic politics, regard political participation not in one but multiple political communities encompassing the equal moral worth of every human being? It must be said here that fulfilling all these criteria that have been derived from previous analysis in this thesis is a broad and complex project that would take many theses to accomplish fully. What I try to provide here are just the first small, but important steps in this task. The approach I take in the following section regards the boundary-construction that a concept of global citizenship (as a multi-spatial form of citizenship) needs. In so doing, it attempts to consider meaningful insights of political participation and democracy at different spatial levels. While moral and democratic cosmopolitanism provide an important contribution and reference of a disaggregated notion of citizenship, the deliberative democratic model brings potentially valuable elements to fill democratic and political gaps that both forms of cosmopolitan global citizenship have.
3. Constructing Political Boundaries: The Deliberative Democratic Approach and Cosmopolitan Norms toward the Practice of Global Citizenship

All modern constitutions offer membership according to a schedule of rights, and these rights are justified in terms of universal, rather than merely local or parochial attributes of members. Modern constitutions therefore tend to make normative claims that they cannot possibly fulfill. This is one way of describing the problem of constitutional scope. The normative force of democratic constitutions coherently demands the extension of inclusion to all persons while simultaneously retracting that inclusion to all members of a set of arbitrarily designated persons in order to actually succeed in constituting a polity.42

Cosmopolitanism can help us envisage the human commonality that the concept of global citizenship may require. But the deliberative democratic model can offer the theoretical and practical dimensions for constructing the political justification and legitimization to exercise meaningful global citizenship in multiple political arenas. What makes the deliberative democracy different from the universal standpoint of cosmopolitanism is the nature of contestation about the moral rights, from a nonfoundationalist basis, to be the justification of the moral recognition of one another’s claims as participants in the moral-political dialogue.

The deliberative democratic model de-centres the demos from the formalising inherent in the liberal concept of governmental-statecraft procedures and boundaries. In contrast, it places special attention on practicing politics actively and acting in multiple public arenas—where ‘public’ is often understood in a non-traditional sense. Benhabib, within the deliberate argument, defines democracy as

a form of organizing the collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the
well-being of collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals. This model provides the possibility to articulate useful elements from both cosmopolitanism (such as autonomy and reasoning) and strong democracy (public deliberation and contestation) thus keeping these models in the theoretical dialogue. The notion of deliberative democracy is based on “the assumption that moral respect for the autonomous personality is a fundamental norm of morality and democracy” but also it “presupposes a discourse theory of ethics to supply it with the most general moral principles.” These principles consider “participants to be equal and free beings, equally entitled to certain moral rights…as the entitlement to universal moral respect [and] the principle of egalitarian reciprocity [in which] the individual has the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts and reflection about the presuppositions of the conversations.”

Although drawing from some elements of moral liberalism, Benhabib differentiates the discourse theory and Kant and Rawls’s notion of public reason by highlighting that the discursive model underpins political debate to build appropriate public space for determining rights claims. This form of discourse for deliberation differs from that of Held’s in conceiving rationality as central to ensure fairness, impartiality and legitimacy for the procedures to conduct democratic deliberation. But deliberative democracy gives a special focus to public discussion based upon reasonable arguments where participants confine their arguments as “acceptable political reasons,” and being reasonable to others,

---

within the process of deliberation. The cosmopolitan approach to deliberative democracy entails the liberal conception of basic rights such as the moderns envision as necessary for democracy. Although Held extends liberal principles to a larger scale in the global sphere, it remains questionable, however, whether the limits of democracy—as cosmopolitans translate it to the limits of ‘global community’—is embedded in the notion of public deliberation as public reasoning in relationship with governmental functions. Or rather it remains embedded in the assumption of an “aggregative” conception of democracy in the presumption of the aggregation of ‘autonomous’ individuals.

‘Public reasoning,’ in contrast, is one of the foremost components to provide the political justification in the view of deliberative democracy. This is one of the axial elements that I want to show in the process of constructing the political boundaries necessary for conceiving a plausible form of global citizenship in practice. Cohen emphasizes on the conception of binding collective choice by requiring reasons acceptable to others who are governed by those choices in the form of deliberation, not solely to provide the favourable conditions for participation, association, and expression, but to ensure responsiveness and accountability of the democratic process itself. This is particularly important because the force of unregulated economic globalisation can foster the uncoupling of jurisdiction and territory confined in the nation-state to non-statatal private

---

46 See chapter one of this thesis referring to the difference between Rawls and Benhabib’s notion on “deliberative speech.”
47 The “aggregative” idea of democracy, as different to deliberative, institutionalizes a principle of equality for the interest of each member, or in other words, the presumption of personal autonomy, and in group, considered as the collective choice either in the form of majority or plurality rule or group bargaining. See Cohen, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” 98.
and corporate bodies—and global capitalism could be conceived as the new global
transnational governance in its own form of “global law without a state.” Therefore,
introducing elements of the model of deliberative democracy will bring the democratic
elements of accountability and transparency that transnational governance largely lacks.
The process of configuring mechanisms resides in conceiving global citizenship as a
disaggregated one, not confined in the exclusiveness of the individual legal status of a
particular territorial jurisdiction only where democratic mechanisms are set up. That is,
citizenship should be disaggregated where state sovereignty may be replaced by popular
sovereignty upon sub-national as well as supra-national spaces for democratic attachments
and agency. This is only possible if they are advanced together with, rather than replacing,
existing polities which are need to be based on the norms of cosmopolitan justice. In other
words, my suggestion, following Benhabib in some crucial respects, is not to dismantle the
existing structures but to give the basis for questioning and even re-constituting them
through deliberative democratic processes toward a “citizenship of residency” which
strengthens the multiple ties to locality, to the region, and to transnational institutions.

The political boundaries of global citizenship that I want to reveal here are not
aggregative in nature, as conceiving deliberation in the form of assembling international
institutions and participation in their multiple fora, but the public authorisation in the form
and the content through deliberative and democratic processes set at different levels of
public institutions, from the local to global stages. The task resides in reconfiguring
citizenship beyond nation-state boundaries, even though contemporary globalisation is

---

53 Seyla Benhabib, “Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in
transforming state power and the nature of political community.\textsuperscript{54} A central aim from now on in this thesis will be to avoid the “ominous epithet” that this could involve the establishment of “empire.”\textsuperscript{55} Here, Benhabib’s passing comment that cosmopolitan federalism could be a project which attempts to restrain in the forces of globalisation while resisting the spread of empire and strengthening the democratic citizen,\textsuperscript{56} is developed further.

Both the disaggregated and the cosmopolitan citizen can develop and sustain multiple allegiances and networks across nation-state boundaries, in inter- as well as transnational contexts.\textsuperscript{57} While moral cosmopolitanism regards the world as one’s \textit{polis}, the disaggregated one considers trans-national action in the context of multiple \textit{poleis}. The borders of a conception of global citizenship that I want to build here is that in its performance through networks that are conductive to democratic citizenship. Its major contrast with the cosmopolitan normative view of conceiving a \textit{global demos} is that it does not reside under one and irrevocable cosmopolitan law. This will involve the attachment to representative institutions–only in line to achieve and sustain accountability, transparency and responsibility –toward a given constituency. This kind of strategy is facilitated by the principle of “democratic voice” where people are not only subjects but also authors of the law.\textsuperscript{58} The question would rely on whether these constituencies will need to be circumscribed in territorially spaces, or could be disaggregated into other forms of

\textsuperscript{54} See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, \textit{A New World Order} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 12.
\textsuperscript{56} Benhabib, “Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship,” 676.
\textsuperscript{57} It is important to distinguish between the democratic and moral cosmopolitan view regarding the levels of allegiance. The democratic view as the one of Held is compatible to disaggregated one in having different allegiances, whereas moral cosmopolitan view, as the one of Nussbaum, the allegiance ‘to humanity’ \textit{must} be in the first place.
\textsuperscript{58} Benhabib, “Transformation of Citizenship: the Case of Contemporary Europe,” 463.
constituencies. At this stage it is perhaps necessary to re-evaluate the reconfiguration of sovereignty in the reconstitutions of citizenship toward the citizenship of residency.

I refer here to Seyla Benhabib’s concept of public iterations that encapsulates in substance the elements of disaggregated citizenship in citizenship of residency as well as the deliberative democratic component that transnational governance requires in the concept I am building for constructing the ‘borders’ of a plausible global citizenship. She argues for a vision of “republican federalism” and “democratic iterations” which would enhance popular sovereignty by establishing interconnections across the local, the national and the global. By ‘democratic iterations’ Benhabib understands them as complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society.59

In other words, iterations are political “repetitions-in-transformation.” And she defines ‘republican federalism’ as “the constitutionally structured reaggregation of the markers of sovereignty, in a set of interlocking institutions each responsible and accountable to the other.”60 In this sense, the ‘cosmopolitan federalism’ suggests democracy between trans- and inter-national norms of international law and the actions of individual democratic legislatures. In the context of multi-spheres of political action (from the local, the national, regional and the transnational) multiple ‘iterations’ are possible.

Cosmopolitanism can be conceived, in the form of ‘republican federalism,’ as the normative threshold for global citizenship justification; and ‘public iterations’ as the political spaces whose boundaries delineates the political borders to legitimate the practice of global citizenship. On one hand, democratic iterations can take the place both in the

60 Seyla Benhabib, “Twilight of Sovereignty,” 31.
spheres of ‘strong’ constituting institutions—those public bodies with constituted legislatives, judiciary and executive powers—and ‘weak’ public spheres, such as the global civil society.\footnote{For a developed idea of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ public spheres see Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).} It is important to clarify here that meaning of concepts or norms through and after ‘repetition’ may become in varied ways as a result. This can be more a potentiality rather than a weakness. The iteration and interpretation of norms can be re-signified or re-valuated in the process of ‘reasonable public discussion.’ The meaning and value may differ one and another time only if the interpretations of norms, in the public discussion, are reasonable to all. By contrast, it ceases discussion when this meaning, as the background of discussion, stops to be reasonable to all. The potentiality, therefore, will reside in the authoritative position of the ‘original meaning’ of norms which can be enhanced and transformed. These processes can bring plausible mechanisms for legitimating the political boundaries within which ‘global’ citizens (in the multi-public spaces as the meaning for ‘global’) can discuss common concerns and at the same time they are re-evaluating, transforming and re-constituting the concept, value, and application of cosmopolitan norms.

On the other hand, cosmopolitan norms can become, and in today’s world are in the process of becoming, an aspect of the political and \textit{legal} culture in multi-spatial polities. Cosmopolitan norms can take the form of global human rights and these could establish new thresholds of public justification for a humanity that is increasingly united and interdependent.\footnote{On the idea of threshold of justification, see Benhabib, \textit{The Rights of Others}, 15-21.} The extension of these norms aims to protect the human being as such, regardless the allegiance(s) or identity(ies) she or he may have. On one hand, cosmopolitan norms will become the basis in which the global citizen would be the citizen of the global civil society. On the other, cosmopolitan norms will be subject to agencies of the public
exercise of power. The idea and practice of public sovereignty, as global and not equated in
the form of state sovereignty, with both considerations of cosmopolitan norms and public
iterations, reinforces the idea of public sovereignty at a global scale.

I want to highlight here that equality and freedom, as Held argues, in the
determination of the conditions, following the principle of autonomy, can provide a free
and equal basis for deliberation in the discussion about matters of public concern.63 The
way Benhabib argues it: “the assumption of moral respect for the autonomous personality is
a fundamental norm of morality and democracy [but where] the deliberative model of
democracy presupposes a discourse theory of ethic to supply it with the most general moral
principles upon which rights claims would be based.”64 The principles of autonomy and
democratic participation, as all-inclusive participation in procedures and discourse between
individuals and associations, give the idea of the universal dimension attributed to global
citizenship that would enhance the idea of popular sovereignty by establishing
interconnections across the local, the national and the global.

Popular sovereignty no longer refers to “the physical presence of a people gathered
in a delimited territory, but rather to the interlocking in a global public sphere of the many
processes of democratic iteration in which peoples learn from one another.”65 What we may
not be able to ignore is that political tensions may surge between national sovereignty and
new forms of ‘de-territorialised’ forms of popular sovereignty. In the form of reinforcing
democratic iterations to make national and transnational forms of sovereignty responsive,
transparent and accountable to the people; and the spread of cosmopolitan to foster and
protect human rights through multiple political arenas could bring the elements to increase

63 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 155.
64 Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model,” 78.
65 See Jürgen Habermas, Has the Heartbeat of the Revolution Come to a Stop? Popular Sovereignty as Procedure: A
Normative Concept of the Public? (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989).
popular sovereignty from different-spatial fronts. The complementarity between the global citizenship that it is constructed here from the post- and other trans-national forms of citizenship regarding popular sovereignty is that they contest to a system which decision-making is still rendered by transnational elites.\footnote{See Held’s chapter 5 in David Held, “Competitive Elitism and the Technocratic Vision,” in Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).} Only through multiple strategies can contestation be achieved in the form of public exercise of power from multiple spaces. Popular sovereignty would derive from the interlocking networks from these multi-level spheres in the form of global civil society.

The emergent global civil society would provide the demos in the process of construction of ‘global’ political boundaries. This could be achieved through world-wide public opinion (in their multi-political arenas) which can bring new forms of bonds, from identity to solidarity. The emergence of new modalities of citizenship, and in this case in the idea of global citizenship that may articulate some elements of each, bring new senses of membership but also new dimensions to conceive the power of democratic sovereignty which does not reside exclusively in the nation-state.

Paradigm shifts on how we conceive the relationship between the citizen and other political communities should give higher prominence in IR scholarship. It does not only imply analysing state transformation in times of heightened globalisation, but also paying attention to possible claims of allegiance and political participation of the individual may have in distinctive public spheres, from the sub-national level to the global. This is particularly relevant since the notion of global citizenship exposed so far challenges the spatial outlines of the concepts of politics and the ethical status of territorial borders that IR scholars have traced.
4. Conclusion: Toward the Practice and Implementation of Global Citizenship

Global transformations have had an impact on the re-definition of political boundaries and this in the re-consideration of the notion of citizenship when linked to the political community. The notion of the modern-liberal community centred in the nation-state and this in the national sovereignty has been altered by global transformations, mainly in the upsurge of potential and non-traditionally conceived multi-spaces of popular sovereignty. In this sense, popular sovereignty through different public-spatial spheres could be achieved via the conception of global citizenship if it is located from the local, transnational, as well as global spaces. And this could be possible if it is accompanied by cosmopolitan norms and democratic processes in which political communities are delimited and by which global citizenship can be performed.

On one hand, cosmopolitan norms—such as human rights through the assumption that every human is of moral equal worth—bring the moral justification in the coordination of democratic iterations. One way which this moral justification can be approached with regard to political membership is by accepting conflicting moral visions and political commitments within existing strong polities – as one evocative slogan of the Immigrant Worker’s Freedom Ride in New York suggested: “No human is illegal.”67 On the other, democratic iterations, for their part, can bring forms of legitimisation to construct political boundaries—either within thick or thin political systems. They may be developed within or in-between both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ political spheres. For example, the person who is a formal citizen and resident of a jurisdictional system, and other unstructured communities of conversation which can involve international and transnational human rights

---

organizations, from the UN representative and monitoring bodies and regional courts of human rights, to INGO’s as Amnesty International, Save the Children, Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Federation of Red Cross and so on.

The performance of politics at different levels from the local to the global level is the global notion of citizenship which I have begun the first steps in constructing throughout this chapter. The next task rests, however, on assessing the plausibility of implementation of this notion through multi-spatial democratic processes.