CHAPTER 1

Changing Paradigms of Citizenship: Toward the Construction of a Global Citizenship

Outside and inside from a dialectic of division, the obvious geometry of which blinds us as soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains. It has the sharpness of the dialectics of yes and no, which decides everything. Unless one is careful, it is made into a basis of images that govern all thoughts of positive and negative. Logicians draw circles that overlap or exclude each other, and all their rules immediately become clear. Philosophers, when confronted with outside and inside, think in terms of being and non-being. Thus profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit geometry which whether we will or no – confers spatiality upon thought; if a metaphysician could not draw, what would we think? ... the dialectics of here and there has been promoted to the rank of an absolutism according to which these unfortunate adverbs of place are endowed with unsupervised powers of ontological determination.¹

The causes and consequences of broader inter-connections between individuals and other political spaces, within a context of heightened globalisation, have evidenced that the modern project of citizenship shows incoherence between its initial platform and the reality of politics in different spatial dimensions. I argue here for a conception of global citizenship for reasons that should soon become clear.

The broad objective of this chapter is to explore the process in which modern-liberal citizenship, centred in the ‘necessary’ link between the citizen and the nation-state, has shifted to other forms of citizenship. The central purpose of this chapter is therefore to identify the gaps that the view of modern-liberal thought on citizenship has presented in reference to the notion of political space and time in our times of intense globalisation. In doing so, I review the theoretical debate between modern liberal citizenship and other

theoretical grounds and set up the basic groundwork for the central arguments of this thesis concerning the need and utility of a global conception of citizenship.

Section one focuses on the modern liberal citizenship approach based upon territorially-circumscribed state sovereignty. Thin models of citizenship are developed stressing the legal status in the relationship of formal rights and duties where the individual has membership status in a particular (territorial) sovereign nation-state. Generally speaking, thin conceptions of citizenship entail a limited number of relations, transactions, and where the individual is viewed as bearer of rights and are usually discussed vis-a-vis the liberal accounts of Locke, Kant, Mill, and Rawls. In the second section I integrate several other approaches to citizenship into the debate which offset the problems that thin citizenship encounters. These centre around what has, unsurprisingly, been termed thick citizenship which I review drawing from the differences in Jean Jacques Rousseau, Benjamin Barber and Hannah Arendt’s civic-republicanism and Seyla Benhabib’s deliberative democracy. Here, I explore and emphasize nuanced forms of inter-active citizenships to open the spectrum to different understandings of how citizenship is delimited as well as how it can be performed in multilayered connections between the individual and other broader political spheres. Section three evaluates several post-

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2 Tilly and Bubeck give slightly different understandings in their differentiation between thick and thin citizenship. Bubeck is more descriptive in defining multiple degrees on citizenship: from the very passive to the very active as extreme poles which citizenship conceptions may fit in between. She attributes to thin citizenship the status which certain individual powers and rights are linked to citizenship, whereas thick citizenship is a practice that requires active engagement with the community and participation in the political life. See Effie MacLachlan, *Who Cares?: Gender and Citizenship in the European Union*, Sixth Biennial International Conference, The Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York, Pittsburgh, PA, June 2-5, 1999, 3. While Tilly differentiates thin from thick in the degree of transactions sustained both by state agents and the people living under their jurisdiction. See Charles Tilly, *Citizenship, Identity and Social History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8.

national,\textsuperscript{4} agonistic pluralism and contemporary moral cosmopolitan approaches to contribute to broader notions of space and time where concepts of global citizenship can be envisioned.

1. **The Liberal Account: Thin Citizenship as a Passive Status**

To understand contemporary models of citizenship in contrast to understanding the ‘necessary’ relationship between the citizen and the nation-state for citizenship to exist and be exercised, it is helpful to look at the grounds in which modern-national conceptions of citizenship was founded and forged under territorialised boundaries. Before I question the relationship between the citizen and the nation-state as ‘necessary’ for citizenship, it is helpful to review contemporary models of citizenship by looking at the grounds in which modern-national conceptions of citizenship was founded under territorialised boundaries.

The modern project gestated in the Enlightenment and enshrined by liberalism\textsuperscript{5} stresses the concepts of state, sovereignty, citizenship and rights\textsuperscript{6} in which conventional ways of analysing politics and power were settled within the boundaries of the nation-state as the natural frame for political systems. Two aspects of the modern concept of the nation-state as the foremost political entity circumscribing the traditional concept of citizenship are worth highlighting: the relation between power and national sovereignty; and the contractual nature of their citizens to legitimize a delimited sovereign body politic. First, the concept of modern citizenship was linked to the expansion of state sovereignty or the build-up of administrative power alongside the development of the state’s apparatus of

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\textsuperscript{5} Liberalism in this sense refers to early and neoclassical liberalism in relation to the emerging concept and practice of modern citizenship, mainly with regard to the project to conform the political organization represented in the nation-state.

government and the ability to supervise subject populations.\textsuperscript{7} As these administrative centres became more powerful, the state’s sovereign authority began to depend more on other cooperative forms that replaced the use of force as a direct medium of rule – i.e. it was no longer possible for the modern state to manage its affairs and seek its survival primarily through the exclusive exercise of force. New forms of reciprocity between the governors and the governed were needed and this transformation was represented in the expansion of state sovereignty which fostered the identity of subjects as political subjects – as citizens. Giddens called this reciprocal relation of expansion of power as “the dialectic of control.”\textsuperscript{8} Second, the sense of a heightened awareness of the subject’s membership of a political community and of the rights and obligations such membership confers\textsuperscript{9} constituted the basis for the social contract centred in nationalism as the “administrative unification of the state.”\textsuperscript{10} A return to Locke’s conception of citizenship is therefore in order to recognize the process where the individual became part of the ‘body politic’ as a bearer of rights and before reviewing how this idea was expanded by Rousseau in defining collective duties in the formation of a social-compact based community.

Early liberal theory focused on the individual as the primary unit of analysis\textsuperscript{11} and society and government as the outcome of social contract between rational individuals pursuing individual interests. That is, it challenged arbitrary power by appealing to universal principles where individuals have certain innate natural rights that are transferred into equal entitlement to manage the individual’s private life. This assumption has its roots

\textsuperscript{7} Anthony Giddens, \textit{A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism} (London: Macmillan, 1981), 169.
\textsuperscript{9} Anthony Giddens, \textit{The Nation-State and Violence}, 210.
\textsuperscript{10} See chapter 8 in Anthony Giddens, \textit{The Nation-State and Violence}.
in Locke’s view of citizenship where individuals are concerned with pursuing their economic interests and their private lives, playing a minimal role in conducting public affairs. The security for doing so, in Locke’s view, is by safeguarding civil liberties where individuals are entitled to retain their natural freedom, bounded by impartial framework of rule of law and order within which individuals can safely pursue their private concerns. For this purpose it was needed to build legitimate government based on the consent of those “to whom its authority extends,” creating hence the notion of the state as the body politic. Locke therefore constructed the idea of citizenship as contractual to the sovereign body politic, bringing to the fore the exclusionary nature of liberal citizenship:

Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and greater Security against any that are not of it.\(^{13}\)

In this way, Locke was assuring the boundaries where the body politic was embedded in a state\(^ {14}\) which secured the enjoyment of the individual’s private rights in the form of citizenship. This position lies at the base of the vision of thin citizenship whether it is conceived as the minimal transaction between the individual and the state (for Tilly), or of thin citizenship as passive interaction of the individual in the public life and the individual status as a holder of certain rights (for Bubeck).\(^ {15}\) For David Burchell,\(^ {16}\) this dimension is contrasted with the “passive, private” model, as I refer to Locke’s position, and the “active, public” form of citizenship that I term Rousseau’s civic-republican view discussed shortly.

\(^{12}\) See John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 1963 [1690]). Emphasis is made to make clear that the state is personified by Locke as a unitary body of political organization.

\(^{13}\) See chapter 8 “Of Civil Government” in Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*.

\(^{14}\) “State” here refers to the condition in which individuals can conduct their private life through civil rights that are conferred by and protected through the rule of law embodied in legal status.


Kant lent the conception of citizenship in modern liberal thought its universalistic dimension. His notion of citizenship was not nation-bounded, but rather connected to the universal will of the people in a “State” as an ideal of united men in commonwealth under the pure principles of right. Kant conceived these rights as necessarily a priori in that they follow automatically from concepts of external right in general; and the state ought to be according to pure principles of right. Citizens, in Kant’s view, are members of society or state who unite for the purpose of legislating in the nature of lawful freedom to obey no law other than that “to which he has given his consent”; civil equality “in recognizing no-one among the people as superior to himself”; and civil independence “which allows him to owe his existence and sustenance no to the arbitrary will of anyone else among the people, but purely to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth.” The passive status Kant gives to the citizen in these provisos is complemented, rather famously, with his view of an active citizen, who is in the independent position, to vote and become not only a part but a member of the commonwealth. Nevertheless, not all men lived in the commonwealth in an egalitarian basis, that is, citizens of the commonwealth were the only persons to become members of it. It was civil constitution that made people – the freedom and equality of all men – become a state. This premise is what Kant expressed as the original contract by which all the people give up their external freedom to receive it back at once they become members of a commonwealth and create their own legislative will: a civil constitution.

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18 Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” in Kant: Political Writings, 139.
19 Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” in Kant: Political Writings, 140. Kant’s civil constitution was closely approximate to his principles of right and reason - by categorical imperative. See Kant “Metaphysics of Morals,” in Kant: Political Writings, 143.
The thin aspect of citizenship pertains to both Kant’s and Locke’s concept of citizenship that consist of equal individual liberties enforced by a legal system with jurisdiction and supremacy within a bounded sovereign territory. But Kant asserts it in the form of a republican constitution based on rational unanimity which should guarantee equality of citizenship. It is thin because equality is not substantive but formal. The citizen is subject to laws *he* gives himself and which requires, for Kant, universal democratic decision making for particular laws. He attributes the idea of reason to the original contract that forces the sovereign to “give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will.”\(^{20}\) It is also thin because Kant relied strongly on moral agency in autonomy and goodness of intention through reason. In this way, the social contract viewed by Kant reflects reason, as each human being is a rational being that contains the basis for rational agreement to the state. The thin aspect of Kant’s concept of citizenship is mainly based on rational potential unanimity based upon fair distributions of burdens and rights in abstraction from empirical facts or desires.\(^{21}\) Therefore, the formality of citizenship relies on his concept of rational universality for the formation of the state, but he assigns no space for real participation of the people and plurality in making the laws.

No overview of modern liberal conceptions of citizenship would be complete without J. S. Mill’s contribution. It is perhaps easiest to examine it by disaggregating his ideas into two conditions where citizenship is employed: the space in terms of nation; and


the separation between the individual autonomy from the state. The first refers to his national dimension\textsuperscript{22} which basically exposes the consideration of national identities to uphold liberal institutions where common nationality and language were necessary conditions for democracy, social unity and stability.\textsuperscript{23} The second concerns his view of individual freedom in which Mill defines freedom as the possibility for every individual to pursue happiness as he sees fit, to set his own goals and to attempt to achieve them in his own way.\textsuperscript{24} Here, freedom is envisioned as autonomy from a variety of situations and possibilities, and means and opportunities for self-development and self-government.

The \textit{thin} citizenship component of Mill’s conception of freedom rests on the passive and negative-right principle in which he set individual liberty: “on pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”\textsuperscript{25} Mill’s ideal entails that we are free only insofar as we are encouraged to choose reflectively our own beliefs and identities in contrast, in Mill’s view, to the ‘authoritative’ set of religious and cultural commitments. He fails, nevertheless, in acknowledging pluralistic views of freedom for individual agency, on one hand; and agency in the public life, in line with representative government, as only adequate for the most competent persons of skilled elites, on the other. This conception exemplifies the idea entrenched in most limited or ‘thin’ views of citizenship which emphasize that freedom is pursued in the private realm, and the public realm of political activity is a mere means to securing the private pursuit of freedom, rather than being seen as constitutive of a kind of freedom.


freedom. On this view, “freedom begins where politics ends.” Liberty is therefore understood as negative liberty, to use a well-known distinction of Isaiah Berlin’s, meaning freedom equals the absence of external constraints. Mill’s notion of citizenship does not consider that freedom—understood as autonomy—might be developed in different contexts of power and culture for multiple possibilities of free agency. Neither can his concept of individual liberty possibly reject the consequences of pursuing one’s self-determination even if in the process it may affect other individuals’ well-being, however distant in space or time. A century after Mill’s concept of liberty, John Rawls moved the liberal account forward. Rawls criticises Mill’s classical utilitarianism asserting that it “adopt[s] for society as a whole the principle of choice for one man.” In so doing, he argues, it fails to “take seriously the distinction between persons.” By contrast, he gave a liberal but plural notion of citizenship.

Rawls explored in 1971 how rational individuals engaging in a hypothetical social contract between peoples would design a truly just society. He distinguishes himself from his liberal predecessors in defending the protection of pluralism and individual rights and the promotion of socioeconomic equality as expressions of a single value. Rawls’s account has influenced contemporary liberal citizenship and liberal and postliberal theory extensively, primarily due to his two principles of justice-as-fairness, which concern equality and difference and the assumptions underpinning them. He attributes to each person equal basic rights and liberties which scheme is compatible for all. He also assigns the concept of fair equality of opportunity to all members of society to his theory of

citizenship. Individual rights and liberties stand first over the reduction of social and economic inequalities – it is the basis in which he still forges the true core of the modern-liberal theory of citizenship. In this sense, Rawls’s account gives priority to liberty as his predecessors did, but he does not go along with them in establishing a society in which mutual respect is secured by an association of rights but to set equal citizenship. His notion of citizenship is thin, akin to his modern precursors, in the idea of the citizen as a private individual in which conditions are secured “under which we can further our determinate conceptions of the good, whatever it is.” It is also thin because he asserts his theory of justice (viewed in his concepts of “original position”) as relatively uncontroversial, relatively fixed, where some principles of justice trump others. For Rawls, citizenship would require a society that consists of a basic structure—a “well-ordered society”—which must assure each citizen “an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all.” More precisely, the main aspect of a Rawlsian citizenship lies in “reasonability” through which this ‘scheme for all’ can be attained.

At this point, Rawls’s resembles Mill’s citizenship in which a perfectionist ethic is based on a regime of liberal rights which ensures autonomy for the pursuit of individual’s notion of the good. Individual freedoms and reasonability are imperative in their notion of citizenship. Locke, Kant, Mill and Rawls share the passivity of their view of the private

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32 For “original position” see section 25 in Rawls, A Theory of Justice; and for “veil of ignorance” see Freeman, Companion to Rawls, 11.
33 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 105-6.
35 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 5.
36 ‘Reasonability’ is, for Rawls, key for public political discourse. Discourse should be, in his view, constrained in manner and matter: to be neutral, confined to those propositions on which all groups happen to agree, and should spurn issues that provoke disagreement. Hence, those limitations would be imposed by “being reasonable” that “is part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the idea of public reason.” See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 62. And for an analysis on “public reason,” see Penny Enslin, Shirley Pendlebury and Mary Tjiattas, “Deliberative Democracy, Diversity and the Challenges of Citizenship Education,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 35, no. 1 (2001): 115-30.
citizen as the primary political agent. Politics, in their view, is practiced only within ‘reasonable structures’ in which the multiple notions of the good cannot interfere between one another. These assumptions presuppose, therefore, pre-political ‘reasonable agreements’ in which politics, according to liberalism, should be based. But, if freedoms and politics are enshrined in the private sphere where citizenship can fully be exercised, as liberals argue, what is it left in the public sphere for constructing inter-active notions of citizenship? Approaches to answer this question are discussed shortly as notions of thick citizenship. Before doing so, I discuss the modern-liberal concept of citizenship conceived as an ‘institution,’ whose legal (and universal) status is still circumscribed by the nation-state.

The first synthesised approach of contemporary modern understanding of citizenship is captured, to some extent, by what T.H. Marshall termed full citizenship. Marshall defines citizenship as a personal legal status that is bestowed on full members of a political community and endows them with a set of common rights and duties. This component made citizenship connect the juridical element and the principle of equality for all members between delimited political communities: the nation-states. National citizenship evolves from this standpoint where civil, political and social rights constituted his notion of full citizenship. This involves the geographic fusion into a national scale where the concept of citizenship is conceived as a status that entitles rights: citizens hold a form of legal personhood, and there is an extension of a fuller measure of equality for all those subject to the law. In short, Marshall expanded the ‘legal subjectivity’ of the (thin) citizen from simple equal civil and political rights, what early liberals did, into the realm of equal social rights, within the boundaries of the nation-state, to full members of society to

be identified with the national community. The Marshallian synthesis of citizenship thus provides, in Cohen’s words, “the classic articulation of the hegemonic paradigm of modern citizenship”\(^{38}\) which, one might add, might be slightly more padded than the Lockean-Millian ultra-formal thin citizen. Yet the formal quality of the status and rights-based elements of Marshall’s version of the citizen still remains enough to accurately categorize this view of citizenship as nevertheless thin. For it remains attached to the view that being a citizen merely ‘underwrites’ and secures the more important ‘stuff’ of liberal living—the pursuit of one’s autonomously chosen individual freedoms in the private sphere, as unimpeded by the state as possible, provided that doing so does not harm anyone else’s rights to pursue the same freedoms.

It is not my intention to explore here the development of formal Marshallian citizenship and the impact in the political development within the nation-state system at a global scale. Instead I hope to use this discussion to shed a little light on how the concept of thin citizenship construed as a package of formal rights (civil, political and social rights) is changed, if not radically, by other forms of citizenship that contest the modern paradigm of citizenship. What remains unclear is whether institutional mechanisms bring themselves meaningful participation of the citizen in more complex societies. This is particularly relevant for the debate regarding forms of transnational citizenship discussed in the last part of this chapter. I give a theoretical matrix to show how thin citizenship—as well as the notion of “full citizenship” as an institution circumscribed to a particular territory—has theoretical and practical flaws which are offset by alternative thick notions of citizenship. The purpose of next section is to give an analysis to shift our paradigm of thin, and rather passive, notion of citizenship to thick and inter-active ones.

1.1. The Shifting Modern-Liberal Citizenship Paradigm

Cohen identifies three key components of the liberal-modern concept of citizenship that brings an analytic matrix I use to re-assess the modern understanding of citizenship in the process of conceptualising global citizenship. These are: citizenship as a political principle of democracy that involves participation in deliberating and decision-making by political equals for a body politic; citizenship as a juridical status of legal personhood that comprises of legally specified rights making the legal subject to claim the state’s (or other institutions) protection; and citizenship as a form of membership in an exclusive category that forms the basis of a special tie giving a social status and a pole of identifications that can construct thick identity to generate solidarity, civic virtue and engagement.⁴⁰ Cohen argues that depending on the theoretical basis—either liberal, republican-democratic or communitarian—theorists have focused on one or another component when conceptualising citizenship.⁴⁰

Starting with citizenship as a political principle of democracy, we return to Aristotle’s principle of self-rule by a demos that contributed to the foundations of modern republican theories.⁴¹ Citizenship is here “construed as an activity that involves participation in ruling and being ruled by equals who have uniform political status and rights.”⁴²

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The second aspect Cohen distinguishes in the literature is that of citizenship as *juridical status of legal personhood* in the construction of the *legal subject* to claim either the state or other legal-bounded institutions for the protections of individual rights. This is particularly what the Roman law to modern liberal accounts of Locke, Kant, Mill and even Rawls have construed for the concept and idea of citizenship. The essential difference between this line and the previous one is that the juridical dimension gives citizenship the universalising principle which makes citizenship inclusive, not tied to a particular collective identity, or membership in a *demos*, and is likely to go well with a plurality of different statuses, and it need not be territorially bound.\(^4\) This will become important later on, since the universal aspect inherent in the juridical model of ‘legal personhood’ is open to models of transnational and even global citizenship as, for example, the global positivisation of human rights. However, the juridical-universal model seems to be depoliticising and desolidarising which is generally contested by most of civic-republican exponents.\(^4\)

The problem republicans find in this vision of citizenship is that it undermines the will of political participation or even a strong identification to a particular community. Two components which bring tension are identified: the juridical as universalising and inclusive but apolitical and individualistic; and democratic civic republican components of citizenship as internally egalitarian and uniform but externally exclusive and particularising.\(^4\) Both by asserting the individual-universal character of citizenship or by standing on the strict civic-republican basis can bring some ethical and practical problems. The individual-universal character of citizenship, however, will be discussed in the last section of this chapter when approaching the linkage between legal personhood and the

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nation-state, as well as taking universality in conceiving global citizenship. I show the theoretical grounds that *thick* citizenship—that is, a fuller and deeper meaning of membership in a political community—provides for contrasting and highlighting the weaknesses that some scholars find in the liberal notion of citizenship.

Three aspects can be distinguished between the (thin) liberal view and a thicker dimension that regards citizenship potentially exercised in different political spheres. The first consists of citizenship conceived as a matrix of rights and obligations governing the members of a political community, viewed in its several ‘natural’ boundaries either as civil society, commonwealth, nationhood or democracy. The thin concept of citizenship downplays or even avoids encouraging political participation in the public sphere. It gives no political sense other than safeguarding individual rights to be exercised in the extensive private sphere. Largely, it undermines obligations to the community above and beyond merely avoiding harming anyone else’s civil or political rights.

The second aspect concerns whether citizenship is seen as a share of rights and obligations arising from a ‘universal’ status alongside the concept of ‘equality’ arising from this shared status. This (thin) formal sense of citizenship leaves little room to motivate or encourage the liberal citizen to participate actively in political life in anything more than a strictly formal sense, as in Kant’s view, or “active citizenship” discussed earlier. This is derived from the general liberal belief that “freedom begins where politics ends.” To be free from politics will allow us to concentrate on following our particularistic ways of life in the enlarged private realm of individual freedoms. But the same problem stems from this: we are not encouraged to engage in thinking about common matters. So collective and political obligations become more of a necessary evil, and not an activity valued in its own
right. The more one thinks of being a citizen like this, the less one will be inclined to, or practiced in, thinking about what could be in the public good.

The third aspect distinguishing thin and thick citizenship concerns whether it claims priority of universalistic identity implied by citizenship over other plural identities. This tension expresses itself in the conflict between the ‘universal’ citizen and various diffused identities, especially where citizenship has traditionally claimed priority over other identities. The problem arise when, in practice, this results in the relegation of alternative identities to an extra-political or even pre-political status.46

These problems have moulded the way, if strictly taken on this account, citizenship is conceived in the dual relation between the individual and the state and how it diffuses the nature of politics in the public arena.

The expansion of scope in correlation to thin-thick concepts of citizenship may well provide the basis for re-assessment of modern liberal citizenship and analyse whether it is indeed feasible and desirable to maintain a unidimensional conception of citizenship. Here I argue for constructing broader scopes involving diverse and multilayered conceptions of citizenship as core for conceiving global citizenship. I concentrate, for now, on thick conceptions of citizenship in democratic civic-republican perspective in Rousseau’s concept of citizenship and the social compact, and Barber’s famous concept on strong democracy. The following section has the hope to flesh out different conceptions with regard to the perception of politics and the political space. It will set the theoretical pathway for the construction of a concept of global citizenship in exploring theoretical visions on expanded political arenas within substantial insights of the political.

2. Active Citizenship: Politics, Public Space and Inter-Action

Rousseau was the very first modern exponent who separated the citizen oriented to the common good from the Lockean private man. For Rousseau, citizenship was the new form of organization and order for political power as the citizen became a member of a national political community. Rousseau moved the individualistic notion of the social contract to a social compact theory that relied on the communitarian individual—the citizen—who acquired obligations to the community.47 Rousseau’s position of citizenship may give us an image of a citizen (or groups of citizens, the demos) with public identity as the dominant identity where the public good precedes individual desires and interests. The problem with Rousseau’s republicanism is that civic virtues, in the Enlightenment and perhaps currently in some liberal countries with high nationalism, take the form of national courage, loyalty, patriotism, military discipline, and primarily, statecraft.48

This form of pure civic citizenship can entail other problems. One concerns individual identity formation which is not necessarily to be central to one’s sense of self and politics.49 The other relates to the transformations of modern states into more heterogeneous and complex societies that do not allow the kind of “moral unity” and “mutual trust” that has been projected onto the ancient polis.50 Nevertheless, if it is

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47 This position is translated to the first and second dimension of Bubeck’s thick citizenship where the first corresponds to the citizen’s possession of virtues, the responsibility for fulfilling specific civic obligations, and the second, the active engagement of the citizen within the community and participation in political life. See Bubeck, “Thin, Thick and Feminist Citizenship,” cited in Who Cares?: Gender and Citizenship, 3-4.
considered that pure civic-republicanism leads to some practical problems, some aspects furthered by Benjamin Barber are worth noting to distinguish the liberal account’s weaknesses on citizenship mainly regarding the nature of politics and spaces for political action.

Barber builds his conception of politics with citizenship, as Rousseau does, in a way which participation is reflected in action forms by contrast of pursing private interests through natural consensus as conceived by liberal thought.  

51 He echoes Hannah Arendt’s conception of action as to highlight the difference between formal political acts and substantive political action – which will be developed later in this thesis.

Barber disaggregates the grip of juridical and procedural theories of liberalism from a conception of “strong democracy” that “aspires to transform conflict through a politics of distinctive inventiveness and discovery.”  

52 He thus conceives politics in terms of conflict and pluralism, and sees action, and the consequences of action, as the focus of political life. He criticises incisively the “formal reasoning and abstract principles” of writers such as Rawls, Nozick and Habermas because they invoke norms of rationality that are not in fact ‘reasonable’ of shared focus on ‘political processes’ on the question of how to act in the face of disagreement and conflict. He continues that there can be no legitimate appeal to overarching truths, and there is no “independent ground for judgement in politics.”  

53 In doing so, he stigmatizes liberal thought for founding a priori reasoning and foundations of universal truths.  

54 Barber’s account is fruitful in furthering the Rousseauian concept of the republic by bringing the conception of politics toward the possibility of agonistic contestation and

52 Barber, Strong Democracy, 119.  
54 Barber, Strong Democracy, 135.
conflict via the principle of mutuality, and proposing ‘self-government’ by active civic engagement in institutionalising strong democracy. However, his account on democracy falls short in supporting two important aspects for politics within and outside the limits of the political community. The first is bringing politics into a centred political space *vis-a-vis* frontal contestation between the members of this political community which does not permit reflexivity and deliberative confrontation that requires contact with *others* from different political spaces. This could bring practical and ethical problems in the implementation of this conception of *strong* democratic citizenship: the civic role of identity may undermine other sources of identities, memberships and belonging; and it may hamper other possible forms of democratic membership in different polities. Here citizenship is a *form of membership* as exclusive category that can foster a common identity—*thick* identity based on solidarity, active engagement and civic virtues—of the *demos* engaged in self-rule.55 This kind of democratic civic-republicanism (such as Barber’s *strong democracy*) could be a mechanism of social closure where citizenship forms a special tie and specific identity, and can be particularistic in the access to membership. This feature may be also paralleled with what communitarians understand belonging in relation to identity where democratic citizenship requires *thick*, shared, national and homogenous cultural tradition that is given, not chosen, to motivate commitment and engagement.56

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Hannah Arendt’s vision of ‘agonism’\(^{57}\) shifted the view in which Aristotle conceived politics as mere activity as the foundation of political participation. She rather concentrated on the agonistic-pragmatic concerns that contrast so sharply with the contemporary liberal and democratic concept of citizenship.\(^{58}\) While there is no time to explore Arendtian agonism in anything like the depth this difficult concept requires here, a brief look at the foremost key contributions of her conception of politics and the public sphere can form a useful basis for several later elements of my argument in this thesis.

In *The Human Condition* Arendt sees action as spontaneous, revelatory and exemplary of human initiative and power. Action is inherently public and takes place in a collectivity that requires a political community of fellow (equal) citizens. She asserts that “[r]eal political action comes out as a group action,”\(^{59}\) where action and speech have a revelatory role in construing our identities and our distinctness in the public realm.\(^{60}\) Arendt’s agonistic politics are therefore constituted by the activity of participating in politics and not by a means-end continuum as found governing the liberal model.

One of the major contrasts Arendt made between her view of politics and citizenship from that of modern liberal citizenship is that hers is based on *praxis*-action and speech being essential for “sheer human togetherness” and “self-revelation” between the individual on common matters.\(^{61}\) This emphasis on human qualities is opposed to the liberal concept of citizenship based on institutions, laws, representation and procedures as the view of political relationships between the individual and, mainly, statecraft. This

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\(^{57}\) Agonism represents the activity of popular confrontation, contestation, conflict and debate on public matters and the arena(s) in which these take place. See Emma R. Norman, “Agonism,” in *Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought*, eds. P. Clarke and K. Foweraker (London: Routledge, 2001), 9.


\(^{60}\) Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 180.

feature, for Arendt, means the destruction of the very substance of human relationships where politics are inevitably constituted by activity and participation and not through “tangible products or recognisable ends of that activity.” The disaggregation that Arendt makes here between the nature of politics and statecraft is crucial for understanding citizenship outside (and/or inside) the structures of the state. Indeed she emphasizes that action “always establishes relationships,” or a ‘web of relationships’ of human affairs that may or not be established within a space surrounded by formal structures. Reducing the state as the exclusive political space, in her view, cannot provide the political realm where formal, state-bureaucratic constraints exist.

Within the republican tradition, Barber and Arendt can be criticised for not foreseeing that strong democracy of active political participation presupposes a normative commitment to the value of political engagement and civic virtue above other private and public goods, and perhaps other action spheres that are not merely the political. The gaps of the model of thick democratic republicanism are tempered, to some extent, by Jürgen Habermas and Benhabib’s models of “deliberative democracy.”

Benhabib aimed to construct a liberal-deliberative democratic conception that avoids thickening civic republicanism into communitarianism. In this sense, Benhabib brings a broader and deeper scope to developing new concepts of citizenship for the 21st century.

Seyla Benhabib’s deliberative democracy consists of procedural deliberation of “intelligible rules, procedures, and practices” where rationality and legitimacy rely on

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64 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 190, 181, 204.
65 I concentrate on Benhabib’s model since space is restricted and her view on democracy will be developed throughout this thesis.
collective decision-making in the common interest of all.\textsuperscript{66} She believes in the liberal maxim of the individual’s basic rights of freedom and equality only in the existence of appropriate public process of deliberation. However, her contribution is highly relevant for construing global citizenship in key points that differ from the ‘procedural’ perspective of liberalism\textsuperscript{67} and Arendtian agonism, while Benhabib puts into practice Arendt’s vision of the nature of politics inserting deliberative forms of procedures. First, she makes the distinction between the concept of civil society and the public realm that is usually tied to state and legal-constitutional functions underpinned in liberal form of democracy. She conversely regards civil society as public where citizens participate in varied associations in an “anonymous public conversation.”

It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations that an anonymous “public conversation” results. It is central to the model of deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere of mutually interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, contestation, and argumentation.\textsuperscript{68}

Her concept of “deliberative speech” makes the difference from the vision of what Rawls conceived as civil society which is attached to the notion of the public and non-public reason in terms of governmental functions.\textsuperscript{69} Benhabib’s public civil society depends on reason and deliberative processes and not in state-public frameworks. Yet, in contrast to Arendian agonism and the participation of the citizen in the public realm, Benhabib argues


\textsuperscript{67} Liberal proceduralism consisted in formalising the political, as Norman notes, “to constitutional essentials, activities of law-making and engaging in the arena of international affairs” where politics is understood as “largely tied to institutions and offices ... in which the power of those institutions and offices has been used and in arguments proposing new uses of the power of the state”. For a further exploration on this point see Norman’s chapter one in Emma R. Norman, El yo político. Concepciones del yo, la política y la autonomía en la teoría política contemporánea (México: Ediciones Coyoacán, 2007).

\textsuperscript{68} Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model,”74.

\textsuperscript{69} Rawls distinguishes public from nonpublic uses of reason by reference to governmental and quasi-governmental venues and functions (e.g. administrative acts, parliamentary debates, political parties, and so on). See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213-20.
that some procedural mechanisms need to be inserted to protect and promote equality in the expression of opinions within the public associations to which individuals belong.

Second, Benhabib complements Habermasian deliberative democracy with her concept, as her procedural mechanism of ‘deliberative–and informed–speech,’ which is agonistically free and unconstrained to constitutional or legislative criteria\textsuperscript{70} but which compel critical reflection. This critical reflexivity “forces the individual to think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved.”\textsuperscript{71} Benhabib’s view of deliberation as procedural mechanism brings the possibility of participation and contestation between individuals and groups, as informed judgement, which can expand our conception of ours’ and others’ identity(ies) beyond the formal borders like the nation-state or any other political entity. At the same time, it is possible to re-affirm identity and difference within this model of free speech and reflexive judgement where participants are compelled to give reason and consideration from the point of view of other. This gives potentiality of identity self-creation and “self-affirmation”\textsuperscript{72} within deliberative and reflective process. Benhabib adds that reciprocal moral recognition takes place in the moral-political dialogue between participants in which one another’s entitlement to moral respect and reciprocity is created.\textsuperscript{73} The extent of these principles derives as consequence of discourse itself. The divergence from what liberals conceived in the formation of civil society of conflicting rights-claim, in the Lockean sense, is that Benhabib’s politics consist in examining, assessing, discuss or even re-formulating conceptions and formulations of rights.

Benhabib’s essential contribution to conceiving global citizenship, in my view, resides in her vision of decentring the demos from the liberal concept of civil society of

\textsuperscript{70} Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model,” 70.
\textsuperscript{71} Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model,” 71-2.
\textsuperscript{72} Norman, \textit{El yo político}, see esp. chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{73} Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model,” 79.
constrained governmental-statecraft procedures and boundaries. This brings the possibility of practicing and acting in multiple public arenas. That is, citizens of the 
*demos* can participate in the public sphere even outside of formal-governmental boundaries. It does not imply that it will be disarticulated or even irrational, but it must compel self-affirmation that would derive from reflexion and could create identities within the deliberation process in the inter-action of individual and groups within and between different political arenas. Recognising that the Arendtian view gives an important conception of politics where this inter-action between groups and individuals can be developed and achieved, Benhabib complements this by giving a valuable component of regulative principles and procedures that can encourage respect, reflexion, judgement, self-creation and self-affirmation that does not rest on pure agonistic face-to-face contestation. This is an essential aspect that delocalising political agora in the formation of the idea and concept of global citizenship.

3. **Globalisation and the Postmodern Paradigm: Post-national Citizenship and Agonistic Pluralism**

Postmodernist international relations theorists strive to challenge the sovereignty of states by deconstructing the boundaries of the ruling powers, highlighting irregular and uncontrolled international movements and flows, and thus fracturing stable unities and oppositions. ‘‘Discourse’’ and ‘‘interpretation’’ are presented as powerful weapons against the institutional rigidities of the modernist perspectives. The resulting postmodernist analyses point toward the possibility of a global politics of difference, a politics of deteritorialized flows across a smooth world, free of the rigid striation of state boundaries.74

Contemporary rhetoric based on the cutting edge of technology and communications, intense flows of capital, goods, information and people, and the world economy, have pushed into our minds an accepted general idea of the impact on our lives that this

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economic transformation has caused.\textsuperscript{75} What it is not sufficiently clear, however, is whether these transformations—namely what modernity has bequeathed us in a world system of nation-states, as some argue\textsuperscript{76}—have established defined patterns across a large number of areas of contemporary life in different regions, and how globalisation has impacted the social and the individual life.\textsuperscript{77} As a response, an overwhelming number of positions have emerged in recent decades to embrace a coherent approach for a conceptual extension or renovation of globalisation to fill the gaps of a monochromatic, somewhat unidimensional view of economic globalisation and interdependence\textsuperscript{78} in the global reality.

Approaches are varied and have given nuanced concepts of globalisation: as action at a distance;\textsuperscript{79} a space-time compression;\textsuperscript{80} an accelerating interdependence;\textsuperscript{81} a shrinking world;\textsuperscript{82} from global integration to consciousness of the global condition,\textsuperscript{83} among other concepts.\textsuperscript{84} The diversification of visions and studies has opened the path for the development of the theory of globalisation starting mainly with the concept of the “global village” coined by Marshall McLuhan that rendered the transformation of political and social functions toward human global awareness.\textsuperscript{85} These visions are expressed as a

\textsuperscript{75} At least for those who has a significant contact with technological, communications and economic transformations.
\textsuperscript{76} For postmodernity refers generally to globalization as a consequence of modernity. See Anthony Giddens, \textit{The Consequences of Modernity} (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).
\textsuperscript{79} See Giddens, \textit{Consequences of Modernity}.
\textsuperscript{80} Refer to David Harvey, \textit{The Condition of Postmodernity} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
consequence of the extensive nature of networks of relations and connections, the intensity of flows and levels of activity within these networks, and the velocity of interchanges that have increasingly occupied the global arena. It is not evident, though, how these processes affect particular political communities: human inter-relations; the development of new and broader identities and allegiances; and their linkage to all these phenomena of extensive, intense, and rapid ‘movement’. In other words, it is unclear how these processes of interaction, organization, flows and networks, are affecting not merely political and social relations but also individual life. For example, Jürgen Habermas, Martin Albrow and Anthony Giddens have different approaches to the global condition, yet they agree on prioritising the decline in the role of the nation-state as the main political subject for defining citizenship.

If this is true in general terms, the macro perspective of globalisation in the world system falls short in explaining or even merely in accommodating the individual position in world politics and her or his daily life political position in the globe. For it is difficult not to agree with Jean Aart Scholte’s observation that “substantial parts of humanity have staked significant parts of their policies, their fortunes, their careers, their identities and their convictions on the premise that ours is an increasingly global world.”

The nature of politics and the creation of new political spaces have changed within a context of global transformations that have created new or enhanced inter-relations between multiple political actors from the local to the global scale. The way these have influenced identity

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88 Albrow, The Global Age.
and allegiance construction between individuals, groups or communities within multilayered political spaces—which may not be construed exclusively within the national context—is linked to how citizenship has changed alongside, and as a result of, these transformations. In this line of bringing answers to questions of global transformations, identity building and political community limitations, postmodern and post-national accounts have explored how these changes have influenced on the idea and concept of citizenship. These have, to some extent, expanded the vision in which global citizenship has come to be conceivable.

Certainly, the multiple discourses on citizenship have reflected the ethical, theoretical and practical endeavours to explain or encourage different assumptions about the citizen, the political community (or the state) and, overall, politics. These discourses have an important role in defining the central position of, and practice of, politics in IR theory, especially when the territorially consolidated, sovereign nation-state has faced increasing pressures over the past few decades. One of the most controversial pressures is the increasing porosity of national borders in the way that nation-state sovereignty within an international system was once conceived.

3.1 Post-national Citizenship

The notion that the nation-state must be a sovereign, bounded, self-sufficient entity exercising uniform control over its ‘citizen-subjects’ is not as empirically accurate as Held, Sassen and Falk may argue. The modern state still continues to exercise jurisdictional authority and, in terms of full citizenship, it remains a very important form of membership, security, status and power. Nevertheless, the international system of states no longer claims

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exclusive sovereignty over internal or external matters of the nation-states such as the environment, the economy and other problems that have an impact at global scale. Questions of justice that require some moral and legal obligations outside national borders are also claimed\textsuperscript{92} as a consequence of major human transnational flows, for example, that has rendered unsuitable, or in contrast to what happens in reality, what the republican model may establish for the membership of national citizens. In this sense, a theoretical groundwork emerges as to study these processes that concern citizenship: post-national citizenship.

On one hand, theories of post-national citizenship attempt to explain how economic and cultural structures upon which national citizenship depend are undermined. On the other, they review the different ways in which citizenship depends on identity, homogeneity and culture, perceived as tied to the nation, have changed.\textsuperscript{93} In this sense, post-national citizenship uncouples the nation and citizenship in a way that undoes the liberal democrat and communitarian projects of (con)fusing nationality and identity culture in their models of citizenship.\textsuperscript{94} There are two arguments that Tambini has distinguished to mobilize in the defence of national citizenship: individuals benefit from being embedded in national cultures, and citizenship cannot function without nationalism.\textsuperscript{95} These two assumptions lead us to imagine that in the absence of the nation as the embodiment of the public good—as communitarians and republicans believe and with no recognizable identity, civic culture, or project, citizenship seems to be impossible to achieve. It is not my intention to develop

\textsuperscript{94}Joseph Carens, “Two Conceptions of Fairness: A Response to Veit Bader,” \textit{Political Theory} 25, no. 6 (December 1997): 814-20. See Kimlicka’s concept of culture as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’, that is more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland in Will Kimlicka, \textit{Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
\textsuperscript{95}Tambini, “Post-national citizenship,” 203.
the debate between the sustainability of national citizenship (though this is an interesting set of questions). I instead highlight here the basic precepts of Yasmine Soysal’s post-national citizenship that develops to imagining citizenship which is not circumscribed, or attached, to the nation-state.

Soysal is one of the most influential scholars in post-national theory who advocates understanding the limits of state sovereignty where rights are concerned. On one hand, she asserts that national sovereignty has become “celebrated and codified in international conventions and treaties.” On the other, the “notion of human rights, as a codification of abstract concepts of personhood, has become a pervasive element of world culture.”96 She rather shifts the vision of citizenship based on national institutions and social entities and human rights discourse to “global discourse [that] creates new actors and collective interests which, in turn, exert pressure on existing systems. Once codified and materialised through conventions, legal instruments, and recursive deployment, this discourse becomes a focal for interest-group activities and public attention.” She adds “[i]t enables mobilization, opens up an array of legitimate claims, and amplifies action.”97

Soysal argues that new transnational institutions permit new forms of participation beyond the nation-state, and thus in effect ‘post-national membership,’ that is, citizenship in practice, without nominal national citizenship is possible. Although Soysal does not advocate for surpassing the nation-state for this aim, she rather demonstrates that “rights that were once associated with belonging in a national community have become increasingly abstract, and defined and legitimized at the transnational level.”98 In sum, for her the existence of global institutions and discourses of human rights, and legal institutions

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of appeal challenge the nation-state’s monopoly on rights and offer new challenges of citizenship participation.

If Soysal’s arguments are valid in that political identity(ies) and belonging(s) need not be conceived in state-centric terms, then democratic governance, as it may be presupposed, implies drawing boundaries and creating rules of membership at some level. Democratic implications of boundary-setting of global political communities are necessary—and will be outlined in the second chapter of this thesis. Following, Connolly and Honig show how citizenship has been shaped in important ways by an increasing sensitivity to the politics of identity. This corresponds to the recent surge of theoretical insights regarding citizenship, the political community, and the existing tension between the heterogeneity of social life and the multiple identities that arise thereof.

3.2 Agonistic Pluralism

In line with Arendtian agonism, William Connolly\textsuperscript{99} and Bonnie Honig\textsuperscript{100} explore questions of identity and difference in post-modern terms. They rely upon Arendt’s account of the relationship between agonism and pluralism in a way that agonism could be compatible with formal respect and recognition for citizens’ multiple identities. They agree with Arendt on the claim that agonistic democracy helpfully directs us to understand the importance of moral and political disagreement in cultivating oppositional yet respectful civic and political relations and practices. For Connolly, this democratic perspective “cultivates a politics of agonistic respect among multiple constituencies who respond


differentially to mysteries of being while acknowledging each other to be worthy of respect.\footnote{Connolly, \textit{The Ethos of Pluralization}, 154.} Accordingly, they believe that insights on truth meaning and identity cannot follow a liberal understanding of politics of neutral institutions and principles. They alternatively urge us to abandon strong norms of political agreement, rational dialogue and ideal consensus in political life.

It is here that postmodern agonistic democrats disagree with mainstream liberals and with some proponents of deliberative democracy in deviating the nature and telos of politics: not as directed through consensus or aim for a \textit{modus vivendi}\footnote{Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism,” \textit{Political Science Series, Institute for Advanced Studies} (2000), 3. [Accessed 13 January 2009], available from: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_72.pdf} but conflict as central to politics in rejecting purely juridical or procedural forms of justice. Proponents of postmodern agonism thus emphasize the need to rethink citizenship in liberal democratic states so as to permit a wider range of ethical differences to emerge in the course of political dialogue and debate. As Miller points out, to conceive the citizen as “someone who plays an active role in shaping the future direction of his or her society through political debate and decision-making.”\footnote{David Miller, “Citizenship and Pluralism,” \textit{Political Studies} 43, no. 3 (1995): 443.} It is in the hope of postmodern agonism to neither presuppose nor aspire to build a fully cohesive ethical or political community bound by common moral or rational institutions and beliefs—as Mouffe anticipates in the “return of the political.”\footnote{Chantal Mouffe, \textit{The Return of the Political} (London and New York: Verso, 1993); and Chantal Mouffe, “Politics, Democratic Action, and Solidarity,” \textit{Inquiry} 38, no. 1 (1995): 102.}

The postmodern grounds of agonistic democracy, such as those underpinning the arguments of Connolly or Honig, carry the dilemmas that Arendtian agonism advocates when these are translated into extraterritorial formations of political communities. The component of plurality does not contemplate other forms of plurality formation besides
from the political—that is, ascriptive and social differences as valuable and worthy of moral and political respect.\textsuperscript{105} To use Deveaux’s words, in contrast with Arendtian conceptions of pluralism as descriptive and normative,\textsuperscript{106} “pluralism is also a normative and evaluative concept, it recognizes the moral, social and political significance of human diversity.”\textsuperscript{107}

What can be gleaned from this is that normative and evaluative processes that may be influenced by moral or social different contexts may have an impact in politics when taken into broader and trans-political communities. The social and moral vision of politics may be also source, or perhaps source of interest, for the formation of political communities that go beyond the nation-state. What it is indeed valuable to focus on is the Arendtian nature of politics and the variable on how pluralism is formed when we analyse transnational political communities and take the concept of global citizenship with deeper meaning.

4. Conclusion: Re-imagining Citizenship: Problems of Imaging and Performing Global Citizenship

The concept and idea of citizenship is now a site of vigorous contestation in terms of how it is envisioned and practiced. The concept and idea of global citizenship has emerged as one response that attempts to explain how political action and new spaces have changed in a context of heightened globalisation. Recent literature on global citizenship has stressed mainly a mainstream approach that focuses on what can be called moral cosmopolitanism as its major theoretical framework. Richard Falk is one of the central advocates of cosmopolitanism in constructing the moral and theoretical ground for global citizenship


\textsuperscript{106} Deveaux does not try to diminish the value of Arendt’s affirmation of human uniqueness and individual diversity, nor her vision of politics. But she argues that Arendtian account fails to address contemporary dilemmas of diversity. That is, in Arendt’s work The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt was concerned to argue for a conception of basic political rights for all citizens that would be agnostic to social and cultural differences – differences which she saw as a basis for withholding such rights. Arendt in this work also denies that social differences among human beings might be politically important in legitimate ways. See Hannah Arendt, The Origin of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 301-2.

\textsuperscript{107} Monique Deveaux, “Agonism and Pluralism,” 8, 10.
which, for him, is embedded in abstract universal rights and in a conception founded upon a multiplicity of citizen-selves. Accordingly, cosmopolitan global citizenship has emphasised the holistic view of encompassing humanity into a single community under an ethical universalistic basis—which proponents of cosmopolitan global citizenship for the most part agree.

On this account, cosmopolitan global citizenship implies, to a large extent, a form of thin citizenship and is largely influenced by modern Kantian thought. Hence, global citizenship is still seen as a moral standard of egalitarian universalism, which demands equal respect for, and consideration of, everyone; and an ethical standard of individualism. If the criticism of, and arguments against, thin citizenship that I presented earlier are correct, then these aspects of thin citizenship reflected in the cosmopolitan view could present gaps in practice and in theory when it comes to resolve the relation between citizenship and identity, on one hand, and politics and public activity, on the other.

I developed throughout this chapter the diverse conceptions of citizenship that can fill the gaps that liberal, and even cosmopolitan, citizenship permit to open up in terms of

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the nature of politics and creation of extra-territorial political spaces. It is in this sense that the concept I try to build from now on contrasts with cosmopolitanism. The claim that citizenship today needs not necessarily be tied to the idea of the nation or to a territorially bounded state is becoming increasingly accepted in the literature on post-national citizenship both within and beyond the discipline of International Relations. What I wish to add is that it also need not necessarily be tied to modern expressions of the individual so crucial to the liberal project. A post-liberal, post-national project instead does not depend on a view of thin citizenship entrenched exclusively in the state’s territorial boundaries. It rather emphasises the realities that constant social and political changes have on sources and definitions of citizens’ identities, and the definition of extra-territorial political communities where political activity can be developed.

Nevertheless, at this point of the analysis on thin citizenship, the concept of global citizenship should not be conceived as, or perhaps furthered in the form of, mere legal status securing a number of fundamental human rights as global rights. Many authors have agreed that global citizenship should not be purely an extension of (individual) rights to a global scale but must have a significant political dimension.  

I conclude that our outlook on the spatial sites where citizenship can be envisioned may vary from the concept we have about politics as relations among co-citizens within the nation-state, or relations among states. Disaggregating citizenship from our imaginary contours of the modern state would not attempt to rule out centuries of modern theoretical development, but it would at least enhance our perception of potential politics within and beyond those confines.