

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. SECURITY, THE ISSUES

Hardly anyone would deny the very important role that security, whether it is global, hemispheric, regional, national –or even individual– has played throughout the history of international relations. This is because conflicts, at all these levels, occur mainly because a certain security dimension of any of these levels' subjects is being threatened.

After the peace of Westphalia in 1648, states emerged as the basic units conforming the world system. Ever since, the clashes among them and the actions that each state has taken to seek power, maintain its status quo or even guarantee its own survival have resulted in making other states feel endangered and vulnerable. In this sense, the term 'national security' and the way each entity applies it has become predominantly important as states, which are still considered to be the main actors in international relations, determine the conditions under which the other levels of security are developed. However, at the same time, it is the different processes and events that take place within a specific region or worldwide that determine the parameters upon which independent and sovereign states define their national security and prioritize the main threats they must confront. In other words, national security policies determine the way in which other levels of security work while, at the same time, these other levels influence the process by which national security is established. Such complex interrelation between different levels of security and

whose security should be addressed in the first place is one of the reasons that make ‘security’ a very debatable concept.

International interdependence is another phenomenon affecting security in the world. It has been observed that sometimes the strongest nation in a region –or a hegemony in the current case of the United States– imposes a strong influence over its neighboring countries’ national security policies as a means to protect its own interests.¹ Therefore, it becomes common that when a superpower is affected by any event, the immediate region or even the whole world is somehow forced to comply with the set of rules under which this superpower plans to deal with the situation. This is perhaps one of the reasons why events such as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, the consequent end of the Cold War, and the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States became milestones in the development of contemporary history. Not only because they changed the way in which nation-states had perceived the international system and the interaction among its actors, but also because they originated many different world-scale processes, such as globalization, which started demanding main concepts to be reviewed. Some of the most important are those of national and collective security.

The ongoing discussions behind the revision of these two terms and how they are related to other levels of security is mainly what the following pages will deal with. However, in order to have a proper understanding of the way in which they are actually assembled, it is necessary to consider first what is meant by ‘security’.

¹ This argument will be fully supported in Chapter three with the analysis of the Inter-American security relations and the important role that the U.S. has played in the establishment of the agenda and instruments supporting its own interests rather than those of the majority in the continent.

This chapter seeks to provide the basic knowledge and conceptual framework under which the conception of security, and others concepts closely related to it, have been constructed and to provide arguments of why it is claimed to be a contested and complex notion.

1.1.1. A Contested Concept

In the broadest sense of the word, the basic meaning of ‘security’ is ‘safety’ –from the Latin *securitas*– for its adjectival form is ‘secure’, meaning safe.² In social and strategic study areas though, security is mainly referred to the ‘lack of risks’ and can actually be analyzed in a wide range of fields extending from the international scene and the state level down to the individual plane, where life itself and the fundamental rights of the person ought to be preserved and protected.

Having labeled security as a ‘contested concept’, Barry Buzan argues that the attempt to provide a precise definition is fruitless. Accordingly, rather than taking on this task directly, as Buzan identifies in some detail, most authors proceed by attaching several limitations to what they mean by this term and then moving on.³ Such a claim happens to not only be true but also necessary as this concept can apply widely to different directions as to include tens of different conceptions and dimensions. Providing two useful definitions and then moving ahead to other important issues concerning this topic is exactly the path that the present project will follow. As a first approach, it is helpful to begin with Azar&Moon’s and Ayoob’s divergent definitions.

² Peter Calvert and Ian Forbes, “Security, the issues” in *The Central American Security System: North- South or East-West?* ed. Peter Calvert (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 4.

³ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 14.

For Azar and Moon, security in the orthodox view is defined as “the physical protection of the state from external threats –*violent threats that are predominantly military in nature.*”⁴ Contrastingly, in Ayoob’s perspective, “[s]ecurity is defined in relation to *vulnerabilities that threaten* to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes.”⁵

The first definition can be related mainly to the traditional approach, understood at the state and military levels, with threats coming from the exterior. The second definition evokes a more subjective concept related to stability and freedom from internal threats, such as guerrillas or perhaps lasting social unrest. This is particularly important, as it shows how the context and connotation under which the notion of security is used can change noticeably. In past decades, mainly during the Cold War years, the concept of security was based on the use of armed forces and the increase of nuclear weaponry. Security was thus easily seen as a derivation of power, especially military power. According to Buzan, “security shrank conceptually to being a way of saying either how well any particular state or allied group of states was doing in the struggle for power, or how stable the balance of power overall appeared to be.”⁶ Nevertheless, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the appearance of other international threats such as drug trafficking and terrorism, the traditional security idea based on the use of force, as the first definition exemplified,

⁴ Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software' Side of Third World National Security” in *Third World National Security: The Management of Internal and External Threats*, eds. Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon (Upleadon: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1988), 3, [my emphasis].

⁵ Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective” in *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, ed. Brian Job (United Kingdom: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 65, [my emphasis].

⁶ Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 8.

became somewhat insufficient. In contrast, as the second definition implies, domestic topics started being incorporated on the security agenda.

This argument on the different kinds of threats that jeopardize state security is only one of the several issues that characterize the security concept's contestability. As mentioned before, the question of 'whose security?' considering again that distinct levels of security may be at stake at the same time (the security of the state, the nation or the person) is the other issue at the core of the international debate. Both will be discussed further in the second chapter.

In the meantime, it is of great importance to establish the differences between the terms 'state' and 'nation', as distinguishing between these terms will become fundamental for future analysis in this thesis. In this and subsequent chapters, both terms will be distinguished as follows. In the words of Brian Job,

[t]he term 'state' has two contexts for reference, an external and an internal. In the former context, states are the actors in the international system, each with a distinct territorial base and exercising sovereignty. In its internal context, the state is usually associated with the set of institutions that organizes, regulates, and enforces interactions of groups and individuals within its territorial confines.⁷

⁷ Brian L. Job, "The insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, ed. Brian L. Job (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 15.

Under this frame, it is the state, in the Weberian conventional definition, that holds the effective monopoly in the use or licensing of legitimate force to maintain order.⁸ On the other hand, the ‘nation’ will be understood, following Horace Davis definition, as a “historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a community of culture.”⁹ From this it can be gathered that while the nation is a cultural community, it is not identical to the political community of the state. Indeed, states may contain more than one nation (e.g. Yugoslavia and Canada) and single nations may span across several states (e.g. not all Jews live in Israel). It is important to emphasize this distinction to avoid any later assumption that the security interests and aspirations of the state and the nation are always the same. Even more, they are not always congruent and concordant. While the state security agenda may be based on assuring its continuity and monopoly over violence, the nation may be willing to replace some state institutions, considering them a threat to its security.

1.1.2. Theoretical Framework

Perhaps the most significant dimension of the security concept is that of its theoretical framework. This is because when scholars locate themselves within a specific school of thought, they are automatically expected to provide a certain type of answer to any of the issues discussed in the other dimensions. These may include the targets, main actors and means used in the process of achieving or maintaining security. Within this theoretical

⁸ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” *Originally a speech at Munich University, 1918*, published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblodt, Munich ([cited 17 March 2005]): available from <http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/DSS/Weber/polvoc.html>

⁹ Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 163, [Quote from J. V. Stalin, 1913].

framework, Realism has been characterized as the dominant flow in the field of security studies, while other recent theories, such as Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism have made very interesting contributions.

1.1.2.1. Realist School of Thought

Classical Realism, represented by intellectuals such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, departs from the assumption that all nation-states are motivated by national interests which, at its most fundamental level, are understood as the preservation of their political sovereignty and their territorial integrity. Realists tend to see power as a source of security: “an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result.”¹⁰ However, power is not absolute, as it is defined in terms of a state’s capability to defend itself from the power of another or its ability to force another state to change its policies. This emphasis on relative power comes from another key conception of realist thought, which is the existence of an anarchical environment within the international system. This means that there is no authority or central government –and should not be one– over the nation-state.

Barry Buzan identifies three major conditions that the context of anarchy imposes on the concept of security:

1. “States are the principal referent object of security because they are both the framework of order and the highest source of governing authority.”¹¹ This is

¹⁰ John Baylis, “International and Global Security in the Post Cold War Era,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 257.

¹¹ Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 22.

extremely important as it helps to understand what was said before about the national security being the basic dominating policy upon which the other levels of security are enhanced.

2. “Although states are the principal objects of security, the dynamics of national security are highly relational and interdependent between states.”¹² What this suggests is that external threats, rather than internal, are supposed to be the dominate features within any national security agenda.
3. “Given the durability of anarchy, the practical meaning of security can only be constructed sensibly if it can be made operational within the environment in which competitive relations are inescapable. So long as anarchy holds the conditions will obtain. If there is ever a structural shift out of anarchy, then the entire framework of the security problem would have to be redefined.”¹³ While Buzan does not mention it, this is something that could be illustrated in the case of the international system’s reconfiguration after the consolidation of the US hegemony in the aftermath of the Cold War.

However, procuring a decentralized authority system has brought an important implication to the international system. Realists such as Morgenthau support the idea that the preservation of such anarchic system must be purchased with force, which has simultaneously reinforced the tendency of states to increase their power. It is precisely this trend to increase power that has made other states feel insecure and develop what is known

¹² Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 22.

¹³ Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 22.

as the security dilemma (a concept that will be examined later). Yet, at the same time, this use of force is generally regulated by another tendency that naturally pushes states to constitute what is called a 'balance of power'. A simple understanding of this concept refers to 'the distribution of power within the international system'. This definition is complemented by intellectuals such as Kenneth Organski, a former professor of political science at the University of Michigan, who claims that the balance of power rests on the fact that "various nations group themselves together in such a way that no single nation or group of nations is strong enough to overwhelm the others, for its power is balanced by that of some opposing group."¹⁴ The same happens with states at a world level. Within the international system, states tend to group to counterweigh the power of other state or groups of states. This tendency makes peace a more feasible condition in a self-help international environment. Morgenthau and Thompson support this argument when saying that, "the balance of power and politics aiming at [the international system] preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations."¹⁵

1.1.2.2. Social Constructivist Contributions

Critical of some of the former realist expositions, Social Constructivism has emerged in recent years as a serious competitor to other dominant approaches in the international relations theory spectrum. This theory is important to our project as it identifies variability and adaptability as two main characteristics of the international system and thus plays an

¹⁴ A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 274.

¹⁵ Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 167.

important role in the explanation of concepts like ‘security’ when recognizing their social construction and dynamic definition. Ole Weaver affirms that constructivism is based on three main premises: “first, states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; second, the key structures in the state system are inter-subjective rather than material; and third, state identities and interests are an important part of these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.”¹⁶

Generally speaking, this theory maintains that a causal relation exists among general values, the nature of the actors and their interests, as there is also an intimate relation between the construction of norms and the preferences of such actors.¹⁷ Constructivists such as Ronald Jepperson and Peter Katzenstein¹⁸ see the international system as shaped by human action and interaction. They do not only believe in a material world (like realists do) but also in the fact that this world is grounded on structures of human association and therefore is determined primarily by shared ideas and knowledge over which international relations are to be built upon.

To Constructivism, the notion of power politics, or *realpolitik*, has meaning to the extent that states accept such idea as a basic rule of international politics. According to social constructivist writers, “power politics is an idea which does affect the way states

¹⁶ Ole Weaver, “American Constructivism and the ES,” *Prepared for the Panel: A Reconsideration of the English School: Close or Reconvene? At the 24th Annual Conference of the British International Studies* December 21, 1999 [cited 28 Aug 2004] : available from <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/wheeler00.htm>

¹⁷ Mark Zacher and Richard Mathew, “Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,” in *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995), 134.

¹⁸ See Peter Katzenstein, Ronald Jepperson and Alexander Wendt, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33-75.

behave, but it does not describe all interstate behavior.”¹⁹ All this leads constructivists to argue that changing the way we think about international relations can bring a fundamental shift towards greater international security. In view of Alexander Wendt, world politics is socially constructed, grounded not on power alone, but defined in terms of shared knowledge and practices (as well as material capabilities). In his most famous text, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, Wendt points out that

In a [traditional realist] Hobbesian state of nature, states are individuated by the domestic processes that constitute them as states and by their material capacity to deter threats from other states. [Therefore] in this world, even if free momentarily from the predations of others, state security does not have any basis in social recognition, in intersubjective understandings or norms...²⁰

Wendt’s criticism here is that, within the realist model, security happens to be a matter of national power and nothing else. This author has a different vision. Wendt and other Constructivism supporters, like Martha Finnemore²¹, retake the concept of security and express the necessity to widen its traditional military and border protection notions. All this considering that “the territorial frontiers is not, in fact, equivalent to the survival of the state or its people,”²² especially when some of the new perils to international security happen to be ‘landless’ and conflicts are generated by more causes than solely power struggles. Therefore, constructivists provide a framework for analyzing threats and conflicts by

¹⁹ John Baylis, *International and Global Security in the Post Cold War Era*, 265.

²⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of world politics,” *International Organizations* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391- 425.

²¹ Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 153-185.

²² Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It,” 414.

understanding them as socially built. Edward Newman puts it very clear: “identity and interest formation derive from the social processes of interaction leading to expectations of benefits and costs attached to different types of behavior within a system.”²³ In other words, identity and interests derive from a process of social interaction and knowledge sharing rather than from power and material capabilities.

This criticism of the realist perspective is particularly important as it shows how a theoretical stand greatly influences the way in which security is perceived by different persons. As this chapter has argued, the different manners in which security is understood is what makes it a very contestable and complex concept.

In practical matters, the contribution of Constructivism remains very significant as it extends an invitation to all states to define their own security in terms of preserving their “property rights” over particular territories. This is important because it suggests that, rather than mere material resources, national interests –defined by the interaction of different actors within a state– ought to play a predominant role in the establishment of each state’s security policies. From a constructivist perspective, this is directly related to human security as states themselves are gradually acknowledging that “some forms of economic, social and political interactions are more conducive to peace and stability than others, among and within communities; that internal conflicts have a direct impact upon the international security; and that certain norms and values can be shared as a minimum standard of cooperation.”²⁴ This is why Constructivism has become perhaps the most

²³ Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” *International Studies Perspectives*, no. 2 (2001): 239-251.

²⁴ Newman, *Human Security and Constructivism*.

important ideological base supporting the promotion and consolidation of human security and why it will be used as the main theoretical stream for this project.

1.1.2.3. Neoliberal Institutionalism Theory

It is also worthwhile to examine briefly the bases of Neoliberal Institutionalism considering the importance that this project will grant to two of this theory's basic elements: cooperative security and the role that organizations play in its attainment.

In general terms, proponents of this theory argue that institutions have an important role in coordinating international cooperation. They begin with the same assumptions used by realists, except for the following: "where realists assume that states focus on relative gains and the potential for conflict, neoliberal institutionalists assume that states concentrate on absolute gains and the prospects for cooperation."²⁵ In other words, the state is an actor who seeks maximum personal utility in any action or interaction in which it is involved (it tends to look for a positive sum-game instead of what might result in a zero sum-game).²⁶ Neoliberal institutionalists, such as Robert Keohane, also believe that the potential for conflict is overstated by realists and suggest that there are countervailing forces, such as repeated interactions, that push states toward cooperation. Those forces are exactly what they call institutions. They are better described as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and

²⁵ Mark Beavis, "Neoliberal Institutionalism," *The IR Theory Knowledge Basis* (Last up-dated on 30 November 2004 [cited 19 Nov. 2004]) : available from <http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm>

²⁶ The positive-sum game is one whereby the international system can be viewed as having resources or room for states to gain or change their nature without infringing on the ability of other states to gain in turn. Absolute gains –or gains without reference to other state benefit– as a result become the concern of the self-interested state.

Shane M. Coughlan, "Can states cooperate in an anarchic environment?", *International Political System-Essay 1* [Cited 20 Nov. 2004]: available from <http://www.shaneland.co.uk/academic/ma/ipsessay1.pdf>

shape the expectations of actors.”²⁷ Institutions²⁸ take some authority from states to mediate any conflict and thus act as a limit on anarchy or what Keohane has called the ‘asymmetrical distribution of information’.²⁹ States consequently give up some sovereign power to institutions, which in return reduce the risk of other states cheating in the international system, and in that way increase interstate cooperation. In the case of international security, institutions help to set up the rules and policies under which states are to act jointly in order to maintain peace and stability.

Neoliberal Institutionalism is directly related to human security as they both stress the importance of enhancing cooperative security at regional and domestic levels through non-state institutions. With regards to the Western Hemisphere, where this project finds its object of study, the Organization of American States OAS stands out as the largest organization in charge of promoting interstate confidence building and accomplishing cooperative security.

1.1.3. Security Dilemma

In the anarchic environment in which international relations are developed, states tend to be fearful of each other because of mutual misunderstandings. Security thus becomes one of the main priorities. The key metaphor used within the realist theory to describe the security problem between states is the “security dilemma”, which was first articulated in 1950 by

²⁷ Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, “Introduction & The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions,” in *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*, eds. Haas, Keohane and Levy (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), 4.

²⁸ These may include organizations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties and agreements, and practices that states accept as binding.

²⁹ John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 99.

John Herz. In his article entitled 'Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma', Herz makes a clear explanation of the concept referring to it as "a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening."³⁰ In other words, all countries try to gain security, obtain military superiority, and improve one's own security status by increasing military expenditure. Since an arms race like the one experienced during the Cold War is an everlasting concern, a state's military superiority tends to be surpassed by others' military building-up efforts. The conclusion that follows from this is that, as some authors note³¹, absolute security is impossible, which places all countries in a dilemma.

While Wheeler and Booth do not approach this general point precisely the way that is developed here, they offer, perhaps, the best illustration of this dilemma. They suggest that because the uncertainty of some states about the military preparations made by other states is unresolvable, they are likely to remain mistrustful of each other situation. They go even further by explaining that "[i]f mistrust is mutual, a dynamic 'action-reaction' cycle may well result which will take the fears of both to higher levels."³² The so called 'missile war' experienced by the US and the USSR in 1961 is a clear example of this.

³⁰ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-180.

³¹ Among them: David Hendrickson, "Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security," *World Policy Journal* 19, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 1-10, and Bjorn Moller, "Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence[sic] as Guidelines for Defence[sic] Planning and Arms Control," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 1, no. 2 (July 1996): 47-66.

³² Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, "The Security Dilemma," in *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, eds. John Baylis and N. J. Rengger, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 29.

The conclusion that stems from all of this seems to be that insecurity has a propensity to produce further insecurity, but with the characteristic that at this level, the potential for inter-state war breaking out is ever present.

1.1.4. Insecurity Dilemma

In the previous section, the idea of how a state's increasing security can place other states into a condition of insecurity has been established. Contrastingly, another situation that remains important, especially for developing countries, is how insecurity emerging from domestic problems in one state may become a condition producing instability to other states., Brian Job, one of the most important experts on developing countries' security studies, analyzes this phenomenon and introduces a contrasting new line of thought when thinking of applying the 'security dilemma' to third world countries³³. This author claims that when internal and external circumstances of these countries are to be considered, the security dilemma does not hold up in several key ways, out of which I have selected the most important:

1. "Within the borders of the state, there is often no single nation (let's say a socially cohesive society). Instead, there are usually a variety of communal groups contending for their own scrutinizes and for supremacy over their competitors.
2. The regime in power, therefore, usually lacks the support of some significant component of the population, because the regime represents the interests either of a particular social sector, or of an economic or military elite that has taken control.

³³ Even though United Nations no longer refers to them as 'Third World Countries' but as 'Developing Countries', we will use the former tem as it is employed in the consulted source.

3. The state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide peace and order, as well as the conditions for satisfactory physical existence, for the population.
4. The sense of threat that prevails is of internal threats to and from the regime power, rather than externally motivated threats to the existence of the nation-state.”³⁴

All these considerations help support the key argument established at the beginning of this chapter and provide significant evidence to introduce and support a second claim. First, these four points show there is no necessary agreement on the notion of national security (at least in the traditional conception) and second, they illustrate that no externally oriented security dilemma for the typical third world country can be applied. Actually, the premises of the security dilemma are violated. After all, the main concern in these countries is the absence of popular legitimacy and not the security of one state over others. At this point the lack of governance becomes the main threat. The coming result is what the author actually characterizes as an insecurity dilemma:

1. “Less effective security for all or certain sectors of the population.
2. Less effective capacity of centralized state institutions to provide services and order.
3. Increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention, and control by outside actors, be they other states (mainly).”³⁵

³⁴ Job, *The insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*, 17-19.

³⁵ Job, *The insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*, 17-19.

Even though this model does not apply to all of the developing countries, it becomes very useful to this project as it helps in terms of constructing theoretical propositions regarding the security relations of third world actors. We must bear in mind that the majority of the nation-states that compose the American Continent and thus conform the Western Hemispheric Security System are classified as developing countries.

Two important conditions that can be extracted from the above segment and taken into consideration in later arguments in this thesis are that 1) sovereignty for developing countries does not imply an effective capacity of state institutions to provide security or welfare to their own population; 2) individuals or groups acting within a state against perceived threats to assure their own security consequently create an environment of increased threat and reduced security for others within the borders of such state.³⁶ These two core ideas are helpful in terms of establishing ahead in this thesis the justification of why basing the Inter-American Security System on a more integral concept of security – addressing threats coming from domestic insecurity– is desperately needed. In the meantime this ‘insecurity dilemma’ remains important to this chapter as it helps evidencing the complexity of security depending on whose security is to be dealt with in the first place.

³⁶ Job, *The insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*, 20.

1.2. SECURITY, THE CONCEPTS

1.2.1. Individual Security

The individual represents the simplest basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied. The recent emergence of social philosophical streams and the shift toward new people-centered approach models of security have placed the human or individual security in the spotlight. Therefore, the debate has come to be whether the main recipient of security should be the state or the person.

One author that has been constantly participating in this debate is Barry Buzan. He suggests that the relevance of individual security relies on the links and antagonisms that may result between personal security and the security of the state, and in the fact that even though the state is in charge of providing protection to the people, sometimes this institution is the one that threatens the individual.³⁷ What can be inferred from this claim is that the people –better understood as the nation– and the state are not always in agreement regarding security issues. Contrary to this, sometimes they can even be seen as antagonists or threats to each others security. Just as it happens with nation-states, individuals are generally perceived as the prime source of each other’s insecurity. Therefore, the state becomes the mechanism through which social insecurity among individuals ought to be regulated (individuals do not live in anarchy as states do). The paradox comes out when the state power grows and it also becomes a source of menace against the person. This is crucial as it explicitly shows that the security of the state does not always implies the security of the nation. It also provides evidence to support the ‘insecurity dilemma

³⁷ Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 35.

argument' that suggests that the lack of governance within a state may produce more insecurity to their own nation as well as to other states.

Most threats to individuals arise from the fact that people, as social animals, are embedded in a human environment that produces economic, social and political pressures. These threats come in a wide variety of forms, but there are four obvious basic types³⁸: “physical threats (pain, injury, death), economic threats (destruction of property, poverty), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil liberties), and threats to position or status (relegation, public humiliation).”³⁹ Individual security thus refers to the protection of the person from experiencing any of these threats whether they come from other individual or from the state. It is important to realize that the factors implicated in providing the individual with security are much more complicated than the ones that would be involved if trying to secure material things or even institutions. This is not only because such factors are subjective, but because many of them cannot be replaced if lost. Another feature that adds complexity to the maintenance of individual security under these terms, is its close relation that links it with the conception of ‘human development’⁴⁰. This is one of the main reasons why security studies scholars do not agree on to what extent individual security corresponds to which field.

³⁸ Some other categorizations will be introduced with the analysis of human security in the next chapter.

³⁹ Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 37.

⁴⁰ Human development can be explained in the following way: it is about much more than the rise or fall of national incomes. It is about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. People are the real wealth of nations. Development is thus about expanding the choices people have to lead lives that they value. And it is thus about much more than economic growth, which is only a means —if a very important one —of enlarging people’s choices.

United Nations Development Program, “What is Human Development?,” *Human Development Reports* ([cited 24 March 2005]): available from <http://hdr.undp.org/hd/>

This concept will be analyzed and contrasted with human security in the next chapter.

Another author that has been studying the complex relation of individual and state security is Emma Rothschild. She argues that historically, a major part of liberal thought had the individual as the referent of security and that regardless of whether it is intellectually coherent or ethically ideal, securitization of the individual is a real political practice of our times.⁴¹ The fact that the security of the person is being introduced as a fundamental element in any theoretical and practical study in many of the current conflicts in different regions of the world clearly supports this idea. Another central point is that the people –rather than the state– are becoming the direct target of the so called new threats, a situation that will be analyzed in the following chapters of this thesis.

It is important to mention that the intention is not to replace the traditional model of security. The real argument relies on the necessity to include a new level of analysis and implementation where a much more integral agenda might be designed. This agenda should involve the territorial protection and continuity of the state while simultaneously promoting a preventive model to avoid any social, economic or political threat to the people. Let's remember that states will never be safe if their citizens are not.

This concept of individual security and the ideas around it turn out to be particularly important to the project as they provide the bases upon which the concept of human security builds its foundations. In this sense, it is important to make a distinction between the deeper philosophical meaning of the concepts of the 'person' and the 'human' at this point in order to avoid any misunderstanding when referring to individual security. Although they are used interchangeably, the two notions are quite different. "A being is human when we refer to its biological, physical status as member of the species Homo

⁴¹ Emma Rothschild, "What is Security?," *Daedalus* 124, no. 3, (Summer1995): 53-98.

Sapiens, and not to its complete moral status.”⁴² However, “naming a creature a person implies that some psychological and moral predicates are met that stand away from biological classifications.”⁴³ Some of the capacities that appear in the criteria for personhood are the acts of remembering, imagining, feeling, willing, choosing and holding values.⁴⁴ All these involve the faculty of self-consciousness.

Since the individual security level, which will be the base for supporting the following parts of the project, involves the protection of such non-biological capacities, the correct term to be used is that of the person. A main argument defending human security will rely on protecting the ‘vital core’ (most meaningful values, rights, etc) of the person. A human does not possess these qualities or capacities, the person does. Not making this substantive difference (or clarification) would perhaps undermine the solid basis upon which the human security concept is constructed. Thus, it is necessary to make clear that, for practical matters, every time the term ‘human security’ is used, a reference to the protection of the person and its predicates, and not the human being, is being made.

1.2.2. National Security

When security comes to discussion in the international context, it is all about the ability of states to maintain their sovereignty and their functional integrity. Because the structure of

⁴² Eliza Loucaidou, “Embryos and Persons,” *Undergraduate Dissertation* (London: University Of Essex, April 1998), 1.

⁴³ Loucaidou, “Embryos and Persons,” 1.

⁴⁴ For further information regarding the concept of the person consult the following sources: Charles Taylor, “The Concept of a Person,” in *Human Agency and Language*, ed. Charles Taylor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 97-114.

Kevin Anderson, “Literature Review: Locke on Personal Identity,” *Classical Modern Philosophy* (March 8, 2001 [cited 27 March 2005]): available from [http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/modern/litrev/Locke-Identity\(Anderson\).html](http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/modern/litrev/Locke-Identity(Anderson).html)

the international system is anarchic, the natural focus of security concerns is the units. And since states remain the dominant units, national security obviously becomes a central issue.

Probably one of the best known conceptual pieces on security is Arnold Wolfers' article on national security. Among other things, it provides the concept with a multidimensional approach and suggests that it does not necessarily mean the same to all nations. In his paper, Wolfers argues that "the notion of national security does not even possess a precise meaning."⁴⁵ This claim might surge from the fact that security in general, as it has been continuously restated during this thesis, is a concept that is not completely agreed upon. This is the reason why all security related concepts are to be treated with special caution and why, considering the large-scale debate about its different scopes, this section will focus mainly on the relation between 'national security' and 'development', which is also the trend that human security is generally related to.

The theoretical range under which the concept of national security can be conceived is so complex and diverse that enough space is allowed to understand it as a condition, a situation, a doctrine, a capacity, or a policy among others. A common tendency though, is the fact that the large majority of independent states' foreign policy has given the preservation of the 'national interest'⁴⁶ a primordial place in the construction of their national security policies, especially when the security is defined in terms of power. National security had thus been understood traditionally in primarily military terms as "the acquisition, deployment and use of military force to achieve 'national goals'."⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1962), 187.

⁴⁶ National interest should be understood as the group of desires or pretensions that the government or special political, economic, religious, or cultural sectors use as a guide in the decision making process to determine national policies.

Alejandro Martínez Serrano, *¿Qué es la seguridad Nacional?* (México D.F.: Mayo 2001), 5, [my translation].

⁴⁷ Buzan, "People, States and Fear," 18.

However, like conceptions of security in general, this concept has been acquiring new dimensions (not focused on military and power issues only). An important distinction between ‘national security’ and ‘national defense’ appears to follow from this. In general terms, the first notion corresponds to the conception where a state must preserve the way of life in order to satisfy the national interest and guarantee the welfare and development of a nation. The second involves the measures that a state as a whole puts at stake in order to defend its interests by military means.⁴⁸ In other words, while the first condition supports national development, the second implies an expression of national power and the protection of territorial sovereignty. Development is therefore closely linked to national security. In the current international system where territorial aggression does not signify the most important threat among states (generally speaking) and where new antagonisms come in the form of landless threats, the national security concept has smoothly shifted toward the idea of development, particularly in the case of developing countries.

Robert McNamara, a former U.S. secretary of defense, stated it clearly: “national security is not the military force, although it may include it; it is not the military traditional activity, although it may include it; **security is development and without development there cannot be security.**”⁴⁹ This claim can be considered part of a tendency that has been center of attention in many debates in recent years and intends to strengthen new paradigms supporting the broadening of national policies. These new paradigms, such as human security, incorporate measures to affront diverse but specific threats against vulnerable minorities. It is especially important to note that addressing the threats that jeopardize the population (vulnerable groups mainly) implies that military strategy is not to be dismissed.

⁴⁸ General Gerardo C.R. Vega, “Seguridad Nacional,” [National Security] (México D.F: 1988), 8, [my translation].

⁴⁹ Martínez Serrano, *¿Qué es la seguridad Nacional?*, 8, [my translation and my emphasis].

In opposition to this, traditional security is to be complemented with parallel actions in order to attend the people's necessities and therefore avoid internal tensions and vulnerabilities. From this perspective, security is to be achieved from the inside out, which leads the argument of stressing the importance of designing security policies based on the needs and aspirations of the people and not of some ruling classes or institutions.

In seeking security, state and nation are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed. Therefore, if the ultimate aim of national security is to warrant security to its nation, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that national security policies are to be constructed over the basic national goals.⁵⁰ The only manner in which this can be done is through a process of interaction between the people and their government. Thus, the person as a citizen, the intermediary groups⁵¹ and the state itself must take joint action in an effort to defend the legitimate aspirations of the people, the basic interests of the state and procure the political, social, economic and military development of the nation-state as a whole.

When it comes down to the Americas, in nearly all of the continent's countries the concept of national security remains unclear and contentious. As it was explained, this is primarily due to the use that was given to it during the Cold War when national security was conceptually linked to the support of military governments, the use of authoritarian power, the worsening of democracy and even the allowance of external forces in domestic matters. "Generally speaking, it reminds of the time when defending the state meant the

⁵⁰ National goals are defined as the basic permanent principles that define a way of life, the ultimate aspirations of the nation, established through time and whose accomplishment relies in the benefit of the national interests.

Martínez Serrano, *¿Qué es la seguridad Nacional?*, 5, [my translation].

⁵¹ Understood as those which constitute themselves apart from the government, within a civil society framework, and help as regulatory forces to balance the state and satisfy the necessities that escape from official action.

repression of the people.”⁵² This tendency however has changed gradually until becoming a systematic list of the states’ priorities and actions in terms of maintaining their status quo. In this regard, Ana Maria Salazar suggests the existence of four predominant types of ‘lists of priorities and actions’ designed as national security doctrines in the American Continent:

1. “Countries, like Mexico and others in Latin America, where the principles of foreign policy seek to protect the state’s autonomy.
2. Canada’s perspective, characterized by the absence of internal and external important conflicts, and whose main concern lies in the protection of the markets to which their products have access to.”⁵³ Canada has been one of the most persistent countries in the promotion of human security though. This will be analyzed in the second chapter.
3. “U.S.’ standpoint oriented to territorial protection from external armed aggressions.
4. Central America’s democratic security based on the search for democracy and strengthening their institutions through the creation of conditions that may allow a personal, familiar, social and peace development.”⁵⁴

In this sense the concept of national security can be appreciated as a condition that distinguishes one country from another if it is understood as a result of the peculiarities and specific features that every nation-state possesses (history, population, culture, territorial

⁵² Ana María Salazar, *Seguridad Nacional Hoy. El reto de las democracias* [National Security Today. The Challenge of Democracies] (México D.F.: Nuevo siglo, 2002), 81, [my translation].

⁵³ Salazar, “Seguridad Nacional Hoy,” 83-4.

⁵⁴ Salazar, “Seguridad Nacional Hoy,” 83-4.

extension, national goals, national interests, etc). National security policies are therefore as dynamic as the changing circumstances –development, evolution– faced by any country.

In order for this project to have a basic definition comprising all the different aspects that have been mentioned hitherto (especially the tight relation to development), specific features that are found useful to the purpose of giving a multidimensional definition to the concept of national security are presented next:

- It is a political, economic, social and military condition
- It is self dynamic
- It is mainly but not a unique state function
- It is born with the state's organization
- It is manifested in the exercise of sovereignty and independence
- **Its basic objective is the achievement of the national goals**
- It includes the conservation and survival capacities that each state possesses
- **It exists in relation to a nation's development**
- It is intended to overcome national trouble⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Martínez Serrano, *¿Qué es la seguridad Nacional?*, 10, and General Gerardo C.R. Vega, *Seguridad Nacional*, 81, [my translation and my emphasis].

1.2.3. Regional Security

Since security is a relational phenomenon, one cannot understand and analyze one part without understanding the influence on the whole. If such a claim is valid, the implication is that one cannot understand the national security of a state without understanding what is happening in the international system or vice versa. However, the problem with such reasoning is that nothing can be fully understood until everything is fully understood. As a result of this difficulty, scholars have designed a hierarchy of analytical levels within the international system to make easier the study and explanation of events.⁵⁶ Between the state level and the international level, the regions occupy a very important and interesting case of study.

For Buzan, ‘region’ in security terms means that “a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”⁵⁷ Complementarily, an important element that authors such as Weaver and de Wilde add to the definition above is that regional security implies the sum of the individual national securities.⁵⁸ This statement is perhaps the most important in terms of understanding the purpose of regional –and hemispheric– security. The argument is the following: if national security seeks the achievement of each state’s national goals, and regional security is conformed by the sum of those national securities, then the aim of a regional security would then be the

⁵⁶ At the same time it has been this necessity of establishing different levels of analysis what has also made the concept of security more contestable, considering that there is no agreement on the level it should attention focus on.

⁵⁷ Barry Buzan, “Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective,” in *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, ed. Brian Job (United Kingdom: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 168.

⁵⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 45.

accomplishment of the shared national goals of the states conforming that region. In the specific case of the Americas, where most of the countries' current national goals are related to development and counteracting new social threats, the regional security system should focus on achieving these goals.

1.2.4. Collective Security

The notion of collective security, a key concept in the relation between states, finds its roots in the primary goal of maintaining stable and long-lasting international peace. Although this conception has existed since nation-states were established as the main actors in the global system, it has gone through several changes every time the international system has been forced to adapt itself to new realities and different scenarios.

The general concept implies the central idea that the “governments of all [states] would join together to prevent any of their number from using coercion to gain advantage, especially conquering another. Thus, no government could with impunity undertake forceful policies that would fundamentally disturb peace and security.”⁵⁹ What Thomas Weiss is saying here could be compared, in a very broad sense, to the indirect establishment of a global governance, but without a central authority, in charge of protecting the state as an entity and regulating the use of force between these actors. Nevertheless, in spite of this attractive proposal, the huge amount of interests, actors, principles and procedures behind this ideal have made it virtually impossible to put this concept into practice. One of the main elements that have become an obstacle is the difficulty of states in cooperating.

⁵⁹ Thomas Weiss, *Collective Security in a Changing World: A World Peace Foundation Study* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 3.

Writers like Mearsheimer do not deny the fact that states often cooperate and that in the aftermath of the Cold War there have been better opportunities for states to act jointly. However, Mearsheimer also argues that there are distinct limits to cooperation, considering that states have always been fearful that others will cheat on them and gain advantages.⁶⁰ Another obstruction to collective security is the fact that it also involves an authentic recognition by states of other two principles. "First, they must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo and agree instead to settle all of their disputes peacefully. Secondly, they must broaden their conception of national interest to take in the interests of the international community as a whole."⁶¹

Even though the search for collective security has been seen through international and regional organizations (such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States or the Organization of African Unity), the complexity in trying to achieve this level of security has pushed states to conform other types of alliances and groups. It is important to become familiar with these other types of groups as to know what kind of security relations, if any, can be found within the American Continent. They are presented as follows:

1.2.5. Security Complexes

Security complex theory conceives the 'region' as a subsystem and provides a very interesting framework for analyzing it. The core idea behind this concept is related to nearness. It is often said that insecurity travels easier over short distances, making states

⁶⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 5-49.

⁶¹ Baylis, "International and Global Security in the post-Cold War era," 264.

feel more threatened by the events that happen in their nearer neighbors rather than the ones that occur in a larger distance. Naturally, states tend to develop security links between those who share geographical closeness. A security complex is therefore defined as a “set of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”⁶² Perhaps the assumption that in North American borders, migration and economic integration issues play a very significant role in each other countries’ national securities could suggest the idea of a security complex in this region of the world.

The dynamics of a security complex can be placed within a range depending on whether the security interdependence is driven by what Buzan calls enmity or amity. At the negative end lays the formation of conflicts, in the middle the security regimes and at the positive end lays a pluralistic security community.⁶³

1.2.5.1. Security Regimes

Drawing attention to Robert Jervis’ work, a security regime occurs “when a group of states cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behavior of others.”⁶⁴ States still treat each other as potential threats, but have made arrangements for cooperation between them. The best illustration of this is the Concert of Europe formulated in 1815 by Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great Britain to establish a balance of power, protect the territorial status quo and enforce the decisions of the Congress of Vienna.

⁶² Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, 12.

⁶³ Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, 12.

⁶⁴ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organizations* 36, no.2 (Spring 1982): 357-378.

Considering the general current conditions of hegemonic and cooperative security, disarmament (especially in Latin America and the Caribbean) and economic integration within the continent, this concept is not of further interest for this project.

1.2.5.2. Security Community

According to Karl Deutsch, “a group of states can be described as a security community if there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”⁶⁵

Even though scholars do not feel comfortable inducing the notion of ‘community’ when trying to explain the global system in terms of international security, the idea that stable peace can be achieved through states sharing their values, norms and symbols is being accepted more often by specialists and authorities worldwide. When talking about security relations between states, Adler and Barnett even suggest that many hardened officials are marrying ‘security’ to ‘community’ by identifying the existence of common values as the wellspring for close security cooperation and, conversely, anticipating that security cooperation will deepen those shared values and trans-national linkages.⁶⁶

As regards to America, it is commonly said that among the different categories under which the American countries have made groups, besides Canada and the US,⁶⁷ the

⁶⁵ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “*Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective*,” in *Security Communities*, eds. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3.

⁶⁶ Adler and Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,” 5.

⁶⁷ The United States and Canada are already conceived, in general terms, as a security community. Some features for this categorization lie on historical cooperation on defense and security issues. For instance, the demilitarization of the borders in the 1870s, the inclusion of Canada to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shared responsibilities for continental air defense in the form of NORAD.

Mercosur (South Common Market)⁶⁸ is the one that most approaches the conception of a security community.⁶⁹ When referring to this region, Klaus Bodemer says that “[i]n accordance with this system of concerted action, the 1990s saw a visible decrease in tensions and a strengthening in the efforts to settle conflicts in the areas of border and territorial disputes, trade and investment and in the institutionalization of confidence building measures.”⁷⁰

Currently, the fact that the Cono Sur countries do not face any foreign threat, that they play a marginal role on the international strategic agenda and that they have become more integrated, economically speaking, in the recent years is also important, as it implies a conflict-reducing effect and creates a climate of loyalty and cooperation among them. The political declaration of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile as a peaceful zone in July 1998 is a clear example of this.⁷¹

Although other countries of the region have joined in different economic blocks in an effort to promote economic cooperation and local stability, the links among them have not been truly expanded to include and guarantee results in other areas such as regional

Sean Shore, “The development of the Canadian-U.S. security community,” in *Security Communities*, eds. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 333.

⁶⁸ It was the Asunción Treaty which formally gave birth in 1991 to the Mercosur group integrated by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and later on Chile and Bolivia. This document signified an important advance in establishing cooperative measures in issues such as democratic conditions, economic integration, political coordination and cooperation on security policies.

⁶⁹ However, much has been said about the potential the ‘Community of South American Nations’ (still in process of conformation) has for becoming a security community. For more information consult:

Julio Sau, “La Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones, un Proyecto para el Siglo XXI,” *Revista Foro*, no. 44 (Marzo 2005 [cited 14 April, 2005]): available from <http://www.chile21.cl/foro21/44/1.act>

⁷⁰ Mainly between Argentina and Chile in the first issue (Beagle Canal, Laguna del Desierto, Campos de Hielo), between Argentina and Brazil in the second field and especially between Argentina and Brazil, but to a lesser growing extent between Argentina and Chile in the third one.

Klaus Bodemer, “The Mercosur on the Way to a Cooperative Security Community?,” *La Chaire Mercosur de Sciences Po. Un pôle intégré de coopération avec le Mercosur* [cited 12 Nov 2004]: available from <http://chairemercosur.sciences-po.fr/docs/livre/59696-403.pdf>

⁷¹ For a complete reading of the political declaration visit :

<http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/varios/otros/Ushuaiazona%20depaz.htm>

security. The Andean Community (CAN) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are just a couple of examples. This is the reason why Mercosur is considered to be the only regional group in the continent on its way to conform a security community.

1.2.6. Inter-American Security

In the case of security, the discussion is about the search of freedom from threats. When this discussion is taken to the context of hemispheric security, the debate is about the ability of nation-states to cooperate on the maintenance of their independent identities, the protection of their interests and the achievement of their national goals. When it refers to the western hemispheric security, the debate is specifically directed to the countries conforming the American Continent. In this sense, a revision and analysis of the security relations that make up the Inter-American Security System will be made in chapter three.

Up to now, this chapter has been able to provide evidence of the high place that the study and enhancement of 'security' hold in national and international agendas. It has also presented and discussed the reasons that make this a contested concept, including the lack of a conclusive definition, the different stands on International Relations Theory, the misunderstanding of some related notions, and its wide scope. The complex nature of security has also been addressed through the revision of the distinct levels of security and the way they are all interrelated. This complexity has also been addressed as another factor increasing the contestability of the concept. However, at the same time, all the arguments presented throughout the body of this chapter have made clear the importance of treating

the concept of security with much caution and establishing specific points in order to avoid uncertainties or confusions.

Considering that the main concepts and debates revolving the security issue have been clearly established in this first segment, the third chapter will allow the reader to understand better how security –collective security to be more specific– has been perceived and adopted by American countries since their independent years and how have some historical events become decisive in the way in which hemispheric security is accomplished nowadays. However, it is important to explore first the human security conceptual and practical framework, so that an integral study can later be done to the case of the Americas. Chapter two will therefore discuss the new trend of placing the individual at the core of security by examining the human security proposal and evaluating its usefulness and adequacy to the Western Hemisphere. The following segment will thus reinforce the conceptual structure of this project and will lead to a better comprehension of the theory and its further implications when attempting to justify the importance of applying a human security model in the Americas.
