

## CHAPTER THREE

### INTERNATIONAL MEASURES IN THE PROTECTION OF FAUNA

#### 3. The need for an *adequate* International Cooperation

As mentioned in chapter two, many failures and gaps are evident in the current set of actions, education and legal framework concerning the protection of animals. Yet, there has been an undoubted increase in Mexican political and public awareness of the fauna situation as a result of both international and national programs. In this chapter I show that international covenants Mexico has signed are a reflection of the dire national lack of enforcement situation, since signing international agreements carries the same responsibility as having many domestic laws: they have to be successfully enforced in order to be *adequate* which has not been the case nationally or internationally.

In sections one and two I argue that increased legal enforcement is being practiced in certain areas and by certain bodies, some international. International cooperation does not only mean protecting species but their habitats as well, due to the degree of interconnectedness of species. Nature does not respect boundaries, hence international cooperation is urgent in order to protect migratory species and shared ecosystems. Despite the many international measures that have been agreed upon, only a few goals have been achieved. Mexico appears to be more effective at enforcing laws when there is international pressure, but this pressure has been insufficient and species are still struggling for their survival. Hence signing international agreements may turn out to be no more effective than having strong national laws on paper but failing to enforce them in practice.

I give evidence to show that Mexico is not the only country failing to enforce adequately international agreements like the environmental side agreement of NAFTA.

This situation suggests that the three North American countries may consider that their international status is improved merely by *appearing* to do something, rather than demonstrating an active commitment to actually *doing* something to protect nature. In section three, I emphasize the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which regulates the illegal traffic of species, as perhaps the most important treaty. It nevertheless lacks credibility. It is charged with leaving the welfare of species aside due to economic profits, benefiting economically strong countries the most. The work of CITES in Mexico is being obstructed by the trafficking of well-established mafias and by the country's long history of corruption.

In the last part of this chapter I describe several new protection measures for the fauna in Mexico that have recently been created. Their existence suggests that the need for adequate animal protection law enforcement is gradually becoming more recognized. However, in practice the results have been less than encouraging. There is evidence that some bodies are enjoying a measure of success. There is also evidence that such success continues to be obstructed by poor enforcement and corruption. The creation of new national measures and the enforcement of international agreements are promising efforts, but if they remained at the current level, they would take a very long time to educate the population sufficiently before several species become extinct and many more become endangered. If this is correct, it seems that more emphasis needs to be placed on enforcing national laws and international agreements providing infrastructure help to poorer countries. The conclusion for this chapter is that enforcing national laws and international contracts needs immediate attention to make civil society aware of them, to place the animal protection issues in the 'high politics' and in doing so, improve the welfare of animals transboundaries.

Most of the information I present in this chapter does not involve animals and their protection exclusively, since approaching the animal issue also means dealing with other environmental problems in the international arena. These are inextricably linked with the conservation of wild endemic and migrant species. Most available examples concern migratory and endangered animals, since they are supposed to be the most protected by international agreements.

### **3.1 International Treaties**

Mexico has signed significant treaties with its neighbors in order to protect animal species and achieve the sustainable development of the continent. Mexico has signed the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) with Canada and the United States. This gave place to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)<sup>1</sup> and the Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystem Conservation and Management. Mexico is an extra-regional member of the Central American Commission of Environment and Development (CCAD)<sup>2</sup> formed by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua and the Mesoamerican-Mexico Biological Corridor<sup>3</sup> with the same countries. Mexico has signed agreements concerning animal protection outside the continent like the Convention on Biological Diversity (CDB), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), The World Conservation Union (IUCN) and more. Due to the extension of this thesis, I will only engage in an analysis of two. The NAAEC and CITES.

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<sup>1</sup> Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, "Speeches, Testimony, Papers: North American Environment under NAFTA," *Institute for International Economics* (October, 2002), <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/nafta-environment.htm> [cited July 2004].

<sup>2</sup> *Comisión Centroamericana de Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo*.

<sup>3</sup> *Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano-México*.

### 3.1.1 NAAEC: Trilateral Cooperation?

Threats to landscapes and species affect the three North American countries, therefore actions considered to ameliorate the harsh consequences are being taken by each of the governments separately and in conjunction, through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA was negotiated in 1991 and 1992. The signing of the agreement, the work and the environmental clauses were held in 1993. It entered into force in 1994.<sup>4</sup> The treaty created the world's largest trading bloc. Due to the pressure of US and Canadian governments, as well as from environmental NGOs, the countries established an environmental side-agreement to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), with the purpose of “making Mexico enforce its environmental laws.”<sup>5</sup>

As Bryan Husted and Jeanne Logsdon mention, NAFTA was the starting point for Mexico in taking action on environmental issues.

A number of signs indicate that Mexico's environmental policy making and enforcement did improve in the early 1990s while NAFTA was being debated. There is also evidence to infer that the NAFTA-influenced environmental commitment has been maintained... Also the technical norms for establishing regulatory standards have continued to be developed. All indications suggest that the structural changes are in place upon which to base higher levels of environmental protection. NAFTA has left indelible mark on environmental policy making.<sup>6</sup>

This is rather an optimistic view, but there seems to be an element of truth to it. Nevertheless, the evidence I have collected suggests that the Mexican government appears to be more effective in enforcing the laws *only* when pressured by other nations. NAFTA did make a major change in Mexico's environmental policy, but in great part it

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<sup>4</sup> Lecomte, Jacques, et al, *La Unión Europea y México: Una nueva relación política y económica* (Madrid: Instituto de Relaciones Europeo – Latinoamericanas, 1997), 17-18.

<sup>5</sup> Ana Romo, “Problems of the Environmental Impact Assessment as a tool for decision making in Mexico,” (University of Sussex, 2001), 4.

<sup>6</sup> Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The impact of NAFTA on Mexico's Environmental Policy,” *Growth and Change* vol. 28, issue 1 (Winter 1997): 32.

was just to convince the U.S. that Mexico was ready to be comparable with its northern neighbors.

Critics had argued that increased Mexican environmental enforcement was at best a response to U.S. pressure for environmental responsibility and was a kind of ‘preemptive reform’ to reduce political pressures by responding to critics without making fundamental changes. According to this view, well publicized plant closings in Mexico City were nothing more than cleverly designed photo opportunities to gain the support of members of the U.S. Congress for the free trade agreement.<sup>7</sup>

In the national arena a significant amount of resources were allocated to Mexico’s Environmental Agency (SEDUE) in 1992, two years after negotiations for NAFTA started.<sup>8</sup> But “[u]nfortunately, the NAFTA-induced leap in environmental regulation and enforcement has not yet been sufficient to create significant changes in overall environmental quality.”<sup>9</sup>

The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established under the NAAEC to promote and enforce the environmental law of the three countries in order to attract the attention and participation of the society in environmental subjects. This agreement provided for some kind of participation by environmental NGOs.<sup>10</sup> The CEC provides funds and logistic aid to several initiatives to search for changes in the area of public policy and to develop investment strategies across the continent in order to protect the shared ecosystem.<sup>11</sup> It was also established to address regional environmental

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<sup>7</sup> Husted and Logsdon, “The impact of NAFTA on Mexico’s Environmental Policy,” *Growth & Change* vol. 28, issue 1 (Winter 97): 31.

<sup>8</sup> Husted and Logsdon, *Growth & Change*, 28.

<sup>9</sup> Husted and Logsdon, *Growth & Change*, 32-33.

<sup>10</sup> Romo, “Problems of the Environmental Impact Assessment,” 5.

<sup>11</sup> Office of Protected Resources National Marine Fisheries Services (NOAA), “Background on the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation,” *North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation: Marine Species of Common Conservation Concern* (July 26, 2001), [http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/prot\\_res/PR/CEC\\_MSCCC.htm](http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/prot_res/PR/CEC_MSCCC.htm) [cited September 2004].

concerns and to help prevent potential trade and environmental conflicts.<sup>12</sup> The Environment Ministers of the three members form the CEC Council. The CEC supports projects in four major areas: “1) Trade and the Environment; 2) Conservation of Biodiversity; 3) Pollutants and Health; and 4) Law and Policy.”<sup>13</sup>

Among the few ‘successes’ the CEC has achieved is an initiative made by wildlife agencies of the three countries that targeted seventeen ‘shared species’ of common immediate concern.<sup>14</sup> This helps to generate public awareness on conservation matters and biodiversity loss. It also aims at increasing collaboration. Stewardship for the shared species was created through the North American Bird Conservation Initiative, the Terrestrial Species of Common Conservation Concern, the Marine Species of Common Conservation Concern, the North American Marine Protected Areas Network, and Closing the Pathways of Aquatic Invasive Species across North America.<sup>15</sup> Another important attempt for the conservation of species occurred in 2004 when the CEC announced the first three wildlife species to be safeguarded under a new trilateral effort: the leatherback turtle, the humpback whale and the pink-footed shearwater. Selected by the three governments in cooperation with environmental groups, these species are being used as pilots for the North American Conservation Action Plans “which will act to

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<sup>12</sup> North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, “Three countries working together to protect our shared environment,” *Who We Are*, [http://www.cec.org/who\\_we\\_are/index.cfm?varlan=english](http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/index.cfm?varlan=english) [cited October 2004].

<sup>13</sup> NOAA, “Background on the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation.”

<sup>14</sup> The shared species are: “the ferruginous hawk, the peregrine falcon, the loggerhead shrike, the piping plover, the mountain plover, the burrowing owl, the northern spotted owl, the Mexican spotted owl, the golden-cheeked warbler, the whooping crane, the California condor, the black-tailed prairie dog, the sonoran pronghorn, the lesser longnosed bat, the (greater) Mexican longnosed bat, the black bear, and the gray wolf.” Commission for Environmental Cooperation Montreal Canada (CEC), “Biodiversity Conservation of Migratory and Transboundary Species,” *Species of Common Concern in North America* (October 18, 2000), [http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/BIODIVERSITY/SCCC-Web-e\\_EN.PDF](http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/BIODIVERSITY/SCCC-Web-e_EN.PDF) [cited April 2004].

<sup>15</sup> CEC, “Biodiversity Conservation of Migratory and Transboundary Species.”

reduce threats, share expertise and provide key information to the public and wildlife officers.”<sup>16</sup>

Under the CEC, the North American Agenda for Action 2003 – 2005 was created concerning biodiversity; it founded the Conservation of Biodiversity program which promotes the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in the continent. This program is very new and its results cannot be fully perceived until the end of 2005. The program will implement the Strategic Plan for North American Cooperation in the Conservation of Biodiversity, which is:

a long-term agenda to catalyze trilateral conservation action at the North American level where the help of a wide range of sectors of the society is needed by a) promoting the conservation and maintenance of regions of continental ecological significance, b) promoting the conservation of North American migratory and transboundary species, c) facilitating data and information sharing across North America and promote integrated monitoring to increase understanding of the state of North American biodiversity, d) facilitating communication, networking, identification and sharing of best practices, priorities and opportunities for education and training e) promoting collaborative responses to common threats facing North American ecosystems, habitats and species and f) identifying and evaluating potential collaborative opportunities for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use that arise from the expansion of regional trade<sup>17</sup>

The need for adequate animal protection beyond boundaries has become an important matter since the early 1990s. Although there is evidence that international cooperation among the North American countries has generated detailed and hopeful plans, results are not really that tangible. The few successes have not had a great impact on the dire situation of the fauna and nature, as the following examples attempt to demonstrate.

Submissions claiming the failure of a member country to enforce its environmental laws from organizations, persons, and parties from the three countries are

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<sup>16</sup>North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, “Three wildlife species chosen for trilateral protection,” *Latest News* (March 24, 2004), <http://www.cec.org/news/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=2600> [cited March 2004].

<sup>17</sup>North American Agenda for Action: 2003–2005, “Conservation of Biodiversity,” *Conservation of Biodiversity* (December 2002), [http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/BIODIVERSITY/conserv\\_bio03-05\\_en.pdf](http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/BIODIVERSITY/conserv_bio03-05_en.pdf) [cited February 2004].

presented to the Secretariat of the CEC. This “provides technical, operational, and administrative support to the Council. It has no enforcement authority.”<sup>18</sup>

The three North American countries have failed to pursue many of the demands established from CEC Secretariat. It has been argued that the submission process “can be effective by creating [enough] political pressure... this alone may be enough to pressure the accused party to strengthen its environmental regulation and tighten its enforcement measures.”<sup>19</sup> The effectiveness of this political pressure, however, is not entirely borne out by the facts. The CEC is formed by three main bodies: the Council, the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) and the Secretariat. Up to 2001, the Secretariat received and considered 31 submissions.<sup>20</sup> “These included ten submitted against Canada, eight against the United States and thirteen against Mexico.”<sup>21</sup> The first petition, filed against the US on July 1995, practically failed.

On November 18, 1999, nine groups submitted their petition alleging the failure of the United States to enforce the [Migratory Bird Treaty Act] MBTA against loggers as a matter of policy. The CEC stated that the petition was a “particularly strong” candidate for review...Although petitioners clearly wanted the Secretariat to investigate the policy of the United States not to enforce the MBTA against loggers, the Council decided to allow the Secretariat to investigate just two specific cases which petitioners included in their submission merely for illustrative purposes.<sup>22</sup>

A more recent petition against the United States was submitted in 2000 over the construction of a bicycle path through a wildlife refuge for allegedly violating the MBTA

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<sup>18</sup> Karen L. Smith, “Habitat Protection for the New Millenium: an Analysis of Domestic and International Regimes in North America,” *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* vol. 14 issue 2 (Winter 2001): 527.

<sup>19</sup> Smith, *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*, 528.

<sup>20</sup> International Trade Canada, “The North American Agreements on Labour and Environmental Cooperation,” *The North American Free Trade Agreement* (November 25, 2002), <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/side1-en.asp> [cited October 2004].

<sup>21</sup> International Trade Canada, “The North American Agreements.”

<sup>22</sup> Center for International Enviromental Law, “History of the petition,” Background to Migratory Bird Press Release (April 24, 2003), [http://www.ciel.org/Tae/NAFTA\\_Background\\_24Apr03.html](http://www.ciel.org/Tae/NAFTA_Background_24Apr03.html) [cited October 2004].



as well as the Endangered Species Act. This submission also failed.<sup>23</sup> In some cases, petitions against the Canadian government have gained the attention of the CEC and a report has been released.<sup>24</sup> However, as with the governments of the United States and Mexico, the Canadian government has ignored the recommendations of their own experts.

The Mexican government, for example, ignored recommendations made regarding the Cozumel Island Pier petitions in February 1996 over its authorization of a cruise ship pier<sup>25</sup> “which could endanger, directly or indirectly, a coral reef of 95,000 square meters.”<sup>26</sup> Several NGOs affirmed that Mexico was violating its environmental laws.<sup>27</sup> But the construction was not judged as illegal by the CEC and the Cozumel Pier was constructed.<sup>28</sup>

Environmentalists and community members started to complain about the government bending its environmental laws to allow the project. A private group filed a public denouncement before the environmental authority, but its reply was that no violation to any law was detected... Three Mexican NGOs filed with the CEC a submission alleging the Mexican government had failed to enforce its environmental laws [a]nd a factual record was prepared, damaging the public image of the Mexican government. However, the Mexican government did not void the permission, and one of the reasons behind this is the great amount of money it is receiving for each ship docking there.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Smith, *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*, 528.

<sup>24</sup> Examples on submissions against Canada can be found in North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, “Ontario Logging,” *Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters* (June 30, 2004), <http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=70> [cited October 2004], and in CEC, “Citizen submissions on enforcement matters,” *North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation* (2004), <http://www.cec.org/citizen/index.cfm?varlan=english> [cited July, 2004].

<sup>25</sup> Geoff Garver, “Factual record helped in Cozumel pier case, says submitter,” *TRIO – The Newsletter for the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)* (Summer 2001), <http://www.cec.org/trio/stories/index.cfm?ed=4&ID=50&varlan=english> [cited July, 2004].

<sup>26</sup> Claudia Schatan, “Lessons from the Mexican Environmental Experience: First Results from NAFTA,” in *The environment and international trade negotiations: Developing countries stakes*, ed. D. Tussie and P. Vázquez, Basingstoke, (Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1999), 176.

<sup>27</sup> CEC, “Cozumel,” *Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters* (November 24, 1997), <http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=32> [cited July, 2004].

<sup>28</sup> CEC Secretariat, “Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel, Quintana Roo,” *Cozumel-Final factual record* (November 1997), <http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF17D1.PDF> [cited July 2004].

<sup>29</sup> Romo, “Problems of the Environmental Impact Assessment,” 9.

This case did have the positive consequence of drawing the attention of Mexican society to environmental issues in terms of favoring the welfare of a species over economic benefit. But in the end, neither the CEC nor the public had the power to deter the government from choosing the latter over the former.<sup>30</sup> The problem again is that although Mexican environmental laws are not weak, there is insufficient national and international pressure to see that they are enforced.<sup>31</sup> According to Albert Koehl, while “[the] public complaint process of the CEC, by exposing non-enforcement of environmental laws, was intended to prevent governments from attracting business at the expense of the environment,” the process, has not proved to be a resounding success.<sup>32</sup>

Although it is encouraging that some public attention has been stimulated through the NAAEC, this situation is not entirely representative of the general feel or opinion in Mexican society. Those few examples that *have* drawn public attention have been largely ignored by the government. The general point that emerges from this is emphasized rather well by Koehl who argues that most accusations have not led to deep enough investigations, even though the CEC recommended them. Environment ministers ignored the recommendations anyway.<sup>33</sup> “Citizen groups that have filed complaints of widespread non-enforcement of environmental laws are only ending up with good reason for

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<sup>30</sup> Emma R. Norman and Norma Contreras Hernández, “‘Like Butter Scraped Over Too Much Bread’: Animal Protection Policy in Mexico,” ‘This is a preprint of an Article forthcoming in Review of Policy Research © [21, 1, January 2005] Policy Studies Organization’. See also North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, “Consultation and Resolution of Disputes,” *Publications and information resources: Part V* (1993), [http://www.cec.org/pubs\\_info\\_resources/law\\_treat\\_agree/naaec/naaec08.cfm?varlan=english#24](http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/naaec08.cfm?varlan=english#24) [cited July 2004].

<sup>31</sup> Other cases that illustrate Mexico is failing to protect its natural resources, is those of a dolphin and *golfinos* sea turtles. For more information see Eleaneth Díaz, “Traficantes ponen en jaque a la fauna chiapaneca,” *El Financiero* (May 25, 2004), 30.

<sup>32</sup> Albert Koehl, “The Commission for Environmental Cooperation: NAFTA’s environmental watchdog might actually work - if given the chance,” *Sierra Legal Defence Fund* (2004), [http://www.sierralegal.org/media\\_articles/ed04\\_05\\_01.html](http://www.sierralegal.org/media_articles/ed04_05_01.html) [cited March 2004].

<sup>33</sup> Koehl, “NAFTA’s environmental watchdog.”

cynicism about the CEC... it must feel like blowing the whistle on high-level corporate corruption only to have the office receptionist investigated.”<sup>34</sup>

The creation of unsuccessful agreements and the failed petitions and recommendations from the CEC have indeed drawn some public attention in the three countries to what their governments are failing to do. This situation has created a positive effect in shaping active civil societies on animal protection issues in the three countries (most strongly in Canada and the US). It has not, however, had much positive effect upon the real actions of all three governments. At present, one can only draw the conclusion that the NAAEC has not really provided the adequate protection of animals and their habitats that it appeared to promise.

One possible argument that stems from this is that the signature of international environmental agreements suffers from a similar problem to the one I have identified in previous chapters concerning Mexican national laws: they are mostly form and very little substance. The point has been recognized by a few scholars, such as Karen Smith. “While these laws are comprehensive in scope, the lack of enforcement in Mexico has resulted in an ineffective regime for the protection of habitat.”<sup>35</sup> Signing international treaties carries the same kind of responsibilities as making lots of comprehensive national laws: they have to be enforced in order to work. In other words, if there is an inadequate practical effort to implement either laws or treaty resolutions, or if economic interests are permitted to always override them, then they are effectively meaningless pieces of paper, at least for the animals they are specifically designed to protect. They may not be *politically* meaningless, since they demonstrate that government attention to the situation is present. The signing of treaties indicates an intention to aid, which does have the

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<sup>34</sup> Koehl, “NAFTA's environmental watchdog.”

<sup>35</sup> Karen L. Smith, *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*, 520.

benefit of increasing awareness and publicity and of sequestering and channeling resources toward some kind of solution. But, as with national laws, this has to be coupled with a long-term and widespread respect of the treaties.

Extending this argument, the failure of the CEC to influence or persuade, for example, the Mexican government not to build the Cozumel pier suggests two things. First, that it may be more important for Mexico's government to appear to want to do something about the fauna situation than to actually do something positive (or refrain from doing something negative). Second, that the resolutions are not always particularly clear, allowing loopholes in their enforcement. What is a fact is that the Mexican government is not enforcing the international agreement resolutions as it should though it might be said that international pressure has forced the Mexican government to appear to make emphasis in the environmental arena like in the signing of the NAFTA.

As they are more government-oriented, the international agreement resolutions themselves are in some way inadequately drawn up since they allow the Mexican and the other two governments loopholes to avoid serious environmental changes. It might be that the three governments are suffering from the same syndrome, the need to appear to be doing something as opposed to the need to actually do something. Indeed, Koehl suggests precisely this point when he mentions that the creation of the CEC was more important as a way for Clinton to 'palm off' environmental activists than as a serious attempt to provide a functional environmental watchdog for NAFTA. "The CEC was Bill Clinton's answer to environmentalists' opposition to NAFTA in the run-up to the 1994 U.S. Congressional elections."<sup>36</sup> The failure in enforcing the CEC's resolutions can fairly indicate that the CEC should be given greater powers, for example to apply sanctions in place of merely giving recommendations, if the agreement is to function more

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<sup>36</sup> Koehl, "NAFTA's environmental watchdog."

adequately. This would surely increase awareness among society and might increase enthusiasm among NGOs as well, to serve as watchdogs and file more effective petitions.

What can be drawn from this is that the trilateral cooperation seems to be frequently ineffective. The three governments might be worried about safeguarding an international image. In this way, the trilateral cooperation hoped at the signing of NAFTA and the creation of NAAEC and CEC has not been *adequate*. It has mostly been a ‘paper cooperation’ just like in Mexico’s national arena.

### **3.1.2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora**

The most important convention on animal protection is the CITES. I therefore analyze it in detail in this section. “CITES was drafted as a result of a resolution adopted in 1963 at a meeting of IUCN members.”<sup>37</sup> It entered into force in 1975 to mitigate the great amount of illegal trade of wildlife, which is worth billions of dollars every year. Specimens and species of plants and animals are traded alive or dead, in the form of food, souvenirs, and the like. It is this illegal trade that is often cited as a main cause of endangering species to the point of extinction.<sup>38</sup>

Levels of exploitation of some animal and plant species are high and the trade in them, together with other factors, such as habitat loss, is capable of heavily depleting their populations and even bringing some species close to extinction. Many wildlife species in trade are not endangered, but the existence of an agreement to ensure the sustainability of the trade is important in order to safeguard these resources for the future... Today, it accords varying degrees of protection to more than 30,000 species of animals and plants, whether they are traded as live specimens, fur coats or dried herbs.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> CITES, “What is CITES?,” *Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora* (October 26, 2004), <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml> [cited October 2004].

<sup>38</sup> CITES, “What is CITES?”

<sup>39</sup> CITES, “What is CITES?”

The Convention regulates the species trade in three Appendices. Species and their subproducts included in Appendix I should not be traded. In Appendix II the species can be traded, “subject to quotas and other controls.”<sup>40</sup> In Appendix III species “are protected at the national level and, by listing them, other Parties agree to support (or at least not encourage or enable violation) of these protections.”<sup>41</sup> The structure of CITES is relatively simple, it is formed by the Conference of the Parties which is divided into the Standing Committee, Animals Committee, Plants Committee and Nomenclature Committee. CITES has its own Secretariat aided by the UNEP, the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, TRAFFIC, and the IUCN.<sup>42</sup>

The first difficulty with CITES is that it only regulates *international* trade of plants and animals. It does not have much force in preventing national illegal trafficking, consumption or maltreatment of wild animals. Appendix III assumes that by signing the Convention, its parties have already agreed to regulate and enforce their own national laws to protect species inside their own territory. However, as I have argued in previous chapters, while the Mexican government has indeed drawn up comprehensive national animal protection laws (elements of which relate to illegal trafficking), adequate enforcement has not yet been forthcoming. As a result, Mexico and several other countries encountering the same problem experience additional problems with following the norms established in the international treaties they have all but rushed to sign.

The second difficulty is that while CITES is an immensely important Convention, it lacks credibility. “CITES is ‘where suppliers, traders and consumers encourage ever-increasing ‘use’ of animal ‘resources’, and where the few environmentalists in attendance

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<sup>40</sup> Tomme R. Young, “Progress on Comercial Marine Species,” *Environmental Policy and Law* vol. 33, issue 1 (2003): 28.

<sup>41</sup> Young, *Environmental Policy and Law*, 28.

<sup>42</sup> CITES, “The Structure of CITES,” *Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna* (October 26, 2004), <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/org.shtml> [cited October 2004].

try to shore up crumbling protections.”<sup>43</sup> So, rather like the NAAEC, CITES is judged to be a Convention where the welfare of species is often left aside in order to benefit commerce. Appendix III of CITES is not the only one with problems, as the following statement from Van Note Craig in 2003 suggests.

Environmentalists have had a long-running battle with the CITES Secretariat over the administrative practices of the treaty organization. For 20 years, according to many critics, the CITES staff have favored commercial exploitation of wildlife over protection. Instead of objectively weighting science and assessing enforcement efforts, the [28]<sup>44</sup> member Secretariat has repeatedly argued against the precautionary principle and ignored flagrant violations of Appendix I and Appendix II regulations.<sup>45</sup>

Illustrations of a lack of animal welfare enforcement were perceived in June 2002 where “Japan and the CITES were hugely embarrassed”<sup>46</sup> because six tons of African ivory heading to Japan were confiscated by Interpol and the Singapore police. Corroborating evidence of Van Note Craig’s criticism is not difficult to find. “Between 1979 and 1989, ivory poachers killed over half of Africa’s elephants, reducing the population from some 1.3 million to 625,000. Parties to the [CITES] moved to end the killings in 1989 by placing elephants on the convention’s Appendix I.”<sup>47</sup> In contradiction to this, however, at the 1997 CITES conference, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, were given permission to trade (mainly to Japan) up to 60 tons of ivory.<sup>48</sup> The Monitoring of the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) system was created to supervise the impact that would create the permission for trading a certain amount of ivory on illegal poaching. The system has not been successful. Kenya, India and their supporters have stated at CITES that since the

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<sup>43</sup> Ben White, “Threatened Species Lose to Trade,” *Earth Island Journal* vol.12 issue 4 (Fall 1997): 32.

<sup>44</sup> CITES, “Organigram of the CITES Secretariat,” *Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna* (October 26, 2004), [http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/sec/sec\\_org.shtml](http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/sec/sec_org.shtml) [cited October 2004].

<sup>45</sup> Craig Van Note, “Victories at CITES,” *Earth Island Journal* vol. 18, issue 1 (Spring 2003): 37.

<sup>46</sup> Van Note, *Earth Island Journal*, 37.

<sup>47</sup> Simon Robinson, “Dying for Ivory,” *Time Europe* vol. 155, issue 15 (April 17, 2000): 44.

<sup>48</sup> Economist, “Excitement at CITES,” *The Economist* vol. 355, issue 8166 (April 15, 2000): 87.

creation of the MIKE project, illegal poaching has not lessened or stopped and by the time the project is fully implemented or reaches its goals, elephants might already be extinct. The project has nevertheless been accepted by CITES.<sup>49</sup>

The problem that enthusiastic countries like Kenya and India<sup>50</sup> face in the matters of animal protection is the well-established nature of the mafias and corruption in their territories. Assassinations of their animal protection rangers have occurred. Mexico is no exception here. Added to the lack of enforcement of its national laws, the few random efforts that have been forthcoming often face violent obstruction. The example of the Michoacán turtle nests mentioned in chapter two perfectly illustrates this situation. In 2003 two officers were shot dead protecting land turtles nests<sup>51</sup> (listed in the Appendix I of CITES as endangered species). But, as seen in the previous chapters, turtle eggs, meat and souvenirs are lucrative products in national and international markets and are therefore highly targeted by illegal traffickers.

Other countries have also undermined their position in animal protection because mafias benefit from endanger species trade. In the case of Japan, “[r]aw ivory fetches the world’s highest price... \$100 or more per pound. Organized crime syndicates (such as the Yakuza) have used their global operations to smuggle vast quantities of ivory into Japan.”<sup>52</sup> In the CITES meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe from June 9 to 20, 1997<sup>53</sup> “the enormously powerful Russian Mafia was said to be in attendance.”<sup>54</sup> The mafia was interested in downlisting caviar in order to be able to free trade with it, despite the

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<sup>49</sup> Economist, *The Economist*, 87.

<sup>50</sup> That have been fighting to upgrade elephants to Appendix I of CITES.

<sup>51</sup> Alejandro Méndez López, President of the Michoacán State Executive Commission of the Mexican Green Ecologist Party, interviewed by Emma Norman and Norma Contreras, *Environmental Efforts in Michoacán* (February 20 and July 22 2004).

<sup>52</sup> Van Note, *Earth Island Journal*, 37.

<sup>53</sup> CITES, “Tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties,” *Conference of the Parties* (June 1997), <http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/index.shtml> [cited October 2004].

<sup>54</sup> White, *Earth Island Journal*, 33.



already existing legal great quantity portion for individual consumption.<sup>55</sup> “Proposals to restrict trade in wild birds failed, perhaps due, in part, to the popularity of packing cocaine inside dead birds in shipping cages.”<sup>56</sup>

For these reasons it seems that CITES is not as benevolent toward wildlife as it appears at first glance. Its very existence places the interests of economically powerful countries at risk. Consequently, the parties end up ‘trading’ the welfare of certain species in order to favor their own, suspicious negotiations that take place in every CITES conference.

Japan and Norway wish to have minke and grey whales downgraded from Appendix I... to Appendix II... The move is fiercely opposed by organisations such as Greenpeace, and by countries such as India and the many African states that want a total ban on ivory trading... in such a closely fought debate the fates of the giant mammals will rest with the delegation more interested in say, Asian ginseng or great white sharks. Those wishing to protect ‘Jaws’ (Australia and America) may find themselves trading off elephants and whales in order to gain support for their own motions.<sup>57</sup>

Another worrying situation concerns bushmeat: the meat of wild animals used for human consumption. CITES cannot deal with the internal national consumption of bushmeat. It can only deal with it when it is unsustainably traded internationally.<sup>58</sup> The bad consequences can be perceived in Africa’s eastern lowland gorilla that has become endangered for its use as bushmeat.<sup>59</sup> A similar situation faces the near disastrous future of the already endangered or special protection species that inhabit Mexico used for consumption, like the hocopheasant, red and green macaws, manatee, common seal, green iguana and the sea cucumber.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> White, *Earth Island Journal*, 33.

<sup>56</sup> White, *Earth Island Journal*, 33.

<sup>57</sup> Economist, *The Economist*: 87.

<sup>58</sup> CITES, “Bushmeat,” *The CITES Programmes* (October 26, 2004), <http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/bushmeat.shtml> [cited October 2004].

<sup>59</sup> Simon Robinson, *Time Europe*, 45.

<sup>60</sup> *Animales en Peligro Edición Especial*, (February, 2004): 21, 35, 36, 52, 71, 91, 95.

Facts about how well CITES is working in Mexico are few. CITES has included many species found in Mexico in the different Appendices. Such as the golden eagle, *arpía* eagle, white headed eagle, bare tail armadillo, jaguar, howling black monkey, ocelot, *teporingo*, small tiger, grey and minke whales, boreal whale, bighorn sheep, sea horse, swap crocodile.<sup>61</sup> However, merely listing them is not enough. CITES work, together with the CONABIO, is being obstructed by corruption and well organized mafias. Many species are still struggling for their survival regardless of the 13 years of work since CITES entered into force in Mexico.<sup>62</sup>

All this said, it is possible that CITES could in the near future provide some limited help in extending animal protection in Mexico. Many national governmental organizations dealing with environmental matters in Mexico that aid CITES invited the Mexican society “to present proposals to amend, include or exclude species in the Appendix of CITES to be considered in the next Conference... in Thailand from the 13<sup>th</sup> to the 15<sup>th</sup> of October, 2004.”<sup>63</sup> Activities like this one provide an opportunity to collaborate with the government in the fauna conservation matters. Though the proposals will not be published until months after the conference, if taken seriously, this opportunity might mean a start in pressuring the government and an international Convention. Nevertheless, such aid is small and likely to promote successes only in the long term and only in conjunction with other, stronger measures.

Such stronger measures, it seems, can only rest in making existing animal protection laws function properly, by enforcing them impartially and reducing corruption.

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<sup>61</sup> *Animales en Peligro Edición Especial*, (February, 2004): 26, 28, 30, 47, 48, 55, 56, 58, 60, 66, 67, 68, 70, 81, 90.

<sup>62</sup> In Mexico the CITES was approved by the *Cámara de Senadores del H. Congreso de la Unión* on June 18, 1991, and was published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* on June 24 of the same year.

<sup>63</sup> SEMARNAT, “Convocatoria para propuestas de Enmienda a los Apéndices de la CITES,” *Dirección de Enlace y Asuntos internacionales de la CONABIO* (March, 2004), [http://www.conabio.gob.mx/institucion/cooperacion\\_internacional/doctos/convocatoria\\_cites\\_2003.pdf](http://www.conabio.gob.mx/institucion/cooperacion_internacional/doctos/convocatoria_cites_2003.pdf) [cited August 2004].

The problem as seen in previous chapters, is that Mexico has a long history of corruption and lack of law enforcement. International illegal traffic of endemic and exotic species that inhabit Mexico has been a lasting problem. The son of a former Mexican cabinet minister “Jorge Hank Rhon... was caught at Mexico City’s international Airport with a dozen suitcases filled with ivory tusks and two ocelot skin coats. It takes six ocelots to make a single coat... and only 300 are left. [But] Hank was held only a few hours.”<sup>64</sup> Hank was not acting alone. He and the son of another former minister, David Ibarra, opened an illegal zoo called *Promotora Beta*, in which they kept endangered birds and manatees.<sup>65</sup> Through an inspection CITES made to this establishment it found that 40 percent of the birds were endangered. *Promotora Beta* also aided international illegal traffic, shipping endangered birds from Indonesia through different Asian, European and Latin American countries. Hundreds of birds were caught and later taken to the US, where they were transported in private yachts. This meant profits for Hank and Ibarra of up to 2 million dollars per month.<sup>66</sup> When authorities tried to do something about it, they ‘went missing’ in mysterious circumstances.

Hank has a way of surviving criticism. An inspection into *Promotora Beta*’s sale of puma cubs ended abruptly when the lead inspector was mysteriously murdered. In 1988, Hector Felix Miranda, a columnist for the Tijuana weekly *Zeta*, was gunned down by two of Hank’s security guards after writing too many critical columns. The guards were sent to prison for 25 years. Hank avoided investigation... Hank and Ibarra also hatched plans for a wild animal park called *Reino Aventura* and illegally acquired an orca to serve as their star attraction. The park was sold to Mexico’s media conglomerate *Televisa* and the whale, ‘Keiko’, went on to international fame as the star of the film *Free Willy*.<sup>67</sup>

CITES and the other international efforts I have mentioned are not exempt from placing economic interests and/or corruption above the welfare of the species they are designed to protect. However, some successes have been achieved. In the case of CITES, in the

<sup>64</sup> John Ross, “Mexico’s Deadliest Predator?” *Earth Island Journal* vol. 11 issue 1 (Winter 1995): 15.

<sup>65</sup> Ross, *Earth Island Journal*, 15.

<sup>66</sup> Ross, *Earth Island Journal*, 15.

<sup>67</sup> Ross, *Earth Island Journal*, 15.

Harare, Zimbabwe meeting in 1997, “[a] proposal from Venezuela to establish a quota for exporting jaguars failed, as did proposals to allow the sale of white rhinoceros horns from South Africa and renewed trade in hawksbill sea turtles from Cuba.”<sup>68</sup> The Convention has also included many felines, all sea turtles many crocodiles, primates, cetaceans, and many more on the first two Appendices.<sup>69</sup> “CITES, through its monitoring requirements, has been very successful in providing the most comprehensive database on international trade in wildlife species available to date.”<sup>70</sup>

### **3.2 New measures in the protection of fauna**

Given to the involvement from the Mexican government in the mentioned international efforts to protect and save species, it seems that it is not unaware of the need to improve the situation of fauna in order to ensure the sustainable future of humanity. But this is not necessarily the only way such efforts can be interpreted. It may well be that the Mexican government is aware of the need to better the fauna situation. It could, however, be argued that the Mexican government is aware that it looks good on the international stage to appear to be aware of the need to better the fauna situation. The signing of such numerous treaties could be influenced by either intention, or a mixture of both. This is a cynical position to take, but not one that is totally fantastical. What will show us which of these scenarios is the most likely, concerns first, just how much effort Mexico puts into the international organizations to make them work in favor of both the fauna and Mexican interests in the near future, and second, just how successful the effects and

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<sup>68</sup> White, *Earth Island Journal*, 33.

<sup>69</sup> Marceil Yeater and Juan Vasquez, “Demystifying the Relationship Between CITES and the WTO,” *Reciel* vol. 10, issue 3 (2001): 271.

<sup>70</sup> Yeater and Vasquez, *Reciel*, 275.

outcomes of the organizations and treaties are in practice in improving the fauna situation.

Clearly finding an answer to this will take time and require more analysis than I can give here. However, there is evidence that could fuel arguments suggesting that Mexico may consider it more important to *appear* aware of the need to better the fauna situation. There has been an undoubted increase in Mexican political and public awareness of the fauna situation as a result of both international and national programs. However, immediate solutions are urgently needed if many of the most endangered species are to be saved. At the national level, aside from the government institutions and well established legal framework, new measures have been created in order to improve the standards of living of fauna and raise awareness and respect to animals. In Mexico City the Animal Surveillance Squad<sup>71</sup> is being created to promote a culture of protection, respect and dignified treatment of all animals. The Squad will enforce the Animal Protection Law of Mexico City of February 26, 2002; it will aid governmental and non governmental institutions to protect animals from abuse. The new animal police will be able to operate in zones where endangered animals are sold.<sup>72</sup> All this sounds very encouraging, although as yet, the Squad has not entered into force and, more worryingly, has not yet been publicized. Any evaluation of the government's intentions and performance regarding the Squad will therefore have to wait. Puebla is apparently in the process of formulating a similar action, as affirmed by Ruth Ramos Barragán, Sanity Director of the State of Puebla.<sup>73</sup> In the reformulated Animal Protection Law of Puebla State, the police will be able to sanction whoever maltreats an animal on the public

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<sup>71</sup> *Brigada de Vigilancia Animal*.

<sup>72</sup> Arturo Sierra, "Buscan policía animal," *Reforma* (March 16, 2004), 5B.

<sup>73</sup> Ruth Ramos, Sanity Director of Puebla, Puebla, interviewed by Norma Contreras, *Animal Care in the State of Puebla* (June 24, 2004).

highway and, depending upon how cruel the act is, the police will be able to take the animal away from his owner.<sup>74</sup>

These actions suggest that the need for adequate animal protection law enforcement is gradually becoming more recognized and may be genuinely aimed at both reducing lack of public awareness on the issue and at improving conditions for animals. Hopefully this relatively new wave of ecological importance in Mexico will provide the country a higher status in the world if properly applied. But while these examples seem hopeful, they are rather vague. They have not yet been publicized and therefore a real change cannot yet be addressed. Clearly on paper more things are being done. Sadly the practice has yet to catch up.

The current administration is undoubtedly aware of this situation as is suggested by President Fox in his announcement on a National Program of Environment and Natural Resources 2001-2006. "All of us working together towards a common objective: the sustainable development of Mexico."<sup>75</sup> He mentioned six stages for the new environmental policy. One is integrating all sectors of the population, and managing the environment as a whole: not in a totally holistic view but as an interrelated system, in which each part of the natural diversity should be taken into account. The second is the commitment of the federal government agencies and bureaus in promoting sustainable development by enforcing laws. The third is to introduce regulations and provide incentives for making enforcement work. This new 'environmental federalism' seeks to establish a respectful dialogue among federal, state and municipal authorities, in order to work jointly and with coordinated actions to ensure that environmental management is

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<sup>74</sup> Ruth Ramos, *Animal Care in the State of Puebla*.

<sup>75</sup> Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND), "Todos trabajando por un objetivo común: El desarrollo sustentable de México," *Programa Nacional de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 2001 – 2006* (2001), <http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/comunicacionsocial/indice.pdf> [cited March 2004].

effective and efficient. The modernizing and development of new environmental regulations will ensure that people respect the environment and teach them how to make good use of it.<sup>76</sup> Fox hopes that these proposals will attract investment in environmental issues and will help reaching the goals, signifying a lower cost to the nation. This National Program as a result provides part of an answer to the poverty and educational aspects analyzed in chapter two. The fourth stage is the assessment of natural resources, which in general means “the rational use of the resources valuing them for their economic and cultural value.”<sup>77</sup> The fifth is the enforcement of the law and the fight against environmental impunity, without exception. The sixth is the social involvement and accountability, which states that all people have access to the information.<sup>78</sup>

Unlike the past administrations, we are reminded that we now have the Federal Law of Transparency and access to the Governmental public information<sup>79</sup> which allows us to monitor, judge and aid the government goals. Notwithstanding all this government rhetoric, it is clear that a lot of problems have to be resolved. Moreover, a lot of real governmental statistics have to be published regarding all issues and environmental issues in particular because, as Greenpeace criticized in 1997, there is a problem in obtaining information regarding environmental problems in general.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> PND, “El desarrollo sustentable de México.”

<sup>77</sup> PND, “El desarrollo sustentable de México.”

<sup>78</sup> Victor Lichtinger, “National Program of Environment and Natural Resources 2001-2006,” *Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources* (2001), [http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/dgeia/web\\_ingles/program.shtml](http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/dgeia/web_ingles/program.shtml) [cited March 2004].

<sup>79</sup> Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental, For further information on this law see Profeco, “Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública,” *Transparencia* (October 29, 2004), <http://www.profeco.gob.mx/html/transparencia/transparencia.htm> [cited November 2004].

<sup>80</sup> Kara Sissell, “Mexico overhauls environmental law,” *Chemical Week* vol. 159, issue 25 (June 25, 1997): 33.

### 3.3 Conclusions

All these new efforts are promising, but if they remained at the current level, would take a very long time to make the population sufficiently aware before several species become extinct. Mexico has to learn from those bitter experiences like the one that is facing the African gorilla population, in which by the time the government and international strategies are fully implemented, gorillas might already be extinct. It is for this reason that effective tasks towards protecting the fauna need to take place in the present.

Adequate enforcement of laws and international measures needs to be promoted in Mexico, because there really seems to be a resemblance between the formal passing of laws by the Mexican legislature and the formal signing of treaties by Mexico. Both are ways of showing that, in principle, the government is actually doing something. On the positive side, these formal activities have the benefit of raising the profile of environmental and animal protection on the national agenda and therefore raising some public awareness over animal protection issues. On the negative side, as I have argued throughout this thesis, the practical outcomes of both national laws and international treaties on improving environmental and animal protection have not been an unqualified success in any area and have been radically less than successful in most. Enforcement as mentioned in chapter two would also do part of the job of publicization if it was correctly achieved, thus saving time and money for authorities.

I have argued in this chapter, the lack of fauna law protection enforcement is not exclusive to Mexico. But unlike Canada and the US, it is in fact more notorious, since Mexico is also failing to enforce its national laws, besides a lack of sufficient resources, infrastructure and personnel. But despite its scarcity or abundance of economic resources, the three countries are ignoring to enforce the recommendations established by the CEC. What can be drawn from this is that internationally they are not being effective. They are



*appearing* to be doing something instead of actually doing them, and therefore very few successes have been obtained through this trinational *cooperation*. A solution to this might be giving the CEC sanction power and therefore increasing the interest and enthusiasm from society and NGOs to be more participative in the submission process and to serve as watchdogs.

Despite the international agreement inefficiency, at least Canada and the US have a culture of animal protection and respect for the law. For this, we can conclude that Mexico faces a major task, since it is not protecting fauna adequately in the national nor in the international sphere. However, I have argued elsewhere<sup>81</sup> that the scale of the problem in Mexico is arguably much greater than in either of its North American neighbors. Poverty is far higher in Mexico, the state of the environmental problems is at a much earlier stage of being addressed and biodiversity in Mexico is much greater than in Canada or the US. Mexico is a richly megadiverse country, but it is also hugely diverse in other problems in the economic and social sphere unlike the other two. For these reasons Mexico cannot deal with its nature's problems by itself and international cooperation must be taken seriously if Mexico is to improve the dire fauna and environmental situation. By taken seriously I mean enforcement of international treaties and the national laws must take place urgently if Mexico is to gain confidence and economic aid from other countries.

As established through this chapter, international cooperation has not been *adequate* as I have understood this term from chapter one, but it has been marginally effective in some areas. Thus I consider it essential to build an adequate international cooperation and not leave the fauna problems as individual national tasks because they

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<sup>81</sup> Norman and Contreras “‘Like Butter Scraped Over Too Much Bread’: Animal Protection Policy in Mexico.”

are not individual; in great part because of the migration of animals and the interconnectedness of all species. *Adequate* national and international cooperation for the fauna means upgrading the animal issues in the political discussion.

Therefore programs and conventions like the CITES are a way to tackle the problem and might signify an answer to the problem in the future if correctly followed. Also, the creation of new bodies like Animal Squads to aid the government and NGOs in the animal protection area as well as to seek the participation from society in the reformulation of agreements like in the CITES Appendices might become effective solutions. More emphasis should therefore be placed in rapidly putting them into force.

The final conclusion of this chapter has two aspects. In the absence of enough evidence to suggest that Mexico is currently enforcing its animal laws adequately, it is clear that Mexico needs all the help it can get in achieving this as soon as possible. For this, it seems that the international community should take some responsibility to provide certain economic and other resources to redress the imbalance that Mexico is currently experiencing. In the second instance, it is a government responsibility to reduce any possible criticisms concerning whether any international aid that *is* given would actually reach the animals it is intended to reach. Addressing corruption or partiality in any form is not going to be an easy task, but it is one that is requisite if Mexico is to receive the resources necessary to reverse its environmental problems.

At present, steps in both of these areas have not been taken very far. Indeed, they are clearly very difficult steps to follow for both Mexico and the international community because so much economic commitment seems to be necessary to show that environmental intentions are genuine, while at the same time, environmental issues still have a low place on the political agenda. In this way, channeling resources in sufficient amounts to really address the problem would probably be committing electoral suicide.

So the only real solution for the time being seems to be a slower approach that takes small but efficient steps in both addressing lack of law enforcement and in addressing the low position on the national agenda of environmental and animal protection issues. It is here that I hope to make some small but positive contributions. In the final chapter of this thesis I will offer what I consider to be some feasible suggestions in terms of law enforcement and, perhaps just as importantly, publicization of animal protection in Mexico.