

## Chapter II

### Political and Social Development of Cyprus after the Illegal Partition of the Island

#### 2.1 Social Relations in the Island

The 180-kilometer-long “Green Line” which runs from east to west along with the U.N. Buffer Zone delimitates the current border between the Turkish Cypriots in the north and the Greek Cypriots in the south.<sup>1</sup> The restrictions on the free movement of people across the line had impeded the interaction between the communities. Besides from creating an authentic ethnic segregation, the physical partition of Cyprus altered the dynamics of economy and demography in the island, which have become crucial conditioning factors for the outcome of the current situation. According to the census conducted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in 2006, the total population in the northern part of the island is 264, 172, while Greek Cypriots estimates a population of 88, 000.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the main concern for the Cypriot people is the economic impact resulting from a possible unification; the social impact is generally disregarded as the bi-zonal character of the country had been long-time accepted. It should be noted that even though both parties agree on the need of two separate administrations, they do not agree on the role of the central government; for instance, the Turkish Cypriots want a weak

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<sup>1</sup> The Green Line consists mainly of barbed wire fencing, concrete well segments, watch towers, anti-tank ditches, and minefields.

<sup>2</sup> The figures show an increase of 31.7% from 200, 587 in the 1996 census, which means an annual population growth rate of 3.2%. Greek Cypriot estimates are based on the known population in 1974, and then increased by population growth in the south plus an adjustment for emigration. The emigration estimates may be misleading according to research conducted in the main targets for emigration (U.K., Australia, Turkey, U.S. and Canada). Mullen Fiona. Financial Mirror. *Census puts northern Cyprus population at 264, 172*. May 9, 2006.  
[http://www.financialmirror.com/more\\_news.php?id=3815&type=st](http://www.financialmirror.com/more_news.php?id=3815&type=st)

central government and rotary presidency, while the Greek Cypriots want a strong central government and two weak semiautonomous provinces.

While inter-communal talks and diplomatic efforts have failed, the evident economic disadvantage which the northern region had suffered since partition had proved effective on convincing Turkish Cypriots, at least, for unification with the Republic of Cyprus. A gap between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities developed since the years of British colonial rule due to the nature of their economic activities.<sup>3</sup> However, from 1960 to 1974, the Republic of Cyprus showed a general stable economy with a Gross Domestic Product increase by an annual rate of 6.5% to 8.5% over the period; also new roads, hotels and industries were created, wages were high and inflation and unemployment were kept low.<sup>4</sup> The main sources of income were Western aid and revenues from the Bases, as well as from the Cyprus Petroleum Refinery which commenced production operations in 1972.<sup>5</sup>

The Turkish invasion seriously damaged the economy of the Republic of Cyprus as the territory taken represented 70% of the productive potential, and, as has been claimed, an important part of the best soil.<sup>6</sup> Also, the Republic had to cope with 200,000 refugees, spending a significant amount of money providing housing for them by rent subsidies, and by repairing and improving the abandoned Turkish Cypriot homes for temporary housing. However, the economy was soon stabilized through the stimulation of full employment, saving and private investment.<sup>7</sup> The economic recovery

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<sup>3</sup> ...the Greeks along with other Christian nationalities, started on the road of economic modernization earlier than the Moslems. Thus, although landed property remained in the hands of Turkish beys, the new wealth coming from commerce was concentrated in the hands of the new Christian middle classes. "The pattern of differential economic modernization of the two communities added an important structural dimension to their future antagonism." Paschalis Kitromilides. *From Coexistence to Confrontation*. Op. Cit. pp. 44-45.

<sup>4</sup> See: The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, *Statistical Abstract 1997*, (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 1999). p5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, *The Republic of Cyprus: An Overview*, 2001. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 2001). p. 55.

<sup>7</sup> From the sectoral point of view, the motors of growth were manufacturing, construction and tourism. *Statistical Abstract 1997*. p. 6.

was also possible due to other factors such as the booming Arab markets, the Lebanese crisis of 1975, high international prices for Cypriot agricultural products (carobs, vegetables, citric fruits, olives, and others), foreign aid, appropriate fiscal measures, an educated work force, and a pushing entrepreneur class.

The relationship with the E.U., which is the main commercial partner as it buys more than half of Cypriot exports, has been crucial for the development of the Republic of Cyprus.<sup>8</sup> The Customs Union Agreement with the E.U. demanded Cyprus to invest on technological modernization and the improvement of competitiveness in all sectors of the economy in order to supply the internal market while remaining competitive abroad.<sup>9</sup> Later, the E.U. decision to accept Cyprus' membership request on late 1997, caused the adoption of fiscal and monetary policies which allowed the Republic's economy to reach Western Europe standards. For instance, at the accession date, the standard of living of the population already equated the standard of living of Western European countries as Cyprus had implemented a social security similar to that provided by the European welfare state; also, Cyprus had one of the lowest unemployment rates within the E.U.<sup>10</sup>

The economy of northern Cyprus has been by far less dynamic than that of the Republic since the separation and isolation of the Turkish Cypriot economy from that of the Republic, and the prospect of receiving a benefit in the long run from the perpetuation of the current state of affairs remains highly unlikely. Since 1974, trade between the communities has been restricted by the Republic of Cyprus' embargo against trade and traffic, also the use of different currencies has complicated the

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<sup>8</sup> In 2005, 45% of imports came from the E.U. (Greece 17.3%, Italy 10.3%, UK 9%, Germany 8.4%) and 55.9% of exports went to the E.U. (France 18.8%, UK 18.1%, Greece 13%, Germany 6%). *Cyprus Economy-2007*. [http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/cyprus/cyprus\\_economy.html](http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/cyprus/cyprus_economy.html)

<sup>9</sup> The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, *The Republic of Cyprus: An Overview*, 2001. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 2001). p. 57.

<sup>10</sup> Louise Curley. Haver Analytics. *Unemployment Rates in the European Union: Developed vs. Emerging Countries*. July 3, 2007. <http://www.haver.com/comment/070703x.htm>

commercial exchange.<sup>11</sup> The region cannot benefit from loans, foreign aid and humanitarian aid because the government is not recognized, neither do they benefit from U.N. military presence or from the British Bases.<sup>12</sup>

Turkey is the only country that recognizes the “TRNC”, and on December 5, 1986, the Economic Cooperation Protocol, unified both countries’ policies on commerce, labor, infrastructure projects, tourism, public and private investment. Since then, “the North has been yoked to the devalued and inflation-prone Turkish lira, and the entire chaotic Turkish economy.”<sup>13</sup> Due to the international request of certificates of origin for Cyprus’ exports, and to the non recognition of airports and ports, Turkey is the only commercial partner, so prices are fixed randomly, leading the region to unemployment and impoverishment.<sup>14</sup> All business has to be made with and through Turkey, isolating northern Cyprus from all opportunities offered by international trade.<sup>15</sup> Exports, as well as tourism, grew in the early 80’s due to trade with some Islamic countries. However, economic and social development remains low mainly due to poor fiscal policies (high inflation, low exports, and unequal income distribution), large public sector participation and a lack of an organized entrepreneur class while the continuous illegal migration of unqualified workers keeps wages down.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Robert Rotberg. Op. Cit. p.3.

<sup>12</sup> Turkish Cypriots receive 19.05% of UN High Commission for Refugees aid channeled through the Cyprus Red Cross. The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. *The Refugees of Cyprus*. (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Cyprus, 1993). p. 17.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Rotberg. Op. Cit. p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> Europe initially decided to accept the origin certificates from Northern Cyprus exports, but in July 5 1994, the E.U. Court of Justice ordered its members states the non recognition of transport and vegetal sanity certificates from northern Cyprus, declaring illegal the exports under Turkish military occupation.

<sup>15</sup> More than half of the exports go to the E.U. (mainly Great Britain) through Turkey which in turn only buys 14% of its total imports, and exports more than 50% of the Turkish Cypriots total exports. Konstantinos Spyridakis. Op. Cit. p. 257.

<sup>16</sup> Turkish massive migration has created an economic and political problem as the number of migrants almost equate those of the natives according to Alpay Durduran figures already mentioned. Also Durduran suggests that the fact that Turkish Cypriots are becoming a minority within their own territory has created an authentic Cypriot identity. See: Niels Kadritzke. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English Edition. *From Missile Crisis to EU Membership-Turkish Cypriot dream of Europe*. September 1998. <http://mondediplo.com/1998/09/07cyprus>

Both the government of Cyprus and the E.U. had declared their willingness to support the economic recovery of the northern region whether the government of the “TRNC” decides to terminate the partition of the island. For instance, Greek Cypriots had helped on the improvement of infrastructure with initiatives such as the free provision of electric energy to the “TRNC” (which the Turkish Cypriots had to pay to their authorities). Thus, as most Turkish Cypriots find much more benefits on joining Cyprus and the European Union than on remaining isolated, the opposition to the current status quo among their lines has grown significantly since Cyprus’ accession to the European Union. However, some sectors of the Turkish Cypriots had been reluctant to accept unification due to the potential costs that returning Greek Cypriots’ properties would imply such as the relocation of those currently inhabiting them. Ironically, for Greek Cypriots the main (and perhaps only) benefit of unification is actually the devolution of their properties.

While both ethnic groups still hold their own specific and legitimate reasons to aim for the physical unification of the island, the probability of becoming a multicultural society fades away as time goes by. A rapprochement of the communities has been scarce, and some incidents among them had enhanced mistrust to one another. A misfortunate example took place in August, 1996, when civil Greek Cypriots demonstrators crossed peacefully the Green Line and were victims of aggression from the Gray Wolves Turkish paramilitary young organization; two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot died as a result of the incident.<sup>17</sup> Also, every July 20<sup>th</sup> Turkish Cypriots commemorate the Turkish occupation in “The Peace and Freedom Day.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> See AI report 1997: Cyprus. <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar97/EUR17.htm>. Gray Wolves is the name given to the youth organization of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and it is an ultra-nationalist, neo-fascist movement founded by Alsparslan Turkes in 1969. The Gray Wolves in Cyprus. August, 1996. <http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/isaak.htm>

<sup>18</sup> The celebration includes waving of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flag, as well as military flight parades. North Cyprus Information. *North Cyprus Public Holidays*. <http://www.northeyprusonline.com/North-Cyprus-Online-General-Information-public-holidays.php>

Such actions have caused the Greek Cypriot community to be the least enthusiastic about unification. For instance, in January 1997, the Greek Cypriot government announced the decision to buy and deploy Russian S-300 ground to air missiles for defensive purposes against a Turkish attack.<sup>19</sup> Also in April, 1998, the Republic opened a Greek air-force base at Paphos according to its common defense doctrine obligations with Greece.<sup>20</sup> The Greek Cypriot military build-up raised concerns in Ankara which threatened to destroy the missiles if deployed; the general tension finally forced Glafcos Klerides to deploy the missiles in Crete.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, the incident resulted in havoc for the Turkish Cypriot opposition forces as the fear to be victims of aggression by their southern neighbors was revived. Ironically, a poll at the time revealed that more than 70% of Greek Cypriots thought that the S-300s would have increased their security while preventing Turkey from invading.<sup>22</sup>

Another display of lack of rapprochement took place in November, 2002; when the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships were discussing the U.N. Annan Plan proposal, Greek Cypriot students demonstrated carrying both the Republic of Cyprus' and Greece's flags.<sup>23</sup> Also, in 2004, Greek Cypriots rejected the U.N. Plan on a referendum. Furthermore, according to a 2006 VPRC poll, only 57% of Cypriots said they would prefer to live together with Turkish Cypriots rather than be separated.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Cyprus bought 4 system of the S-300 PMU-1 Type. Each system has 12 rockets with a range of 160km. In response Turkey had recourse to Israeli missiles, using the Lefkoniko air base in Northern Cyprus. Niels Kadritzke. Cyprus hostage to Athens-Ankara confrontation, From Missile Crisis to EU Membership. *Le Monde Diplomatique*. <http://mondediplo.com/1998/09/06cyprus>

<sup>20</sup> Greece and Cyprus established a Common Defense Doctrine in 1993 which takes Cyprus as part of Greece's defense space. The Paphos base (named Andreas Papandreu) is supposed to assist the National Guard but it can also be used by Greece against Turkey in case of conflict.

<sup>21</sup> Experts have concluded that in case of war Turkey would win any war in Cyprus in about three days. However, Turkey was upset about the Russian S-300 ground-to-air missiles as their radar system required the presence of Russian experts who could provide Moscow with sensitive information in the East Mediterranean region. Michael Stephen. See: *The Cyprus Question*. London: Northgate Publications. July 2001. pp. 137-139.

<sup>22</sup> Niels Kadritzke. *Ibid*.

<sup>23</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. *Cyprus condemns UDI anniversary in occupied territory*. November 15, 2002. <http://www.hri.org/cgi-bin/brief?/news/cyprus/cna/2002/02-11-15.cna.html#01>

<sup>24</sup> Kathimerini, English edition. *Cyprus guarded in vote run-up*. 15/05/2006. [http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/\\_w\\_articles\\_politics\\_100014\\_15/05/2006\\_69699](http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100014_15/05/2006_69699)

Another opinion poll conducted by the state broadcaster, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, showed that support for living with Turkish Cypriots had fallen to less than 50% in the past three years.<sup>25</sup>

The alienation of both societies was promoted by their own leaderships as the Greek Cypriot authorities had opposed or boycotted bi-communal activities when officials were involved in order to avoid recognition of the “TRNC”.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Rauf Denktaş government restricted Turkish Cypriots participation on Greek Cypriots’ civil events. Nevertheless, many initiatives and proposals have been continuous on both sides of the island after Denktaş ceased to rule the Turkish Cypriots in 2003. Also, Greek Cypriots stated their firm commitment to the promotion of bi-communal projects for Turkish Cypriots social relief before accession to the European Union. For instance, there have been attempts on both sides to appease the anxiety for the possibility of a future violent outbreak. Thus, the Greek Cypriot military expenditure has been reduced over the past years and military exercises from both parties had been cancelled.<sup>27</sup> There is no doubt that the transfer of resources from military to civilian needs will promote economic growth and development.<sup>28</sup>

The political parties from both sides have been specially committed to the promotion of positive measures such as the opening of more crossing points or the demining of the buffer zone. The foundation of the parties’ proposals is that economic cooperation and the building of networks of economic relationships could serve as vehicles for social stability and prosperity, which would ultimately facilitate, and indeed

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<sup>25</sup>Financial Mirror. *Papadopoulos repeats commitment to bizonal, bicomunal Cyprus*. 10/05/2006. [http://www.financialmirror.com/more\\_news.php?id=3828](http://www.financialmirror.com/more_news.php?id=3828)

<sup>26</sup> In October 2004, for example, the Greek Cypriot Government forbid its officials to take part in a seminar of the “Deutsch-Zyprisches Forum” about “Sustainability for Cyprus” because Turkish Cypriot officials were also invited to speak in their private capacity as experts. Jerry Sommer. *Op. Cit.* p. 57.

<sup>27</sup>From US429 million in 2000, to US250 million in 2002, and US148 million in 2004. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>28</sup>Andreas Theophanous. “Necessary Conditions for Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Cyprus” in *Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1997), p. 78.

accelerate, the resolution of the conflict in a peaceful and mutually beneficial manner. Other interests groups had also contributed with different initiatives such as the All Cyprus Trade Union Forum, which comprises all Greek and Turkish Cypriot trade unions, and which advocates an economic order that will allow people to work anywhere in the island.<sup>29</sup> During the discussions before Cyprus' accession, the Forum met regularly to plan the E.U. Bi-communal Project (to enhance links between the trade unions and the development of a common understanding about E.U. issues) despite Denktash opposition to accept Greek Cypriot representatives when meetings were held on the occupied zone.<sup>30</sup>

Finally, after the failure of the 2004 Annan Plan many NGO's has been engaged in promoting bi-communal activities as they have realized the need to cultivate appropriate social conditions for rapprochement before proposing a political plan.

In neither society are the values of reconciliation nurtured by political institutions, the news media, or the educational system, so the public as a whole cannot be expected to support far-reaching solutions.

...Substantial *political* transformation rarely occurs without a public demand for change, a demand that is typically articulated by a social movement.<sup>31</sup>

## **2.2 Political Parties in the Republic of Cyprus**

As has been noted in Chapter I, internal divisions within Turkish and Greek Cypriots' lines emerged since the birth of their first administrations. On the Greek Cypriots side the first political fissures were due to the existence of different ideas about the status of Cyprus after independence from Great Britain. Initially, the discrepancies were between the nationalists, who wanted *Enosis*, and the communists who wanted an independent State but the latter chose to support, peacefully, the nationalists in order to

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<sup>29</sup>The organization was created in 1995 with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot trade unionists. PASIDY. All Cyprus Trade Union Forum. <http://www.pasydy.org/forum.html>

<sup>30</sup> Hartford Web Publishing. *Trade Unions Protest Restrictions in Cyprus*. 21 January 2002. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/362.html>

<sup>31</sup> John Tirman. The Wall Street Journal Europe. *Working towards a Just Peace*. April 2, 2004. <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/conflict%20res%20-%20section.htm>

reach the ultimate goal which was independence. Once the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed, the nationalists were divided in the pro-Greece and the pro-Makarios and it was the violent outbreak between them which ultimately justified the unfortunate Turkish invasion. Other parties emerged since then with different political views and proposals for a solution, however, most of them share the principle that any given agreement with the Turkish Cypriot should include the creation of a federal republic, the withdrawal of Turkish troops, the right of Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their properties, the deportation of illegal immigrants, free movement of goods and people within the whole island, and the replacement of the Guarantor Powers for International Organizations on security matters.

AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People) was created in 1941 becoming the first organized party in Cyprus and the largest non-ruling communist party in the world at the time.<sup>32</sup> Inspired by Marxism-Leninism, this party is among the most influential forces in current Cyprus politics; it promotes a socialist democratic society with special attention to the interest of the workers. AKEL had always tried to attract workers from the Turkish Cypriot community but the course of events complicated their incorporation within its lines.<sup>33</sup> They have always favored a U.N. based solution while repudiating NATO and U.S. interference. They had also suggested the replacement of Great Britain as a Guarantor Power with a member of the Security Council, and they have condemned the Anglo-American use of the British Sovereign Bases as a threat to

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<sup>32</sup> AKEL actually succeeded the KKK (Communist Party of Cyprus) which published its first constitution in 1926 in Limassol and aimed to solve the problems facing the working class and the farmers. T.W. Adams. Op. Cit., p. 14.

<sup>33</sup> Many Turkish Cypriots did join the communists' labor-union fronts for economic benefits derived from membership but later many of them joined the Turkish Trade Union Confederation in 1943. During the 1950's many other Turkish Cypriots left AKEL for its support for *enosis*; finally the murder of two communist journalists, Mustafa Hekmet and Muzzafer Gurkan in 1962, and of the Turkish trade unionist Dervis Kavazoglou in 1966 caused Turkish Cypriots to mistrust the communists as they would mistrust the Greek Cypriots, as Dr. Fazil Kutchuk pointed out: "If a Turk becomes a communist in Cyprus, then he also becomes a Greek." Ibid. p. 45, 63 and 197.

neighboring countries.<sup>34</sup> In May, 1990, AKEL dissidents formed a new political group, ADISOK (Democratic Socialist Renewal Movement) which has been a strong supporter for inter-communal rapprochement.

Another left-leaning party is EDEK (Cyprus Democratic Union), created in 1969 by Vassos Lyssarides, a close friend of Makarios, who founded the Cypriot Branch of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization in 1962 and the influential newspaper "NEA" in 1969.<sup>35</sup> Linked to the International Socialist, this party believes that the conflict is not between the Cypriots but against Turkey, therefore they have been reluctant about giving concessions to the Turkish Cypriots as it would only benefit Turkey, and actually they had suggested the increase of more troops to deter Turkey.<sup>36</sup>

The Patriotic Front of Archbishop Makarios was the main force throughout the struggle for independence and the early years of the Republic; it consisted of different factions that had the common goal of achieving independence and *enosis*. Thus, after independence was granted many of these factions formed their own political groups which became political parties during the 1970's.<sup>37</sup> The most relevant parties on Cyprus' present politics were actually founded after partition. DISY (Democratic Rally), a center-right leaning party, was created in 1976 by Glafcos Klerides.<sup>38</sup> As has been mentioned, Klerides founded DISY after his clash with Makarios regarding the

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<sup>34</sup> The General Secretary of AKEL declared in 1968: "The Anglo-American imperialists are using Cyprus as a base for their own aggressive and adventurous activities in the Middle East as well as for those of their Zionist puppets... The Cypriot people will not remain indifferent toward the fatal danger of total annihilation as a result of the conversion of their country into a nuclear base. The best guarantee for the Cypriot people's security is the abolition of the bases and the complete demilitarization of Cyprus...The bases must go; they are not a "spring of prosperity" as the imperialists have devilishly described them, but a spring of death." Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 140-146.

<sup>36</sup> Movement of Social Democrats. EDEK. <http://www.edek.org.cy/>

<sup>37</sup> In 1969, excisions from the Patriotic Front caused the emergence of four ultra nationalist groups: the Unified Democratic Party (led by Polykarpos Georghadjis and Glafcos Klerides), the Progressive Party (led by Nicos Sampson), the Progressive Front (led by the right-wing farmers movement, PEK, and included most non-communist labor and trade organizations), and the Democratic Center Party (led by Takis Evdhokas who demanded instant *enosis*). T.W. Adams. Op.Cit., p. 148-149.

<sup>38</sup> DISY evolved from the Unified Democratic Party. See: Democratic Rally of Cyprus. DISY. <http://www.disy.org.cy/english/profile.shtm>

handling of intercommunal talks which he headed, thus his initial stance was very conciliatory toward the Turkish Cypriots' demands in order to prevent the *de facto* partition from becoming accepted by the international community. Also, unlike Makarios he supported the potential involvement of NATO in the island and recruited many ex-EOKA members in his party.

Also founded in 1976, DIKO (Democratic Party) emerged as a pro-Makarios coalition which included AKEL.<sup>39</sup> They supported the continuation of intercommunal talks with complete involvement from the United Nations. This party, then headed by Makarios won the Greek Cypriot Parliamentary elections on September 5, 1976, but lost in the elections on May 24, 1981 due to the poor leadership performed by Spyros Kyprianou who succeeded Makarios as President in 1977. Even though, Kyprianou was formally elected in 1978 and 1983, opposition against him caused many excisions on the coalition. On May 25, 1980, AKEL withdrew its support from the coalition and its leader, Ezekias Papaioannou, accused Kyprianou of intransigence on the negotiation table and for his failure to establish a dialogue with the opponents of Denktash.<sup>40</sup> On September 24, 1980, the Minister of Education, Khrysostomos Sophianos, resigned and founded the Pan Cyprian Reformist Front and on October 14, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Alekos Mikaelides, also resigned and founded the New Democratic Front. Tassos Papadopoulos, an independent former EOKA leader, who succeeded Klerides as head of the intercommunal talks and as leader of the House of Representatives was dismissed by Kyprianou and founded the Union of the Center on November 12, 1980.

The 1988 Presidential elections were won by Georgios Vassiliou, an independent, but on the 1993 elections he lost against Klerides, accused of making too

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<sup>39</sup> See: Eric Solsten, ed. *Cyprus: A Country Study*. Political Parties. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. <http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/64.htm>

<sup>40</sup> Pierre Oberling. Op. Cit. pp. 203-204.

many concessions for the Turkish Cypriot leadership.<sup>41</sup> That same year KED (Free Democrats Movements) was founded, promoting a free market economy, demilitarization and federalism. Klerides won again the 1998 elections; however his lack of success at the negotiation table caused his own attorney-general and right-hand man in the talks, Alecos Markides, to announce his candidacy for the 2003 Presidential elections in order to ensure the success of the 2002 U.N. Plan.<sup>42</sup> However, Klerides lost popularity for supporting the 2002 U.N. Plan which was accused of giving too many concessions to the Turkish Cypriots; as a consequence, many members resigned the party and formed the European Democracy party which became the European Party in 2005. On February 16, 2003, the elections were won by Tassos Papadopoulos, from the Democratic Party (DIKO) who was supported by AKEL, the social democrats (KISOS) and the Ecologist movement (OK).<sup>43</sup>

### **2.3 Political Parties in the Turkish controlled “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”**

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<sup>41</sup> On Vassiliou’s period see: Eric Solsten, ed. Cyprus: A Country Study. Political Culture on the Vassiliou Era. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. <http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/67.htm>

<sup>42</sup> Markides announcement was made after Klerides declared he would seek a mandate of only 16 months to finish negotiations. BBC News. *Aide to Run against Cyprus Leader*. Jan 5, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2628371.stm>

<sup>43</sup> During elections Papadopoulos’ law office helped in the registration of Yugoslav firms reportedly engaged in sanctions-busting for the Milosevic regime. Diplomatic Observer. *Facilitation Provided by the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus to Milosevic*. [http://www.diplomaticobserver.com/news\\_read.asp?id=1437](http://www.diplomaticobserver.com/news_read.asp?id=1437) Denktash regretted that a hardliner like Papadopoulos, who signed a death warrant for him, had won and declared:” I am aware that Kliridhis rejected the Annan plan, regardless of the fact that he pretended to accept it. I regret to say that the Greek Cypriots who oppose an agreement have achieved victory. I do not believe that Kliridhis would have solved the Cyprus problem with me. He proved through his approach that he would not be able to do so and, in fact, would not do so. Kliridhis has been accused of making too much concessions. What are the concessions he made? Where are they? He has not made any concession. However, the propaganda against him was successful. So, he lost the elections.” Bayrak TV, Nicosia, in Turkish. *Turkish Cypriot leader views outcome of Greek Cypriot elections*. Feb 17, 2003. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2003/03-02-17.tcpr.html>

The first Turkish Cypriot political party was organized in 1942, but the Turkish Cypriot community became politically active with the struggle for independence in the mid 50's.<sup>44</sup> However, the proliferation of political parties started after the creation of the "TRNC" in 1983, which introduced the figure of the Prime Minister as Head of Government. It has been mentioned that the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed by popular suffrage; however, for most Turkish Cypriots' parties, the vote reflected more the fear against Greek Cypriots than a true desire to be under Turkish occupation. Opposition to the leadership was initially motivated by the poor economic results of the administration, the lack of freedom, political repression, and by the immigration policy which allowed the massive entry of impoverished and undereducated foreigners.<sup>45</sup> Also, the stalemate of the intercommunal talks and the prolongation of their isolation soon caused unrest among many members of the Turkish Cypriots. Many of these groups later materialize their proposals and became political parties. Most of the Turkish Cypriot parties share the view that any agreement with the Greek Cypriots should include a bi-zonal federation with the protection of the Turkish Army. Even though, during the 1950's and 1960's Pan-Turkish ideals were developed among the Turkish Cypriot society and union with Turkey was demanded, most of the current political parties has not seem to ever considered union with Turkey as a viable solution.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> "Within the next three years, a community political structure was developed as a result not only of efforts of Turkish Cypriot leaders to oppose enosis, but also of encouragement from British and Turkish officials who were seeking to safeguard their countries' strategic interests". Dr Fazil Kutchuk in interview to RA Patrick, Doctoral Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1972. [http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org/quotations/quotes\\_turkcyprriot.htm](http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org/quotations/quotes_turkcyprriot.htm)

<sup>45</sup> "I remember that when I was a child, the population of Turkish Cypriots, which was only 65,000 was shown as 85,000 by the Turkish leadership. When our population was shown officially as 104,320 by the 1960 population census the Turkish Cypriot leadership presented it as 120,000. Our population in 1974 should have been 115,000 but was presented to be 140,000. When it was declared as 180,000 it has come to the surface that population from Turkey was transferred to the island." Quoting Kutlu Adali (Turkish Cypriot political journalist who was assassinated in 1996 in occupied Cyprus). March 1993 [http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org/quotations/quotes\\_turkcyprriot.htm](http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org/quotations/quotes_turkcyprriot.htm)

<sup>46</sup> Frictions between Turkish Cypriots and Anatolian settlers, as well as with the Turkish troops, have been evident since the late 1970's and Denktash had been condemned for extending the Turkish regime to the island. Pavlos Tzermias. "A United Cyprus as a Factor of Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean" in

The main political force supported by the army and the Turkish government is the UBP (National Unity Party) which was created in 1975 by Rauf Denktaş who remained in power since June 20<sup>th</sup> 1976 to 2005. The party keeps strong ties with Turkey in action and thought thus, it propose a confederation of two zones with absolute political equality, separate sovereign rights, and more Turkish troops or a separate independent state.<sup>47</sup> Clashes within the party have been frequent through its history. For instance, in 1979, 11 deputies resigned from the UBP destroying its majority in the assembly. In 1993, another fissure in the party caused the creation of the center-right DP (Democratic Party), which being more conciliatory formed a coalition with the Turkish Republican Party.<sup>48</sup>

The oldest opposition party is the CTP (/Turkish Republican Party) which was founded by Ahmet Berberoglu in December 1970, as a response to the rise of unemployment, the lack of professional opportunities, military repression, and the lack of intercommunal communication to reach an agreement. It is a progressive party which stands for human rights, unification of Cyprus, social justice, equal wealth distribution, state of law, and workers rights. The party voted for independence for fear of disappearing losing all their chances to keep fighting for reunification which is still their aim. In the 1980's, the CTP under Ozker Ozgur approached AKEL; in fact, during the Cold War years it was usually considered to be pro-communist and influenced by the USSR, but it had always supported the non-alignment policy of the Republic of

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Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, ed. Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1997), p. 101.

<sup>47</sup>Denktaş long relationship with Ankara was very controversial. He discretely opposed Turkish attempts to annex the island as that would have relegated his power to a provincial governor. Also, all through his rule, he sought to gain international political stature by disengaging himself from being Ankara's puppet. Gilles Bertrand. Vingt-cinq Ans Apres, Ou en est la Partition de Chypre? Paris: Centre

d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales. 1999. P. 16

<sup>48</sup> The DP was created after the former Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister, Dervis Eroglu, challenged Rauf Denktaş authority in the UBP. The DP is headed by Serdar Denktaş and has been generally unconditional to Rauf Denktaş. Ibid. p. 18.

Cyprus.<sup>49</sup> Ozker Ozgur resigned from the party after openly criticizing Denktash regime in 1998 when he was holding the post of Vice-Prime Minister. He was replaced by Mehmet Ali Talat.<sup>50</sup>

In regard to the Cyprus solution, the CTP supports a bi-zonal, bi-communal, independent, federal state. The CTP believes that the solution can be reached only when confidence between the communities return with the help of free communication and transit between them, and by finding common values; in order to achieve this goal the party propose the reduction of Turkish troops, permanence of small Greek and Turkish troops on the conflict zones, and the permanence of Turkey and Greece as Guarantor Powers excluding Great Britain which should be replaced by members of the Security Council. Great Britain is also requested to return the Sovereign British Bases to Cyprus.

In 1990, the CTP allied with the immigrants party, YDP, because they share the common value to fight poverty but it still opposes to the flux of this immigrants and requests them to go back home with a fair compensation.<sup>51</sup> The YDP (Yeni Dogus Partisi), which was created in 1984, represents the main force within the pro-separatist parties; it supports more integration with Turkey. This party had made many alliances with different parties, mainly the UBP, but offers no concessions to the Greek Cypriots.<sup>52</sup>

Another important opposition party is the center-left TKP (Communitarian Liberation Party) which was created in 1976 and headed by Alpay Durduran; it

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<sup>49</sup> Actually, early members of the CTP were former AKEL members. Ibid.20

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> CTP Head, Mr. Ozker Ozgur challenged the Turkish government by declaring in 1998 that Turkish's strategic issue (Greece cannot be allowed to dominate this part of the Mediterranean) came well before any concern for the fate of the Turkish Cypriots. He implied that Turkish migration policy has nothing to do with Turkish Cypriots wellbeing. Niels Kadritzke. *Le Monde Diplomatique. From Missile Crisis to EU Membership-Turkish Cypriot dream of Europe.* <http://mondediplo.com/1998/09/07cyprus>

<sup>52</sup> Even when all Turkish Cypriot parties have reservations against the colonists, their vote has to be considered as they represent almost half of the total population in the north. See footnote 103.

promotes the values of democracy and social justice. Soon, after its creation, it became a strong opposition force but it lost in the 1976 General Elections to Denktash. However, Alpay Durduran became Denktash and Ankara fiercest opponent; thus, he resigned from the TKP in 1983 after his parliamentary group voted for independence, and founded the YKP (New Cyprus Party) in 1989.<sup>53</sup> As the CTP, the TKP stands against partition and independence but they demand political equality between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the negotiation table, it also wants to diminish the Turkish tutorage. The party mainly favors the reduction of Turkish troops, and demands the return of the British Bases in exchange of the recognition of political equality. It believes both communities should work together to improve their living conditions through the implementation of measures and policies of mutual social benefit such as freedom of movement, common infrastructure works and the integration of the economy in order to work on a federation. It has worked closely with other civil society groups such as the All Cyprus Trade Union Forum.<sup>54</sup>

In 1999, Alpay Durduran and Ozker Ozgur founded the YBH (Patriotic Union Movement) which supports a federal solution to the conflict of Cyprus and E.U. membership.<sup>55</sup> The party strongly opposed Denktash policy of international recognition of the “TRNC” as a precondition to negotiations, and it proposes the deportation of most Turkish settlers with a fair compensation but some of them could be granted special permits to stay. Alpay Durduran is one of the Turkish Cypriot politicians who have been seriously engaged on building rapprochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.<sup>56</sup> For instance on April 6, 2003, Alpay Durduran made his way to

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<sup>53</sup>The deputies explained they voted for independence, for fear of challenging Ankara. He was replaced by Ismail Bozkurt. Gilles Bertrand. *Op. Cit.*, p. 2.1

<sup>54</sup> Actually, the former International Secretary, Nihad Elmas, was the Turkish Cypriot coordinator of the Forum. *Ibid.* 21.

<sup>55</sup> It was the only party that actually supported Cyprus accession to the European Union without unification, as they believed that membership was a guarantee for Turkish Cypriot’s rights protection. *Ibid.*, 22

<sup>56</sup> Durduran’s YKP had a strong link with the Greek Cypriot Reformed Leftist (ADISOK).

attend the signature of the Olympic Truce against the restrictions of the Turkish Cypriots authorities. Denktash had hindered other representatives of the Turkish Cypriot political parties invited to attend the event organized by the Association of Social Reform (OPEK).<sup>57</sup>

Opposition within the Denktash regime became fierce during the 2002 and 2003 discussions to reach an agreement based on the Annan Plan. Turkish Cypriots were divided on settlement issues such as the territorial adjustments part of the plan. For instance, while Denktash, the government and right-wing parties rule out any substantial territorial compromise, leading socialist politicians threw support behind the Annan Plan.<sup>58</sup> After the failure became evident, party leaders who had representation in the Parliament asked repeatedly for his resignation.<sup>59</sup> The failure also triggered fresh tensions between the right-wing politicians and the leftist, mostly Marxist, opposition not represented in Parliament. As a result the “Cyprus platform” was created bringing together all opposition groups.<sup>60</sup> Besides from internal conflicts, Turkey’s approach to the plan made evident a fissure in the relationships between Denktash and Ankara.

The Turkish Cypriot elections on December 10, 2003, brought new hopes for the opposition as Mehmet Ali Talat (from The CTP) became Prime Minister.<sup>61</sup> Talat

<sup>57</sup> Diplomatia. *Olympic Truce*. <http://www.diplomatia.gr/main.php?issueID=5&articleID=187&lang=en>

<sup>58</sup> Tahsin Arif, a former presidential candidate, declared on private that a part of Cyprus was administered by Greek Cypriots, and a part by Turkey but after a settlement Turkish Cypriots would have some 28.5 percent of the island to administer themselves. Turkish Daily News. *Controversy Brews over Cyprus Plan*. November 15 2002. <http://www.presswire.net>

<sup>59</sup> Denktash presented party leaders a written explanation of his objections to and assessment of the Annan plan, and asked the leaders to present the position of their parties in writing regarding the Annan plan. The opposition parties presented their written responses to Denktash, renewing their call for his resignation.

Mark Bentley. PSEKA. *Turk Cypriot Protest Piles Pressure on Denktash*. 2003-01-15. <http://news.pseka.net/index.php?id=2770&module=article>

<sup>60</sup> An opinion poll run by Kibris newspaper showed that 27 percent agree with Denktash policy on the Cyprus issue while 44 percent opposed completely. 65.4 Approved the UN Plan. 56.6 agreed with the territory that would be return, 45% were happy with Greek Cypriots living among them and 41% opposed completely with the idea. Almost 75% would prefer to see a solution prior to the island’s entry to the EU compared to 21% who would rather see the settlement of the Cyprus problem after Turkey’s E.U. accession. Turkish Daily News. *Ankara tells UN Envoy: NO Compromise on Turkey’s Strategic Interests on Cyprus*. January 11, 2003. <http://www.presswire.net>

<sup>61</sup> The opposition Republican Turkish Party, led by Mehmet Ali Talat, won with 35.5% of the vote, getting 19 seats. The Democratic Party, lead by Serdar Denktash (son of Rauf Denktash) got only 12.7%

supported the unification of Cyprus and the Annan Plan, he is also considered to share political views with Greek Cypriot leftists. Despite of the failure of the United Nations-held referendum on April 24, 2004, which would have allowed Turkish Cypriots to join the European Union, he became President of the “TRNC” in April 17, 2005, ending with Denktash long-lasting rule (Ferdi Sabit Soyer became the new Prime Minister on April 25, 2005).<sup>62</sup> The new government has been proactive on finding a solution. For instance, it approved the Law of Land Retribution, which granted the devolution of Greek Cypriot properties after unification. The law provides that 50, 000 Greek Cypriots would be able to resettle or receive compensation for their properties in the north.<sup>63</sup> Also the new government has favored rapprochement between the political parties from the two communities which have found ground for cooperation on different subjects such as the environment which can be illustrated by the United Cyprus Party association with the Greek Cypriot Green Party-Environmentalists movement.<sup>64</sup>

#### **2.4 The road to the European Union**

Cyprus’ relationship with the European Union started in 1962, when both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot deputies agreed to apply for membership to the European Economic Community. In 1973, an Association Agreement was signed with the Republic of Cyprus only, followed by a Customs Union Treaty in 1987. Since the proclamation of the “TRNC”, accession negotiations and agreements with the E.U. were conducted without Turkish Cypriots representatives. The Republic of Cyprus applied

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of the vote and 7 seats. Cyprus News Agency. *Opposition RTP clearly leads ‘elections’ in occupied areas.*, 15/12/2003. <http://www.cna.org.cy/newse/>

<sup>62</sup> Rauf Denktash did not run on the elections. Ertugrul Onalp. Op. Cit. p. 245.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 251.

<sup>64</sup> The Leader of the Turkish Cypriot United Cyprus Party, Izzet Izcan, expressed in a meeting with the Cyprus Green Party - Environmentalists Movement his opposition towards Rauf Denktash Cyprus policy to ask Greek Cypriots to show their passports at the control points to cross to the occupied areas. BBC. *United Cyprus Party head slams Turkish Cypriot leader's Cyprus policy.* May 14, 2003. <http://www.presswire.net>

for full membership in 1990; however, the accession process did not start because unification was a precondition to consider Cyprus as a candidate member. It was until 1995, when the E.U. decided to start the accession process without union, mainly as a reward for Greece which had gave up its veto against the establishment of an E.U. customs union with Turkey, but unification remained a condition for actual membership.<sup>65</sup> The issue of Cyprus' membership to the E.U. gave the inter-ethnic dispute a new dimension and it received an important consideration in subsequent intercommunal talks.<sup>66</sup>

Nevertheless, during December 12 and 13, 1997, the European Union decided in Luxembourg the process by which new members would be accepted, and Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia were formally invited to start negotiations to join the Union. Later, in the meeting at Helsinki in 1999, the E.U. decided that Cyprus accession to the E.U. would be considered regardless of the situation in northern Cyprus, unless Greek Cypriots sabotaged the negotiations, also Turkey's candidacy was accepted.<sup>67</sup> This decision was again mainly influenced by Greece, which had threatened to block the whole Eastern European enlargement process.<sup>68</sup> It was also agreed that the Accession Treaty would be signed by the new members in April, 2003 to become formal members on May 1, 2004. During the European Union meeting in Copenhagen on December 12 and 13, 2002, it

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<sup>65</sup> Greece became member in 1981 and Turkey applied for membership on April 1987 but accession talks had been delayed, However a Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union existed since 1963. Andreas Theophanous. *Op. Cit.* p. 74.

<sup>66</sup> Joseph S. Joseph. *The United Nations, The European Union and Cyprus Search for Security. Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1997), p. 113.

<sup>67</sup> Turkey had threatened to annex the island if Cyprus accessed the E.U Niels Kadritzke. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English language edition. *Cyprus, North and South*. April 2002.  
<http://mondediplo.com/2002/04/09cyprus>

<sup>68</sup> Dan Lindley. The Republic of Cyprus' Road to European Union Accession: Missed Opportunities to Promote a Cyprus Solution. *Hellenic Studies*. "The Fifth EU Enlargement: Revisiting the Triangle of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey," Vol.11, No.1 (Spring 2003), pp. 37-56.  
[http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/cypruseuarticle.htm#N\\_1\\_](http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/cypruseuarticle.htm#N_1_)

was decided that the *acquis communautaire* would be suspended on the occupied part of Cyprus.<sup>69</sup>

It was highly expected that accession negotiations to the E.U. would have served as a “catalytic effect” for the unification of the island before or simultaneously with actual accession as the E.U. offers a legal framework which could be useful for the two communities to ensure their security and human rights’ protection. Also, as has been already noted, Turkish Cypriots have been discomfited with their economic isolation since the creation of the “TRNC”, thus, the prospect of European Union citizenship was considered to be a great incentive for their leadership to adopt a more conciliatory policy. However, Turkish Cypriots’ leader, Rauf Denktash, opposed to negotiations between the E.U. and the Republic of Cyprus due to the fact that they were not represented on that government and were only invited to participate as part of the Greek Cypriot delegation and not as separate equal partners.<sup>70</sup> Despite of this negative response, some actors of the Turkish Cypriot society decided to take active steps to approach a solution, mainly the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and the unions which had participated in E.U.-sponsored bi-communal projects; eventually these groups organized a mass mobilization against the authorities forcing them to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward unification and E.U. membership.

In November 2002, the U.N. Secretary General Koffi Annan presented a Plan which provided the existence of a federal state of two constituent states, and a Turkish

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<sup>69</sup> *Acquis communautaire*: “The entire body of European laws is known as the *acquis communautaire*. These include all the treaties, regulations and directives passed by the European institutions as well as judgments laid down by the Court of Justice. The term is most often used in connection with preparations by the 12 candidate countries to join the union. They must adopt, implement and enforce all the *acquis* to be allowed to join the EU. As well as changing national laws, this often means they must set up or change the necessary administrative or judicial bodies which oversee the legislation.” BBC News World Edition Taken from A-Z of Europe. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in\\_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216329.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216329.stm)

<sup>70</sup> Turkey also opposed to the accession of Cyprus to the E.U. and declared that it would annex northern Cyprus. Niels Kadritzke. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English language edition. *Cyprus, North and South*. April 2002. <http://mondediplo.com/2002/04/09cyprus>

Cypriot zone of 28.2% of the island.<sup>71</sup> The international community, including Erdogan was enthusiastic about the opportunity presented for the unification of Cyprus.<sup>72</sup> Thus, on December 5, the E.U. announced the closing of the 31 chapters of harmonization with the *acquis communautaire*, and stressed the E.U. commitment to give financial aid for the recovery of the north after unification.<sup>73</sup> However, the U.N. proposal caused major political unrest between and within Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments, and even when Denktash was initially optimistic about the proposal, he finally failed to sign it for the E.U. Summit Meeting in Copenhagen.<sup>74</sup> As the Turkish Cypriot society realized that they could be left out from the E.U., they openly showed its discontent with the negligence of their authorities in a series of mass demonstrations: On December 13, 2002, thousands of Turkish Cypriots demonstrated in Nicosia to ask for the demission of Denktash as they blamed him for the failure on the last negotiations, also demonstrations of 6 000 persons were reported in Famagusta on the 20th, in Morphou on the 24, and on December 26, 30 000 people demonstrated again in Nicosia to support the Annan Plan and accession to the EU.<sup>75</sup> The largest demonstration took place on January 14, 2003, with more than 70 000 Turkish Cypriots demonstrating in the occupied part of Nicosia to demand the reunification of the island, the demission of

Rauf Denktash and the incorporation to the E.U. Many unions, declared a strike so the

<sup>71</sup> Denktash argued that the Plan would dilute the concept of bizonality by allowing the return of about 45 000 Greek Cypriots. While Greek Cypriots were asking the right to return for all refugees. Phantis. *Annan Plan for Cyprus*. [http://wiki.phantis.com/index.php/Annan\\_Plan\\_for\\_Cyprus](http://wiki.phantis.com/index.php/Annan_Plan_for_Cyprus)

<sup>72</sup> Goliath. *Reactions by the international community on the Cyprus Peace Plan*. November 14, 2002. [http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary\\_0199-2215298\\_ITM](http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-2215298_ITM)

<sup>73</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. *Cyprus Foreign Minister holds contacts in Brussels*. December 10, 2002. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cypio/2002/02-12-10.cypio.html#03>

<sup>74</sup> Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan was accused by Foreign Ministry Sukru Sina Gurel to be secretly negotiating with Greece Premier Simitis on conditions that were unacceptable for Turkish Cypriots accused the U.N. of leaking its Cyprus plan for the reunification of the divided island of Cyprus to Greek Cypriots before it was presented to the Turkish Cypriot side. Turkish Daily News. Controversy Brews over Cyprus Plan. November 15 2002.

<sup>75</sup> Erdogan declared his support for a solution and condemned Denktash for his unwillingness to reach an agreement: "If 30 000 people protest at the same time in northern Cyprus then it means that something is going on in northern Cyprus... This is not an ordinary event. We have to think hard about this business, you can't just ignore what people think." Turkey's change of policy at the time was directed to their own membership acceptance into the E.U. Deutsche Presse Agentur. *Turkey and Turkish Cyprus "moving Apart over Cyprus"*. January 2, 2003. <http://www.presswire.net>

workers could join the demonstration.

The parties agreed to resume negotiations, subsequently on January 7, two special committees met to discuss and organize the treaties and common laws respectively. It was expected that an agreement would have been ready by February 28, 2003, so that both communities would benefit from the E.U. membership. The U.N. had hoped that whether an agreement based on the Annan Plan would not be reached, at least the parties would compromise on holding referendums on the Annan Plan by March 30. In order to support the U.N. attempt to terminate the conflict in Cyprus, Great Britain offered to give up 116 km<sup>2</sup>, that is, almost half of its Sovereign Military Bases on the island, but warned that the offer became null and void if either side rejected the Plan within the U.N. timetable, or the people rejected it at a referendum.<sup>76</sup> On February 16, 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos, leader of the Democrat Party (DIKO), was elected president of the Republic. Right after the elections, he declared his commitment with the unification of Cyprus and with the return of refugees to their homes; thus, by the end of February he agreed with Kofi Annan to meet with his Turkish counterpart on March 10 in The Hague, to settle an agreement which would be submitted under referendum on March 30. However the failure of negotiations became evident by March 11, as Denktash demanded radical changes on the Annan Plan, despite it had been modified three times so it could satisfy both parties.

The European Union reacted to the failure by declaring that a lack of solution to the Cyprus problem would difficult the entrance of Turkey as the E.U. has always condemned the illegal Turkish occupation of Cyprus; and as Turkey do not recognize the Republic of Cyprus.

In case an agreement is not reached before the beginning of negotiations for the accession of Turkey to the EU on December 2004, we would face a peculiar

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<sup>76</sup> BBC News. *UK Offers to Cede Cyprus Land*. February 24, 2004.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2794421.stm>

situation, in which a candidate country who calls to the EU doors does not recognize one of our member countries.<sup>77</sup>

On April 16, 2003, the Republic signed the European Union Accession Treaty including two Protocols which stipulated that the *acquis* would be suspended on the occupied zone and that the Treaty would not apply to the British Sovereign Bases. However a new Annan Plan was presented on March 31, 2004 and even it was rejected by both communities' leaders, they agreed to put it under referendum on April 24, 2004. It was rejected by the Greek Cypriots and Cyprus became a full member on May 1, without the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>78</sup> For the purpose of Euro elections, Cyprus is represented by 6 Euro MP's of whom at least one could be a Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriots promised to ensure Turkish Cypriots would have the right to vote in the elections to the European Parliament.<sup>79</sup>

In the occupied territory, open opposition to Denktash and support for the union of the island has been continuous. Also, the international community witnessed the repression suffered by opposition members and condemned the Turkish Cypriot regime. For instance, the European Parliament President, Pat Cox showed his concern on March 27, 2003, for the detention of six members of the opposition organization "This Country is Ours", which organized a referendum on the Annan Plan.<sup>80</sup> Even the immigrants felt dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs as they showed on May 11, when the

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<sup>77</sup> Interview with Enlargement Commissioner, Gunter Verheugen. EurActiv Network. *Gunter Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enlargement*. May 20, 2003. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/gunter-verheugen-european-commissioner-enlargement/article-117420>

<sup>78</sup> Europa-Gateway to the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union. *Protocol 10 on Cyprus*. p. 955. [http://europa.eu/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l\\_236/l\\_23620030923en09310956.pdf#page=25](http://europa.eu/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_236/l_23620030923en09310956.pdf#page=25)

<sup>79</sup> Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. Measures for Turkish Cypriots: The Policy of the Government vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriots. April 30, 2003. <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/9a145f057213f8e3c2257076004d020c/745a5d6134331502c2256d9f00338d9a?OpenDocument>

<sup>80</sup>Hellenic Resources Network. *EU Officials Express Concern over T/C arrests in occupied Cyprus*. March 28, 2003. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cypio/2003/03-03-28.cypio.html#03>

Association of Turkish Settlers organized a demonstration to demand Turkey the solution of the Cyprus' problem or their return to their motherland.

In order to placate international and domestic criticism, on April 23, 2003, Turkish Cypriots authorities partially opened three control posts (two in Nicosia and one in the village of Pergamos in Famagusta) to allow the free crossing of the border. By the end of April, 120, 000 Cypriots crossed the border; more than half of them were Greek Cypriots, who were allowed to stay in the zone for three days and only in hotels. The free movement of persons and merchandise was a measure adopted by Denktash presented to the government of Cyprus on April 2. The measure was condemned by President Papadopoulos, as Greek Cypriots were required to show their passports upon crossing to the north.<sup>81</sup> The Greek Cypriot authorities also warned the population of staying overnight in the occupied area and allowed in "only pedestrians in the Greek Cypriot side as driving licenses and registration plates issued by the illegal regime are not recognized."<sup>82</sup>

In any case, the Turkish Cypriot regime move had the positive side effect of showing both ethnic groups that reconciliation is possible as has been proved by the fact that violence has been absent in both sides since free crossing was allowed.<sup>83</sup> Also it had a positive effect on the Greek Cypriot authorities approach toward the Turkish

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<sup>81</sup>Greek Cypriot Government Spokesman, Mr. Kypros Chrysostomides accused Denktash of trying to suggest that he exercises separate sovereignty over the occupied areas and that they constitute a separate State by asking Greek Cypriots for a passport. Goliath. *The Cyprus Government's Firm Policy Is to Ensure Free Movement for All Its Citizens*. April 23, 2003.

[http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\\_0199-2705103/The-Cyprus-Government-s-firm.html](http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-2705103/The-Cyprus-Government-s-firm.html)

<sup>82</sup> Chrysostomides declared that the formalities required concern mainly those who illegally enter or reside in the occupied areas and noted that "for the lawful Turkish Cypriot citizens such formalities will be kept down to the minimum and all such citizens will be allowed to move freely, provided that they prove that they are indeed lawful citizens of the Republic of Cyprus". Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> "While the opening has not instantly resolved the political dilemmas posed by the Annan Plan and its rejection, nor indeed of EU membership, it has answered the social dilemmas that many people feared--namely, that once there was access north and south, reprisals and violence would follow. Despite the teachings of the extremist institutions and religions, and their thirst for revenge, the people have responded with maturity and foresight--and forgiveness. That they have confounded the politicians and priests so profoundly is certain to have positive political repercussions down the line." John Tirman. *The Wall Street Journal Europe*. *The Cyprus Conflict. Working towards a Just Peace*. April 2, 2004. <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/conflict%20res%20-%20section.htm>

Cypriot population. For instance, on April 30, the government of the Republic announced the establishment of measures to improve the living conditions of the Turkish Cypriots. The measures entered into force on May 2 and included the free movement of persons, vehicles and merchandise; the hiring of Turkish Cypriot workers from the occupied zone; the signing of contracts and subcontracts with Turkish Cypriot enterprises; the recognition of professional qualifications; professional education for Turkish Cypriots; participation abroad on sports, cultural, scientific and professional events; aid for the families of missing persons and death non-combatants; the creation of a joint committee for humanitarian issues; expedition of identity cards and other legal documents; medical care; protection of the cultural heritage; the increase and improvement of TV program for Turkish Cypriots; the removal of mines from the buffer zone; cooperation among local authorities on each side of the Green Line; the establishment of direct phone communication with the occupied zone and Turkey as well; the participation on local and European Parliament elections; and the creation of a Turkish Cypriot Affairs Office.

Cyprus entrance on the E.U. opened the door to new opportunities for reaching an agreement among the communities. The E.U. has been using its moral and financial resources to support projects directed at the economic development of Turkish Cypriots and at peace promotion between the two communities. Such involvement could not be fully blocked by Greek Cypriots due to the fact that before accession the Council of Foreign Ministers officially stated its determination to end Turkish Cypriot isolation. For instance, the E.U. funded a list of measures for the northern part of Cyprus with € 9 million, of which € 6 million were allocated for infrastructure and rehabilitation projects and € 2 million for “Support to Civil Society” and “Trade Unions” in the North.<sup>84</sup> Also between 2000 and 2003, the E.U. funded bi-communal activities with € 14.2 million in

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<sup>84</sup> Jerry Sommer. *Op. Cit.* p. 55- 56

a programme called “partnership for the future”. Nearly two-thirds of this money was allocated to the rehabilitation of the old city of Nicosia in co-operation with the Nicosia Master Plan, a plan for urban renovation and infrastructure modernization on both sides of the divided capital Nicosia. The E.U. also paid € 5 million for de-mining operations in the buffer zone in Cyprus. It has allocated € 1 million for road works in the buffer zone, so that more crossing points can be opened.<sup>85</sup>

Even when most of the E.U. pre-accession programs were not meant to be for peace or reconciliation, they had helped to bring the communities together, even in a short extent. Also, besides from the countable benefit, Turkish Cypriots acquire the feeling that they are part of Europe or at least important to it. Ultimately, it had caused them to remain positive about a future European Union membership. The E.U. still have to learn how to deal with Turkish Cypriot omnipresent fear of being wiped out from the island.

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid.