

Chapter I

Historical Development of the Cypriot Society

1.1 Brief Description of Cypriots before British Rule.

The history of Cyprus is not only fascinating but also an important reference to the study of Western civilization from its origins to the present day. This imminent importance and basically all the history of Cyprus as a whole relies on its geographical situation- a small island of 3.572 miles or 9.250 km. located in the Mediterranean and between Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

Vestiges of civilization in the island can be traced back as far as the Neolithic period; and according to archaeological discoveries the Cypriots had relations with Anatolia, Thessaly, Hungary, Syria and Palestine since then. The former, which was the closest neighbor, had some kinship with the primitive natives of the island; however the population was heavily and definitely influenced by the Hellenic culture since the Achaean-Mycenae's arrived into the island in the half of the second millennium B.C.¹

Besides from being a small island located in an advantageous position, the significant production of copper transformed the island into an important commercial center by the Late Bronze Age (2300-1050 B.C), thus Cyprus became victim of numerous invasions and colonization from different cultures through all its history². Almost all surrounding powers such as the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Macedonians, the Lusignans, Venetians, and Ottomans owned the island at some time; an important exception was Greece.

¹ Konstantinos Spyridakis, Alejandro Zorbas and Nikiforos Nicolaides. Breve Historia de Chipre y Los Últimos 30 años (1968-1998). Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile: Universidad de Playa Ancha de Ciencias de la Educación- Colectividad Helénica. 1999. p. 30.

² Glen Camp. "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus" in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 1. (Spring, 1980), p. 43.

The longest occupation was carried out by Turkey, which remained in the country from 1571 to 1878; as a result, the Cypriot population became more heterogeneous when the Turks with their different religion and institutions settled permanently in the island. These settlers were brought in as labor force and as they were needed, which meant that there was no intention from Turkey to create a Turkish majority or upper class in the island.³ However, the latter gradually became the most important second ethnic group after those which considered themselves Greeks, but always remaining distinct from each other, and with the Greek Cypriots always as a majority group.

It is important to mention here the two other ethnic groups that comprise the Cypriot population: the Maronites and the Armenians. The Maronites arrived to the island from Syria around 1097, they established themselves basically in the village of Kutsafendis (Kutsovendis) and in the monastery of Saint John Chrisostomous; today they can be found in four villages at the northwest, mainly in Kormakiti, employed on agriculture. The Armenians were brought in by the same time; they live in small numbers in the cities, mainly in Nicosia employed on commerce, services and other activities. Both groups are small in number and usually voluntarily absorbed by the Greek Cypriots⁴. Also, there were some Africans who were introduced in the island as slaves but they were converted to Islam and absorbed by the Turkish Cypriots.

In the contrary, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had and have been divided along linguistic, ethnic, cultural and religious lines. The formers speak Greek and identify with the Greek nation, culture and religion (the Orthodox Church of

³ The Ottomans had the policy that after the conquest of a territory, an Ottoman repopulation would have to take place in order to avoid a new invasion from the enemy or re-conquest and to provide workforce for the abandoned lands to increase the income sources and provisions for the population. See Ertugrul Onalp, Chipre del Pasado al Presente. Ankara: Instituto de Historia de la Republica Turca de la Universidad de Ankara No:28. 2007. p.19.

⁴ There are also Jewish and Catholics or Latins but representing a very small percentage of the population. For more information on Maronites and Armenians see Konstantinos Spyridakis. Op. Cit. p. 100-102.

Cyprus, branch of the Greek Eastern Orthodox Church). The Turkish Cypriots, in the other hand, speak Turkish and identify with the Turkish nation and culture, and virtually all of them are Muslims from the Sunni sect.

The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus (under Selim II) was fast and even greeted by the natives who saw an end to their calamities and serfdom under the Venetians.⁵ As in most conquests of the time, some forced religious conversions, and new taxes were imposed on the people, but in exchange, Cypriots were integrated under the *Millet* system, which allowed religious communities to have a great extent of autonomy⁶. Thus, Cypriots could enjoy some rights that were denied before, such as the right to property and the Orthodox Church was recognized and even supported by the Turks who preferred to put administrative issues on the hands of the local authorities.⁷

The role played by the priesthood, headed by the Archbishop was very important during the Ottoman Empire rule, they were allowed to collect taxes, preach, educate and improve the living conditions of their people. Actually, not only the survival of the Hellenic culture and the attenuation of the sufferings of the Greek Cypriot population was possible because of the labor of the Bishops and Archbishops, but it was the Orthodox Church which started the process of ethnic differentiation as its “original motives however were not nationalist but were dictated by a pastoral strategy aiming at eradicating the elements of religious syncretism at the grassroots.”⁸

Thus, the bi-communal character of the Cypriot society was soon consolidated. There were purely Greek, purely Turkish and mixed settlements in all regions of the

⁵ Lawrence Durrell. Bitter Lemons. London: Faber and Faber Ltd. 1957. p. 123.

⁶ *Millet* actually means religious communities. The villages were allowed to choose through direct vote their local leader or *muhtar* and their local Elderly Councils. In bigger towns the communities were allowed to choose separately the members of the General Council which has the same number of members for each community. See Ertugrul Onalp. Op. Cit. p. 25-26

⁷ The Orthodox Church also saw benefit on the Ottoman conquer as the Lusignans and Venetians rule had imposed them to be under the authority of the Catholic Church. Ibid. p. 6-10.

⁸ Paschalis Kitromilides. “Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus.” Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1990). p. 6.

island and each community freely practiced their respective religions. Turkish Cypriots generally lived in the Paphos region in the southwest, along the south coast in the cities such as Limassol, and throughout Nicosia.⁹ Despite the evident differences in religion and language, syncretism and symbiosis did take place among the two main ethnic groups in a considerable extent.

In at least one mosque, at Galatia, the largest Turkish village in the island, the influence of Orthodox architecture is obvious...

The dress of the people is much the same...Nor do the two communities follow different occupations. Very few Cypriot Turks [*sic*] observe strictly the Islamic prohibition of wine-drinking and many of them make their living by the cultivation of the grape vine...there is a popular belief in Cyprus that eating pork can cause leprosy, but there are Turkish farmers who keep pigs. Perhaps the only Greek trade in which they do not participate is the painting and sale of icons.¹⁰

Unlike Cypriot Greek, which is a distinctive dialect differing considerably from the standard vernacular of Athens; Cypriot Turkish is very similar to the language as spoken in the Republic. It has naturally been affected by Greek and certain Greek words and phrases are commonly heard in Cypriot Turkish.¹¹

That is not to say that there were not conflicts during the Ottoman Empire but they were definitely not due to ethnic clashes, at least not in the sense that members of one group would find enough reason to kill people because of its different culture. It should be noted that traditionally, under Islamic rule religion was not a source of conflict but a mean to administrate the territory and govern the people. Religion, in Cyprus became a pretext of conflict only until it was politically manipulated to that end.¹²

Two of the main problems during Ottoman rule were the extreme poverty and repression which were indistinctly suffered by both Turks and Greek Cypriots.

Therefore, it was quite frequent that both groups would fight side by side against the

⁹ Rotberg, Robert I. *Cyprus after Amman: Next Steps toward a Solution*. Cambridge: BCSIA Program on Intrastate Conflict, World Peace Foundation. WPF Report # 37. (Dec. 2003). p. 4.

¹⁰ C.F. Beckingham. "The Turks of Cyprus." Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Volume 87, Issue 2 (Jul.-Dec., 1957). p 170.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 171.

¹² Paschalis Kitromilides. "From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus" in Cyprus Reviewed. Edited by Michael A. Attalides. Nicosia: The Jus Cyprus Association. 1977. p. 38.

authorities. Moreover, it would be the Turks themselves who would start the rebellion sometimes, such was the case of the rebellion of Kyrenia in 1765 which was commanded by the governor Halil Aga and followed by both groups.¹³ It should be noted that repression and abuses came not only from the Turkish authorities but also from some Bishops and other Greek Cypriots appointed to administrative posts like the *Kotzabasis*¹⁴ who profited from their influences with the Turkish rulers for their own benefit.

The common fate and solidarity of Greek and Turkish peasants during the Ottoman period is particularly clearly shown by the fact that on a number of occasions there were peasant's rebellions under Christian or Muslims leaders with followers of both faiths. These rebellions were frequently aimed at opposing higher taxes, whether imposed by the Church, or the Ottoman Governor. Such revolts took place in 1665, 1764, 1830 and 1833.¹⁵

As had been noted earlier, Greek Cypriots were always allowed to keep their language, religion, and through their right for their own education they could also kept conscience of their own past and ties with the Hellenic culture. Thus, when revolution against Ottoman rule started in Greece in 1821, as a consequence of the Greek aspirations of restoring the Byzantine Empire or *Megali Idea*, the Greek Cypriot authorities (the priesthood) felt compelled to give some economic aid.¹⁶ Even though at the beginning of the revolution open support in the island was inexistent, the Turkish authorities were suspicious, subsequently many were hanged, including Archbishop Kyprianos, and repression grew for all.¹⁷ However, thousands of Greek Cypriots

¹³ Konstantinos Spyridakis. Op. Cit. p. 136.

¹⁴ *Kotzabasis*: Name given by the Turks to those Christians enriched, who would have an enormous influence in the affairs of their communities and beyond them. Because they used to oppress their countrymen, the word *kotzabasis* took a pejorative sense in the Greek language and it came to mean abusive, cruel, and despotic. Explained by translators in footnote 22. Ibid. p. 135.

¹⁵ Michael Attalides. "The Turkish Cypriot: Their Relations To The Greek Cypriots in Perspective" in *Cyprus Reviewed*. Edited by Michael A. Attalides. Nicosia: The Jus Cyprus Association. 1977. p. 75.

¹⁶ The *Megali Idea* or Great Idea was an "ideological process that politicized the local ethnological traditions and turned them into dynamic elements of political change in distant and isolated regions without any direct or organic ties with the independent Greek state." Paschalis Kitromilides. *Greek Irredentism*. Op. Cit. p. 4.

¹⁷ Archbishop Kyprianos was accused of having secret contacts with the Filiki Eteria organization, which was plotting for the Independence of Greece, after his cousin the Priest Teofilos Teseus was caught distributing pamphlets calling for a general insurrection. Ertugrul Onalp. Op. Cit. p. 23.

decided to fight in Athens against the Turks. It was then when nationalism was irreversibly implanted on the Greek Cypriots, and the wish for independence followed by union with Greece (*Enosis*) was for the first time formally proclaimed.¹⁸ “From this one could see just how deeply hidden, and in what depths of unconscious historical process, the roots of Enosis lay hidden.”¹⁹

1.2 Cypriots under British Rule.

In June 13, 1878, the island was put under control of the British through the Congress of Berlin in order to content the Russian expansion toward the west.²⁰ Great Britain in change was bound to pay Turkey an amount equivalent to the revenues of the island, but the money was actually paid to the French and British creditors who gave Turkey loans to wage the Crimean War (1853-1856)²¹. As the money came from the budget of the island, which was mainly collected by a high tax policy, there was nothing left to cover the needs of the island and its inhabitants. As a result, discontent, and thus nationalism, grew even more among the Greek Cypriot population which found continuous frustration after their many requests for independence or self government to the British, who used the island only as protection to the Suez Canal and as contention to Russian expansion.

However, the British did try to modernize the administration of the island; so by

1881 a census was carried out, showing that the island had 185.630 inhabitants, from

¹⁸ Enosis “essentially represented an extension to Cyprus of the same historical phenomenon that elsewhere in Europe took the form of the Italian Risorgimento, the movement for German unification, and the irredentist movement of the Balkan nations.” Paschalis Kitromilides. *From Coexistence to Confrontation*. Op. Cit. p. 41.

¹⁹ Lawrence Durrell. *Op. Cit.* p. 124.

²⁰ The Congress of Berlin was attended by Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy and the Ottoman Empire. It was held to arrange the state of affairs created after the war between Russia and Turkey, a small autonomous Bulgaria was created, Great Britain acquired Cyprus and Austria-Hungary acquired Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Chris Cook and John Stevenson. *Guía de Historia Contemporanea de Europa*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. 1994. p. 329.

²¹ The Crimean War started on October 1853, when Turkey declared war on Russia, a month later, Turkey was loosing the battle, thus Great Britain and France fearing Russian success, entered in the war on the Turkish side. *Ibid.* p. 314.

which 74% were Orthodox Greeks, 24% Turkish Muslims, and 2% were Latins, Maronites, Armenians, Jewish, Catholics, Protestants, and others. Also, the British issued a Constitution in 1882, but it failed to please the Greek Cypriots as it provided for a Legislative Council where the High Commissioner had the right to veto, and where the Turkish Cypriots and the English always voted together against the Greek Cypriots. “The system was also bad because it relied for its efficiency upon keeping alive the racial hostilities between the two sections of the population.”²²

Although the situation did not provoke any significant ethnic clash among both Cypriot communities, the nationalistic demands of the Greek Cypriots caused Turkish Cypriots to be conscious of their own ethnic identity and their right to participate in the decision-making process. Therefore, the latter chose to side with the British in order to avoid being overwhelmed by the Greek Cypriot majority and succumb to their national aspirations. However, the poor condition of the inhabitants brought them together in the Legislative Council over financial issues. “The interethnic disagreement over the national status of the island remained academic, was confined to the elite level, and was never strained enough to cross the threshold of violent ethnic conflict.”²³

Meanwhile the Greek nationalism kept growing, and in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) the Greek Cypriots fought alongside with the Greeks against the Turks. By the 1920s, nationalism ceased to be an elite demand in the Legislative Council to become a massive popular movement as it reached the rural communities. The spread of nationalism was promoted by the professionals and intellectuals who were educated in Athens bringing the ideas of the belligerent Greek nationalism of the time.²⁴ It should be noted that Greek Cypriots’ nationalism was directed against two targets the British

²² Peter Loizos. Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus. Man, New Series, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Dec., 1988). p. 643.

²³ Paschalis Kitromilides. From Coexistence to Confrontation. Op. Cit. p. 43.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 41-42.

colonial rule and against Turkish colonial rule over Greece. Their ultimate aim was to join a unified Greece and, at the time, the Turkish Cypriot community did not represent a threat to their aspirations, nor did they were considered enemies.

During World War I, Turkey allied with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and therefore, Great Britain took full control of the island in 1914. The latter offered Cyprus to Greece in exchange for their support against Germany, but Greece did not accept immediately and the offer was withdrawn²⁵. At the end, Greece entered the war and gained important territories from the defeated Ottoman Empire, a fact that inflamed the *Megali Idea* and led to many struggles against Turkey until their own defeat in 1922 which culminated with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923²⁶. Greece returned the territories previously gained to Turkey, and the latter ceded all its rights over the island to the British.

In 1925, Cyprus was proclaimed Colony of the British Crown, and the frustrated Greek Cypriots broke out in open rebellion in 1931 marking the height of *enosis* agitation. However, the rebellion was promptly suffocated, and the British authorities abolished the constitution and imposed severe restrictions.²⁷ “The Legislative Council were suspended, political parties were made illegal, municipal elections were abolished, and the police were given the right to search persons and their homes at will”²⁸. The measures were perceived by the Greek Cypriots as a British attempt to terminate the Hellenic culture. Thus, the relationship between the Greek Cypriots and the British

²⁵ The offer was refused by King Constantine. See T.W. Adams. AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1971. p. 11.

²⁶ The Treaty of Lausanne was a continuation of the Treaty of Sevres signed in 1920 between Turkey and the Allies. It had the purpose of reducing the Ottoman Empire to a minimum extent. The Treaty of Lausanne specifically stipulated that Turkey would be reduced to Anatolia and the region surrounding Istanbul (Rumelia) in Europe. Chris Cook and John Stevenson. Op. Cit. p. 332-333.

²⁷ T.W. Adams. Op. Cit. p. 19.

²⁸ Between 6000 to 8000 Turkish Cypriots, mainly students due to the restrictions on education. Pierre Oberling. The road to Bellapais, the Turkish Cypriot exodus to Northern Cyprus. New York: Columbia University. 1982. p. 36.

authorities did not get any better, not even after Greece joined the British side in World War II, and Cypriots fought alongside one or the other.

Turkish Cypriots were also victims of the punishments meted out to the Greek Cypriots, and as a result many immigrated to Turkey.²⁹ Thus, the independence movement turned radical for both groups. For Greek Cypriots, Enosis also became a mean to avoid being recaptured by post-Ottoman Turkey.³⁰ Turkish Cypriots, in turn, feared that union with Greece would mean their total submission and the disappearing of its culture.

In 1943 the Cyprus Turkish Minority's Association was founded, and became the Cyprus Turkish National Party in 1945 headed by Dr. Fazil Kutchuk. Two years later this party took the stand that in case the British left Cyprus, the island should be restored to Turkey. Also in 1943, separate Turkish Cypriot trade unions were created, but many Turkish Cypriots preferred to remain as members of the Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation (PEO) which, organized by the communist party AKEL, formed "a basis for the integration of Greek and Turkish Cypriots outside the village context, in towns, building sites and factories."³¹

The Greek Cypriots continued their struggle by peaceful resistance, in which the leadership of the Church took an important role, especially through their diplomatic efforts on getting public support against the situation of colonialism in the island. Naturally, the Church, headed by Archbishop Makarios III, was responsible for organizing the people, particularly the students.³² In 1950, 96% of the Greek Cypriot population voted for union with Greece in a plebiscite held by the Church, but the

²⁹ Ibid. p. 53.

³⁰ Robert Rotberg. Op. Cit. p. 4.

³¹ Even by 1958 three and a half thousand Turkish workers remained members of PEO, they were forced to abandon membership due to TMT threats: "Trade Unionists were murdered, and left-wing clubs were burnt down." Michael Attalides. Op. Cit. p. 81.

³² Michael Mouskos was the Bishop of Kition; he was elected Archbishop of Cyprus at 37 years old in 1950 becoming Makarios III.

British authorities ignored the results. The Turkish Cypriots did not participate in the vote. Although the purpose of the plebiscite failed, international support was gained and Greece's Premier, Alexander Papagos, decided to take the issue to the U.N.³³ In 1954, 1955 and 1957, Greece pleaded to the U.N. for the Greek Cypriots right of self determination, but they failed as the Greek Cypriots were claiming for union with Greece and not for self government.³⁴

Anti-British demonstrations escalated in the island, and, as result, the British intensified restrictions to the natives. Meanwhile, terrorist activities in Egypt forced the British to move their bases from the Suez Canal to Cyprus, thus, in 1954, the British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, declared "that Cyprus was one of those territories that could never hope to be fully independent because of Britain's defense obligations in the Middle East."³⁵

1.3 The Struggle for Independence.

After realizing that Great Britain was not willing to grant independence, the Greek Cypriots decided then to change their passive strategy to violence. Thus, with support from Greece, the terrorist group EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kiprion Agoniston³⁶), which was formed and commanded by Colonel Gheorgios Grivas (alias Dighenis), proclaimed the Cypriot revolution on April 1, 1955.³⁷ The liberation movement got almost

³³ Greece could not challenge Great Britain directly for its military and economic dependency. The move was against U.S. quiet diplomacy of not exposing Western problems at the U.N. where they could be exploited by the U.S.S.R. Van Coufoudakis. "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy" in Cyprus Reviewed. Edited by Michael A. Attalides. Nicosia: The Jus Cyprus Association. 1977. p. 106.

³⁴ At the U.N. Makarios sought support from every nation and declared "we will accept support from every hand, even from dirty hands" and "we will put forth our hand for help to both the East and the West." T.W. Adams. Op. Cit. p. 41.

³⁵ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. The struggle for Cyprus. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. 1975. p. 23.

³⁶ In English it means: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters.

³⁷ Grivas was a prominent Greek Cypriot military who made a successful career on the Greek Army. He was appointed leader of the liberation guerrilla group in 1951 by a conspirator committee, "the Sacred Liberation Committee," which included Archbishop Makarios. It has been recorded that Papagos knew the plans of the conspirators and formally agreed with them. Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. pp. 10, 15 and 31.

immediate support from a large part of the Greek Cypriot population. However, even when life for Cypriots under British rule was far from being pleasant, many Turkish Cypriots and even some Greek Cypriots were reluctant to fight the British or cooperated with them becoming targets of EOKA attacks and assassination regardless of their ethnic origin. For instance, the communists of AKEL, the most organized political party at the time, were reluctant to fight for union with fascist Greece.³⁸

The discourse and actions of EOKA caused the Turkish Cypriots to feel threatened by the Enosists, thus, that same year the Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, change the name of his party to “Cyprus is Turkish Party,” which was supervised by the Turkish officer Hikmet Bil. The fear of becoming a minority under Greek rule and the violent strategy of the Greek Cypriots inclined the Turkish Cypriot community to ally with the British, who in turn exploited the tension through the use of Turkish Cypriot police officers to subdue Greek Cypriot rioters and to hunt EOKA members, causing them to become targets of EOKA attacks.³⁹ Turkey became anxious about the probability of Greece’s taking over of an island only forty-three miles away.

As a response to the Greek Cypriot insurgency, the police force was increased, concentration camps were created, many schools were closed, and many were arrested and condemned without trial. Soon, the British realized the strong Greek Cypriot determination to fight for their independence, thus, British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, who replaced Churchill that year, invited Turkey and Greece to discuss important issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the question of Cyprus. Through this invitation, Turkey became officially an equal partner in the dispute.⁴⁰ During the conference, held in London in September, 1955, Turkey announced its commitment

³⁸AKEL and EOKA were involved in open conflict and many AKEL members were assassinated. T.W. Adams. Op. Cit. p. 51-53.

³⁹ Peter Loizos. Op. Cit. p. 643.

⁴⁰ The announcement of this British measure was made on June 30, 1955. Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. p. 51.

with Kutchuk's claims for the restoration of Cyprus to them whether the British withdraw from the island. Once Greece and Turkey became directly involved in the island, the deteriorating process of the previous mild inter-ethnic relationship was inevitably accelerated while the Cyprus question became an international concern as both countries were NATO members.⁴¹

Also, the British promoted peace talks with Archbishop Makarios III, and even offered a new constitution and a plan by which self-determination was granted but until after a stable political situation in the Middle East could be reached. The plan was rejected, and, despite worldwide condemnation, the British decided to exile the Archbishop to the Seychelles islands on March 9, 1956. Thus, Grivas took full control of the leadership and the terrorist activities increased. As a response, the British suggested that the Turkish Cypriot minority, like the Greek Cypriots, would also be granted with the right to determine its own future when the time came.⁴² It was then when the idea of partition materialized among Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, the British and Turks supported the emergence of a Turkish Cypriot extremist group as a counterbalance for EOKA.

After receiving military training in Turkey, the group became a terrorist organization known as Volkan which became later the TMT (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati), and which was commanded by Turkish officers who were, in turn, influenced by pan-Turkish sentiments.⁴³ Their first aim was to impose by all means the idea of ethnic segregation and partition to the whole community.⁴⁴ Thus, Turkish Cypriots on the island became extremely belligerent; mainly the attacks were directed against Greek

⁴¹ Both Greece and Turkey became NATO members on February 18, 1952, thus the prospect of conflict among the two states was of direct concern to the U.S. which was also alarmed by Soviet advances in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Thus, the Cyprus issue fell irremediably within the sphere of "the Cold War politics" Van Cofoudakis. *Op. Cit.* p. 133.

⁴² Lawrence Durrell. *Op. Cit.* p. 243.

⁴³ In English, TMT means Turkish Resistance Organization.

⁴⁴ Paschalis Kitromilides. *From Coexistence to Confrontation.* *Op. Cit.* p. 48.

citizens and their property with acquiescence from the British security forces.⁴⁵ The first act of inter-communal violence took place in the town of Kondemenos on June 12, 1958, where mass murder was carried out against the Greek Cypriots.⁴⁶ The British authorities did not punish the Turkish Cypriots; however, many of them were expelled from their villages and became refugees in other Turkish Cypriot enclaves⁴⁷

Makarios was freed on April 17, 1957, after Grivas promised to stop the terrorist activities if Makarios was freed to conclude negotiations, but he was not allowed to return to Cyprus. However, the terrorist activities decreased and so the restrictions. The British then proposed the Greeks to start negotiations under a NATO framework, but the proposal was rejected because Greece wanted Makarios III to conduct the negotiations on behalf of his people and without interference from NATO.

As the situation was reaching a dead end, conflicts between Greek Cypriots and the British and Turkish Cypriots resumed. In June 1958, a series of battles left so many casualties that the U.N. felt for the first time compelled to find a solution for Cyprus. The British offered a new plan (Macmillan) which only provided for the procrastination of the problem for seven years, and for the joint administration of Greece and Turkey; it was immediately rejected by the Greek Cypriots.

The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Evangelos Averoff and Fatin Zorlu respectively, entered negotiations between January 17- 22, 1959 in Zurich. By February 19, an agreement was reached and signed in London by the Prime Ministers Macmillan from Great Britain, Constantino Karamanlis from Greece, and Menderes from Turkey, and by the representatives of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Makarios III and

⁴⁵ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. p. 115.

⁴⁶ It is usually argued that this attack was the first act of inter-communal violence. The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. The Cyprus Problem. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 1999). p. 11.

⁴⁷ Pierre Oberling. Op. Cit. p. 61. However, Greek Cypriot sources and pro-Greek Cypriot authors assured that Turkish officials forced them to move in order to concentrate them in compact areas where they could demand autonomy and later partition.

Dr. Fazil Kutchuk respectively. The agreement provided the quality of Cyprus as a sovereign state, and excluded union with Greece and/or partition of the island. Also, Cyprus had to sign two treaties to ensure the London accords: the Treaty of Guarantee with Great Britain, Turkey and Greece, giving them the right to take joint or unilateral military action to preserve the status quo in the island, and the Treaty of Alliance with Greece and Turkey which established the size of the troops that could be placed in the island. A joint army would be established with 950 Greeks and 650 Turkish soldiers commanded by an annually rotated leadership. Finally, it was agreed that Great Britain would retain control over the military bases of Akrotiri and Dekelia.⁴⁸

The British imposed a Constitution to the Greek Cypriot leadership. It basically provided for a bi-ethnic state and it contained articles which while granting Turkish Cypriot participation in the policy-making process, also promoted the institutionalization of the ethnic division.⁴⁹ Thus, it established that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were separate communities, with equal rights governed by a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-president with equal veto powers. The House of Representatives, the police and civil service would be established in the proportion of 70% Greek Cypriots to 30% Turkish Cypriots. The various restrictions on the Constitution and the Treaties had the ultimate intention of guaranteeing Turkey that Greece would never be a threat to its southern border.

Makarios III accepted the agreement and signed the Treaties as it was the only possible solution at the moment to achieve independence without partition.⁵⁰ However,

⁴⁸ In the context of the Cold War, Cyprus represented a strategic location: as an air base: Moscow is 1500 air miles away, Akhtopol, a Bulgarian Port, is 550 air miles, Batum, the nearest former USSR city, is 830 miles away, many former USSR strategic points such as oil and industrial centers are within 2000 miles. Also, Turkey is 40 miles away, Syria 60 miles, Athens 565 air miles and Egypt 260 miles. It should be noted that it was from Cyprus that the British launched its air strikes to Egypt in 1956 and to Jordan in 1958. The British Sovereign Bases comprise 3 percent of the territory (99 square miles). See T.W. Adams. *Op. Cit.* p. 86-87.

⁴⁹ Paschalis Kitromilides. *From Coexistence to Confrontation.* *Op. Cit.* p. 49.

⁵⁰ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. *Op. Cit.* p. 156.

Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with the agreement achieved, mainly because they saw frustrated their dream for Enosis. Many ex-EOKA members felt betrayed by Makarios, and headed by Grivas, who was expelled from Cyprus as part of the negotiations, remained armed and ready for a continuation of the struggle. Nevertheless, Makarios was warmly received when he finally returned to Cyprus on March 1, 1959.

The Republic of Cyprus was formally proclaimed on August 16, 1960, and Makarios III was elected as president of the Republic (with 67% of the popular vote⁵¹), and Kutchuk as Vice-president. Unfortunately, Makarios III by serving as both President and Archbishop proved unable to separate church and state and could not avoid failing both as the religious Ethnarch of all Greek Cypriots and secular President of the 577, 615 Cyprus' inhabitants.⁵² The nature of these roles, led Makarios to be in constant contradiction, and confrontation through all his government period with the different actors of the Cypriot society.⁵³ For instance, he relied remarkably in AKEL and Soviet support, even though communism and religion are clashing ideologies; and his aim for union with Greece, which had an historical enmity with Turkey, clashed with his responsibility to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. Therefore, both the Republic of Cyprus and his government started with a predictable political crisis.⁵⁴

Elections were also held in the House of Representatives, in which 65 seats were granted to the Greek Cypriots and 15 to the Turkish Cypriots, elected by its correspondent community. Most of the Greek Cypriots elected to the House of

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 160.

⁵² According to the last official census carried out in 1960. About 80% were Greek Cypriots and 18% Turkish Cypriots. It was estimated in 1970 that the population increased by 100 000. See T.W. Adams. Op. Cit. p. 85.

⁵³ It should be noted that the fact that a religious leader could become a political leader was a tradition inherited from the Ottomans who considered that a religious leader was a natural political leader in monotheistic communities. Ibid. p. 114.

⁵⁴ As pointed out by constitutional and legal experts, Cyprus was the first country in the world to be denied majority rule by its own constitution. This meant that the constitution would automatically give Turkish Cypriots more voting power per person than it would give to Greek Cypriots. Argerious p 10

Representatives, as well as most ministers and military officers, were ex-EOKA members, a fact that would result a source of conflict in the near future. The new state was immediately recognized as the 99th member of the UN, as part of the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Council of Europe.

1.4 Ethnic Clashes in the Republic of Cyprus.

Once Cypriots were left on their own, tension escalated among the two main ethnic groups of the island, due to the lack of a recognized common leadership and to the subsequent lack of mobility in the government which was caused by the inability of both groups to reach consensus on every issue, a problem which was worsened as both the President and the Vice-president held the right to veto on certain issues such as foreign and security policies. For instance, The Turkish Cypriot leadership opposed Makarios' non-aligned approach and his attempt to unify the military forces.⁵⁵ The House of Representatives also found problems functioning as basic articles were impossible to modify, and it was required the vote of two-thirds of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members for constitutional changes such as electoral law. "Thus 8 Turkish Cypriot members of the House could defeat a bill voted for by 35 Greek Cypriot members and 7 Turkish Cypriot members."⁵⁶ Every attempt to modify unilaterally the Constitution was met with a suspension on payment of taxes and rates.⁵⁷

The unwillingness to reach consensus was foreseeable as both groups neglected each other the legitimate right to rule the country. The Turkish Cypriot leadership

⁵⁵ Ironically, it was this non-aligned policy which ultimately cost Makarios to become a problem to the U.S. Makarios III was not anti-Western, but he would use all sort of help from Moscow for his political interests. "In that Manichean struggle of absolute good against absolute evil, neutrality was equivalent to immorality, while nonalignment which included flirting with Moscow was morally outrageous. The West demanded a clear-cut policy of active anticommunism publicly announced and implemented. Makarios obviously did not regard such a policy as in his interest..." Glen Camp. Op. Cit. p. 52.

⁵⁶ The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. *The Cyprus Problem*. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 1999). p. 7.

⁵⁷ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. p. 161

feared that every attempt to modify the Constitution from their counterpart was meant to bring down the state and achieve Enosis. The Greek Cypriot leadership considered unfair to share equal rights with the Turkish Cypriot minority, and also it seemed to them that Turkish Cypriots were getting too many benefits so as to have the last word in every issue of that new country they had tried to impede by allying with the British.⁵⁸ Thus, an anti-Turkish Cypriot feeling was radicalized in the whole society through the schools, the Church and the media which was controlled by the Greek Cypriots.

The situation got out of control when in December 1963 Makarios III presented Kutchuk a new Constitution which mainly provided the elimination of the veto power of the President and the Vice-president, the reduction of the number of Turkish Cypriot civil servants and the unification of municipalities, the military and police forces.⁵⁹ The measures were perceived by the Turkish Cypriots as a termination of their rights and safety, thus, they created the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber which undertook the powers from the Legislative Council and the Ministers Council.⁶⁰ Violence spread up immediately after Greek Cypriot paramilitary and terrorists attacked many Turkish Cypriots civilians. During December 24 and 30, the Guarantor States met, under Turkish pressure, to restore peace in the island; they agreed to send troops commanded by the British as a peace-keeping force and to establish a cease fire line.⁶¹ Turkey also sent a warning flight.

As skirmishes continued in other points of the island, a Turkish government was set up in a Turkish neighborhood in Nicosia, and many Turkish Cypriots moved from the villages to the cities. On January 1964, the British proposed a Plan which provided

⁵⁸ Konstantinos Spyridakis. *Op. Cit.* p. 162.

⁵⁹ Greek Cypriots have been accused of developing and executing a Turkish Cypriot extermination plan which is known as the Akritas Plan and which presumably contained the formulation of the changes in the constitution. The plan was attributed to the Minister of the Interior, Polikarpos Yorgadjis. Ertugrul Onalp. *Op. Cit.* p. 73-74.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 73.

⁶¹ This neutral zone came to be known as the Green Line for the color of the marker used. Pierre Oberling. *Op. Cit.* p. 99.

for temporary NATO military occupation, but Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan and chose instead to take the issue to the Security Council. The Plan was rejected because a NATO framework would have implied legitimacy to the Treaty of Guarantee and the constitution provided, which was exactly what Makarios wanted to modify, whereas the U.N. was not committed to the Treaty.⁶² It was expected that a U.N. resolution confirming the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, would challenge the right of the Guarantor Powers to intervene in the island.⁶³

After a long wave of aggressions and retaliations among the communities throughout the island, the Cypriot government was unanimously recognized as legitimate on the Security Council on March 4, 1964 (Resolution 186) which meant that all members of the U.N. would respect the sovereignty of that government, and refrain from any intervention. The resolution also provided that a U.N. peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) would be sent to Cyprus and a U.N. mediator would be in charge to conduct the negotiations between the parties involved.⁶⁴

However, interethnic violence continued and Turkey enforced its military threat.⁶⁵ While Greece decided to send an army commanded by Grivas to the island to protect it from outside intervention, he also took control of the National Guard. At this point, Turkish occupation seemed imminent but through diplomatic channels both the

⁶² Also, the Soviet Union was a member of the Security Council and friendly to Makarios, thus the latter expected to gain more influence through Soviet support. Nikita Khrushchev actually warned the Guarantor Powers about a possible intervention in support of an independent Cyprus. Van Coufoudakis. *Op. Cit.* p. 113.

⁶³ James Boyd. Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping. *International Organization*, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Winter, 1966). p. 5.

⁶⁴ General Gianni (from India) was sent to command the troops of the UNFICYP which comprises 6,238 men and 173 as a police force. Galo Plaza was sent as mediator, but resigned from his post after his pro-Enosis project was rejected by Turkey; he was succeeded by Osorio Tafa.

⁶⁵ On March 14, the U.S. Sixth Fleet approached Cyprus and the U.S.S.R. moved its submarines in the area, the next day an UNFICYP contingent arrived and Turkey backed down.

U.S.S.R. and the U.S. prevented Turkey from occupying the island.⁶⁶ Finally, the Security Council called for a cease-fire, and all parties consented.⁶⁷

The UNFICYP could not prevent the exchange of fire in every village. “Cyprus was a land of inextricably mixed communities. The fighting had now consolidated scores of embattled Turkish enclaves among a sea of Greeks, each of which required U.N. protection”.⁶⁸ Hostilities continued and a major battle took place in the region of Kokkina with such intensity that the UNFICYP observers on the area decided to leave.⁶⁹ Turkey, in turn, decided to send air raids against that region for three days causing many casualties.

Greek Cypriots decided to punish the Turkish Cypriot community with an economic blockade and with the suspension of their civil rights, but the measures only caused more resentment while enhanced the desire for partition. Makarios wanted to avoid another confrontation with Turkey but could not stop Grivas who had decided that only violence would subdue the Turkish Cypriots. As the latter had control of the National Guard, Makarios decided to increase the number and power of the police force and created “a strong paramilitary force under an indigenous leadership that had been tempered in years of guerrilla warfare and was attuned to Grivas’ tactics.”⁷⁰ However, Grivas counted with the support of more than 20, 000 Greek troops stationed in the island to counter 10 000 Turkish Cypriots troops.⁷¹

⁶⁶ U.S. President Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Premier Ismet Inonu warning that Washington would not honor its NATO defense commitments to Turkey whether its invasion of Cyprus would result in open conflict with the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev had informed Inonu that the U.S.S.R. would take action in favor of Cyprus. Glen Camp. Op. Cit. p. 50.

⁶⁷ The casualties of that battle were 53 dead Greek Cypriots and 12 dead Turkish Cypriots, but the total toll of casualties since December, 1963 was 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots and thousands of refugees from both sides. Pierre Oberling. Op. Cit. p. 120.

⁶⁸ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. p. 164.

⁶⁹ Pierre Oberling. Op. Cit. p. 118.

⁷⁰ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. p. 172.

⁷¹ they were presumably armed with NATO weapons smuggled in from Izmir Foley 165

On April 21, 1965, a coup took place in Athens and a military Junta seized the Greek government.⁷² The Junta was ideologically opposed to Makarios and supported the “double enosis” proposal which Makarios had rejected.⁷³ Even though, the Junta tried to negotiate with the Turks, they finally decided to support Grivas on their attacks to the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the National Guard worsened its campaign, killing many Turkish Cypriots and incarcerating others, including Rauf Denktash, a speaker of the Turkish Cypriot community and one of the founders of the TMT.⁷⁴

After Turkey realized it could not take control over the fights in the south where Turkish Cypriots enclaves had been isolated, it sent an ultimatum to Greece to withdraw its army. Greece recalled Grivas in 1967 and agreed to the withdrawal of troops under U.S. pressure, but kept some instructors for the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Turkey demanded the disbandment of the Guard but they refused to do so as Turkey failed to withdraw its own soldiers as had been agreed. In any case, the TMT took full control of the regions already gained (which represented 4% of the total territory, and which comprises 60% of the Turkish Cypriot population⁷⁵), not allowing the Greek Cypriots to enter them and ignoring the Cyprus’ government.⁷⁶ On December 28, 1967, the Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration (TCPA) was proclaimed with an Executive Council headed by Dr. Kutchuk and Rauf Denktash as vice-president.

⁷²The U.S. supported the Junta, especially President Nixon after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

⁷³ Dean Acheson’s Plan proposed union of Cyprus with Greece together with the establishment of Turkish military bases on lease for 50 years and three cantons with full local administration and NATO protection. The sovereignty of Cyprus would be terminated by a unilateral declaration of *enosis* by Greece. To ensure that the prearranged strategic concessions to Turkey would be made, a secret NATO protocol would be drawn up in advance establishing that Greece would request the Commander in Chief of NATO to determine on the grounds of strategic necessity the extent of the bases to be leased to Turkey. Papadopolous, Greek Prime Minister, accepted but Demirel, Turkish Prime Minister, argued that enosis was prohibited in the London agreements and demanded the withdrawal of Greek troops. Van Cofoudakis. Op. Cit. p. 115-116.

⁷⁴ Rauf Denktash had been expelled since 1964, he was captured while trying to return to the island; later he was released under international pressure and deported to Turkey on November 12, 1965.

⁷⁵ Konstantinos Spyridakis. Op. Cit. p. 219

⁷⁶ The Turks proclaimed this area to be the border between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and called it the “Attila Line” after the name of the Turkish military operation on Cyprus.

In 1968, the Greek Cypriots, through the UN Secretary General, U Thant, proposed a plan by which the Turkish Cypriots would be granted of autonomy, mainly in the issues of education, religion and culture. But, as the Turkish Cypriots wanted full autonomy on administrative issues, the proposal was discarded. However, as an attempt to end the conflict, Makarios lifted the economic blockade and Rauf Denktash was allowed to return to Cyprus.

Also that year, presidential elections were held and Makarios was elected for another term defeating the pro-Grivas National Party. However, the conciliatory intentions of Makarios made more evident the internal division among the Greek Cypriots which were nurtured since the birth of the Republic as many disagreed with exchanging the ideal of Enosis for an independent state subject to the vigilance of three other states. Therefore, when Makarios finally realized that Enosis would not be achieved in the near future, and that it was more important to maintain the integrity of Cyprus, he encountered a strong opposition, even within the church, which caused alarming fissures in the Greek Cypriot society as a whole. Also, his relationship with the Greek Junta kept deteriorating as he tried to find conciliation with the Turkish Cypriots.⁷⁷

Already by 1969, relations between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had so dramatically improved that when a tornado struck the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol Makarios inspected the damage and promised the victims that his government would provide them with all that was needed to rebuild their homes.⁷⁸

Under such circumstances, EOKA reappeared using the new name of EOKA-B and under the command of Grivas, who returned secretly in 1971 to destabilize the government⁷⁹. Makarios responded to the aggression by allowing Greek dissidents in the island. The crisis reached its highest point when the Junta accused Makarios to plot

⁷⁷ The Greek Junta was accused of three assassination attempts against Makarios: Operation Hermes (1970), Operation Apollo (1971) and Operation Aphrodite (1974). Glen Camp. Op. Cit. p. 56.

⁷⁸ Pierre Oberling. Op. Cit. p. 153.

⁷⁹ EOKA- B: the B was for Beta: "after the second letter of the Greek alphabet." Peter Loizos, Intercommunal killing in Cyprus 640

against Athens after a cargo of weapons coming from Czechoslovakia was found in his palace. Turkey, fearing a Greek invasion, immediately move more troops and prepared an air drop. The Greek Cypriot bishops demanded Makarios to resign as they “made the belated discovery that it was uncanonical for the head of the Church to be also head of state.” Makarios yielded the weapons to the UNFICYP and offered his abdication but a massive demonstration of popular support kept him in power.⁸⁰ He was reelected again in February 1973.

The Junta continued his campaign against Makarios III and his policies, and even though they used the popularity of Grivas as a freedom fighter, they could not challenge the fact that despite all political internal crises, the Ethnarch was still the only legitimate leader recognized by the Greek Cypriot people. Grivas died in 1974, and Makarios dismembered the EOKA-B and demanded Greece to recall its citizens from the National Guard. Nevertheless, on July 15, 1974, the Greek Junta and the National Guard launched a coup against Makarios III, who fled to the British base at Akrotiri.⁸¹ Nikos Sampson, a former EOKA member and enemy of Makarios, was appointed President.⁸²

Sampson’s reputation for its atrocities committed against the Turkish Cypriots and the coup clear intention to annex the island to Greece violating the Treaty of Guarantee, allowed Turkey’s Premier, Bulent Ecevit to discredit Greece as a Guarantor Power.⁸³ Great Britain and Turkey could not agree on a common policy; thus, Turkey decided to take unilateral military action in the island in order “to support its linguistic

⁸⁰ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. p. 171.

⁸¹ The coup was presumably planned by Demetrio Ioannides, who was the chief of the military police of the Junta and an open enemy of Makarios.

⁸² Kissinger declared that he did not condemn Nicos Sampson government as it could be perceived by the Turks as a green light to consume the invasion. Ironically, the lack of condemnation caused Turkey to believe that the U.S. was going to recognize the illegal regime, which ultimately prompted Turkey to act.

⁸³ Jerry Sommer Security in Cyprus: Threat Perceptions, Possible Compromises and the Role of the E.U. Sep 2005, paper 44. www.bicc.de/info/staff/staffpages/sommer.php p. 15

kin and protect its own southern flank".⁸⁴ On July 20, Turkey launched an air and sea attack, followed by the deployment of 40 000 troops and heavy armory to occupy the area between Kyrenia and Nicosia.⁸⁵ The British and the Americans acknowledged the Turkish military action but they preferred to avoid a fissure on NATO and did not intervene.⁸⁶

The National Guard mobilized immediately and the exchange of fire throughout the island started again, mainly in Nicosia, Kokkina, Lefka and Limnitis, and on the Turkish Cypriot quarters of Paphos, Larnaca, Limassol and Famagousta⁸⁷. The U.N. also reacted immediately and on the same day the Security Council adopted the resolution 353 which called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces in the island which did not belong to the authorized U.N. forces. Nevertheless, the fight continued until July 22, when the Turks took effective control over Kyrenia, only then they agreed on the cease-fire.

Meanwhile in Greece, the Junta was overthrown and Constantine Karamanlis succeeded in power and Sampson was replaced with Glafkos Klerides.⁸⁸ Between the 25 and 30 of July, the Guarantor Powers and representatives from both Cypriot communities met in Geneva to find a possible solution. The Greeks claimed the sovereignty and integrity of the island while the Turkish Cypriots demanded the recognition of the existence of two separate communities. Actually, the latter presented themselves as the Turkish Cypriot Autonomous Administration (TCAA)⁸⁹. Therefore, they were only willing to agree on a cease fire.

⁸⁴ Robert Rotberg. Op. Cit. p. 5.

⁸⁵ Turkey's initial landing was legal according to the Treaty of Guarantee, but as they failed to restore the state of affairs they violated the same Treaty. Glen Camp. Op. Cit. p. 47.

⁸⁶ The U.S. feared that an independent Cyprus under Makarios III would fall in the Soviet sphere, thus it was the status quo which the U.S. opposed and either Enosis or partition would serve for the purpose of halting Makarios political race. Ibid. p. 58.

⁸⁷ For a detailed account of the conflict of July 20, see Pierre Oberling. Op. Cit. p. 163-166.

⁸⁸ The decision to restore the Greek government to civilian hands was due to the fact that the Cyprus question resulted on a "political, diplomatic, and military humiliation." Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Op. Cit. p. 175.

⁸⁹ Konstantinos Spyridakis. Op. Cit. p. 221.

The Declaration of Geneva on July 30, 1974, recognized the existence of two separate administrations, and it was agreed that Turkish Cypriots would be allowed to move to the north and Greek Cypriots would be able to move south or remain in the north whether they prefer to do so. Also, it was granted free access to the U.N. Subsequently 200,000 Greek Cypriots moved south and 40,000 of the Turkish Cypriots moved north, it was in both cases almost half of their respective total population in the island.⁹⁰

Later, between August 9 and the 14, a second meeting was held between Klerides and Denktash. Turkish Cypriots were offered more administrative autonomy, but Rauf Denktash rejected it, and demanded a bi-zonal state with definite borders, self-government and Turkish protection. After the failure of the meeting, the Turks, ignoring the Security Council resolution and the agreement on the cease fire, launched a second offensive, invading from Kokkina to Famagusta all along the Attila line.⁹¹ The Greek Cypriots realized they were fighting alone, as Greece was dealing with its own political instability, withdrew from the occupied zone, losing 37% of the territory. The *de facto* partition of the island was concluded leaving casualties of 5,000 killed and 1,619 missing persons⁹².

It should be noted here that even violence between the two ethnic groups was clearly open in many cases; there were also many incidents of cooperation and mutual protection.⁹³ Furthermore, opposition or reluctance to cooperate with the extremist separatist was evident within the Turkish Cypriot side, even with the threat posed by the

⁹⁰ See appendix taken from Konstantinos Spyridakis. Op. Cit. p. 202.

⁹¹ Since 1965 the Turks proclaimed this area to be the border between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The denomination of "Attila Line" was given after the name of the Turkish military operation on Cyprus.

⁹² But it is not quite clear whether these figures include the Turkish Cypriot casualties. According to the Bulletin of May 2003, there were 500 disappeared Turkish Cypriots but information of 201 of them had already been issued by that date. The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. The Refugees of Cyprus. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 2003). p.13.

⁹³ "Only four months before the coup, Denktash was invited to speak at a Greek Cypriot gathering of businessmen and professionals. There was a readiness on the part of various groups of both communities to take part in seminars organized to promote inter-ethnic understanding." The Hellenic Electronic Center-Action Cyprus. www.greece.org/cyprus/Takism4.htm

extremist separatist and the leadership's call for unity against the Greek threat.⁹⁴ Also, the opposition Republican Turkish Party was formed in December, 1970, as a response against the leadership's policies. Real interethnic hate was hard to achieve as it was hard to break the pattern of traditional inter-communal interaction that had distinguished the Cypriot society before and during the conflicts.

1.5 Partition of the Island and Creation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”.

In 1974, the partition of the island was a harsh reality. In the occupied zone, 20% of the inhabitants were Turkish Cypriots and the rest were Greek Cypriots; actually 40% of all Greek Cypriots were inhabitants of that territory⁹⁵. But as violence continued south the Green Line, more Turkish Cypriots moved north voluntarily or forced by their leaders. Through the good offices of U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Klerides and Denktash agreed on “the mutual release of prisoners and detainees, for assisting the aged and infirm left behind in isolated villages and for allowing sick persons and pregnant women to cross the boundary between the two zones for medical treatment”⁹⁶. Later, they agreed to allow foreigners to return home, to allow students to study abroad, to let UNESCO the supervision of cultural sites, to let the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) search for missing persons, and to allow the exchange of population in a short degree.

However, those Greek Cypriots that remained in the occupied zone were forced to leave (200 000 refugees) leaving 48, 600 houses, while Turkish Cypriots, who moved

⁹⁴ For instance, in April, 1965 a Turkish Cypriot journalist and trade unionist named Kavazoglu was murdered after he accused the leadership's policy for the separation and isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Michael Attalides. Op. Cit. p. 85.

⁹⁵ In 1974, the area comprised 233 950 persons, 36.9% of the island's population. 160 308 are Greek Cypriots, 71, 170 Turkish Cypriots and 2, 400 belong to other ethnic groups. Nicos S. Symeonides. “The Unity of the Economy and the Economy of Separation” in Cyprus Reviewed. Edited by Michael A. Attalides. Nicosia: The Jus Cyprus Association. 1977. p. 256.

⁹⁶ Pierre Oberling. Op. Cit. p. 186.

north during the hostilities leaving behind 7 930 houses, were denied of their right to return to their homes in the south by the Turkish Cypriot authorities⁹⁷. Also, Turks were brought in to modify the demographic structure of the occupied territory⁹⁸. The Turkish Cypriots were dissatisfied on their new territory due to the fact, that the military (35, 000 Turkish soldiers, whose commander also oversees the police and firefighters) and the new immigrants constantly abused them or their properties; in fact, 8,000 Turkish Cypriots fled the country after the invasion.⁹⁹

The international community expressed its support for Cyprus and on November 1st the General Assembly accepted the resolution 3212 which demanded the recognition of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign, and not aligned state, and called for the safe return of refugees, and refrained foreign intervention on Cypriot issues. In order to stop violence, the UNFICYP established a buffer zone all along the “Attila line.”

Greece withdrew its troops from NATO until 1980, while the Greek Lobby put pressure on the U.S. government to impose an arms embargo against Turkey, on the grounds that it had violated the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which stipulated that military assistance would be provided only for national security and defensive ends, they achieved its goal on February 5, 1975.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ According to Greek Cypriot sources, there were about 40 000 displaced Turkish Cypriots from the south in the controlled area, but according to Turkish Cypriot sources there were 90 000. The inflation of the number might have had the purpose of justifying the astonishing increase of the Turkish Cypriot population, which was evidently caused by migrants from mainland Turkey. However accurate numbers for the Turkish Cypriot migration to the north is not available as they moved or were forced to move secretly, illegally and gradually. The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. *The Refugees of Cyprus*. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 1993). p. 11-12.

⁹⁸The first colonists were the parents of soldiers who fell in Cyprus. They were given ownership titles and permanent residence permits on the principle of “land for blood.” Greek Cypriot sources estimate that until 1993, 80 000 settlers from Turkey were arrived, while 30 000 had left. *The Refugees of Cyprus* 21. Alpay Durduran (from the Turkish Cypriot party New Cyprus) believes that 40 000 Cypriots have emigrated, while 80 000 remained in Cyprus, thus according to the 1997 Turkish Cypriot census, which recorded a total population of 160 000, there are 80 000 settlers. See: Niels Kadritzke. *From Missile Crisis to EU Membership-Turkish Cypriot dream of Europe*. <http://mondediplo.com/1998/09/07/cyprus>

⁹⁹ The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. *The Refugees of Cyprus*. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 1993). p. 11.

¹⁰⁰ Theodore Couloumbis. “The Impact of Greek Americans upon United States Foreign Policy: Illusion or Reality?” *The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus*” in *Cyprus Reviewed*. Edited by Michael A. Attalides. Nicosia: The Jus Cyprus Association. 1977. p.146.

On December 7, 1974, Makarios returned to Cyprus and resumed his presidency, which the Turkish Cypriots accused as illegal as he was away for more than 75 days, thus by February 13, 1975, the Turkish Federate State of Cyprus was proclaimed.¹⁰¹ The action was condemned by the Security Council (through its resolution 367) and the international community as a whole. However, a year later, elections were held and Rauf Denktash (from the National Unity Party) became President.

As noted earlier, the Turkish Cypriots were soon discontented with the new state of affairs, due to the fact that the administration was ruled by Turkish officials, and because many immigrants of Anatolian descent were brought in with granted immediate citizenship and right to vote¹⁰². Being, most of them impoverished peasants, they kept unemployment high and wages low. Also, those immigrants had the same origin and religion but very different traditions and mentality that clashed with those of the Turkish Cypriots, who, after all, adopted some features and values from the Greek Cypriots and their Western ideology. Even the former Turkish Cypriot's leader, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, protested against the massive immigration of undereducated Turks¹⁰³.

In the meantime, "round of talks" were promoted by U.N. Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, these rounds pretended that both parties could negotiate over coherent proposals which would be previously presented, in order to reach understanding and compromise in the short time. The Brussels Accord of December 12, 1975, between Greek and Turkish Cypriots foreign ministers set the guidelines for the continuation of inter-communal talks, territorial issues, and secrecy on the process of the negotiation. Between April 1975 and September 1981, there were eight rounds of talks, but they were unsuccessful on providing a comprehensive agreement that could bring the

¹⁰¹ Klerides became the leader of the House of Representatives and head of inter-communal talks but he was removed after he failed to notify Makarios on a secret agreement with Denktash and was succeeded by Tassos Papadopoulos. He founded the Democratic Rally (DISY) but lost on the parliamentary elections against Spyros Kyprianous from the Democratic Front. Pierre Oberling. *Op. Cit.* p. 199.

¹⁰² Konstantinos Spyridakis. *Op. Cit.* p. 235.

¹⁰³ Currently there are about 100 000 illegal Turkish Settlers. *Ibid.* p. 208.

conflict to an end, mainly because the parties' proposals contrasted on the functions and powers of the Federal State, as well as territorial issues. Basically, the Greek Cypriots suggested a strong federal government with participation of the two communities according to the ratio of their respective populations, while the Turkish Cypriots proposed two independent federated states with their own legislative assembly, central bank, defense force and the right to sign separate treaties with other countries.¹⁰⁴

An important concession from the Greek Cypriot side took place when Denktash and Makarios met in Vienna between March 31 and April 7, 1977 (sixth round of talks). The Turkish Cypriots were granted their own region, finally accepting the bi-zonal condition of the island, also it was recognized that each territory should be economically viable. Still the Turkish rejected the proposal as they considered that the proposal would deprive them from agricultural and water resources and because their demand for a federal state with a loose central government was not accepted.¹⁰⁵

Makarios died on August 3, 1977 and was succeeded by Spyros Kyprianous in February 1978. The new government was particularly controversial; besides from being surrounded by internal and international scandals, he found opposition within his government and started a witch hunt against many of his colleagues and foreign diplomats. Even Tassos Papadopoulos, the head of the inter-communal talks, was dismissed as negotiator on the peace talks, and as a result the talks fell on a stalemate. Also, not only did he discard any possible concession to the Turkish Cypriots, but he campaigned for their discredit in the international arena. Despite his moderate approach when he was the head of the inter-communal talks, he refused to meet with Denktash without the auspices of the U.N. as that would have meant its recognition as head of state.

¹⁰⁴ The Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus. *The Cyprus Problem*. (Nicosia: The Press and Information Office, 1999). p. 27.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

On September 26, 1978 Carter lifted the arms embargo imposed on Turkey, an action that diminished Kiprianou's enthusiasm from getting support on the West against Turkey's invasion and turned to the Third World and Iron Curtain countries for support.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the U.S. plan proposed on November 7 was immediately rejected. In anyway, on May, 1979, Presidents Denktash and Kyprianou finally met and agreed to resume the inter-communal talks based on the Makarios-Denktash agreement of 1977 and previous U.N. resolutions but no result was produced from these talks.

The unwillingness of Turkish Cypriot authorities to restore the state of affairs prior to the invasion became dreadfully obvious when on July 1982, the "TRNC" decided to grant Turkish Cypriots and settlers from Anatolia title deeds to Greek Cypriot property. Subsequently, on November 15, 1983, the occupied zone officially became the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), followed by a Declaration of Independence by popular suffrage. Also, a new Constitution was drafted and placed under popular referendum on March, 1985. That year Rauf Denktash became President of the "TRNC", and a Judicial Power was created with its Supreme Court. Also the Turkish lira was introduced and a Central Bank was created. It is worth noting the fact that prior to the suffrages for Independence, Denktash warned that voting against the Independence declaration would cause the political parties to be forbidden in the new republic, at the end, the results were unanimous¹⁰⁷. The unilateral move was declared illegal by the world community with the exception of Turkey which is the only country that had recognized the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" so far.

On November 18, 1983, the Security Council adopted resolution 541 which condemned the declaration as illegal, called for its withdrawal and ordered the

¹⁰⁶ He was successful at the non aligned countries meeting at Havana in September 1979, and in November achieved another UN resolution (34/30) which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and voluntary return of refugees.

¹⁰⁷ Konstantinos Spyridakis. Op. Cit. p. 234.

implementation of its resolution 365 and 367. It also, called on all states not to recognize the illegal regime. The Commonwealth of Nations also condemned the declaration at the Commonwealth Summit Conference in New Delhi on November 29, and established a 5-nation action group (Australia, Guyana, India, Nigeria and Zambia) on Cyprus at high-level to assist in securing compliance with Security Council Resolution 541. The European Community Council of Ministers suspended trade concessions to Turkish Cypriot goods and ruled that exports from the island must be accompanied by a certificate of origin issued by the government authorities of Cyprus. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe refused to accept deputies from Denktash's illegal regime.

On March 10, 1984 U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar through Mr. Gobbi proposed to continue the peace-talks, but Turkey replied on April 21 that talks could only be resumed after the recognition that the government in the south did not represented the whole Cyprus. However, they accepted the U.N. invitation for a new round of talks in N.Y. on September 10, and both Kyprianou and Denktash attended the meeting where they attempted to find common ground upon which they could base a fair and viable settlement but there were no results; neither did subsequent talks or meetings produced results.

Round talks, and high level meetings under U.N. auspices had been continuous since then, but an agreement has not been reached yet. There have been 80 resolutions on Cyprus adopted between 1974 and 1999 by the U.N. Security Council, and 12 for the U.N. General Assembly. But no resolution or proposal has been enough to reunify the country. The European Court of Human Rights had issued several resolutions against Turkey's violations of human rights in Cyprus (10/5/2001-the last one), finding Turkey, a member of the Council of Europe, guilty of violations to 14 articles of the European

Convention of Human Rights, but they have not prevented Turkey from backing the illegal government or from keeping their troops in the island. The Greek Cypriots had offer concessions that the Turkish Cypriots could not accept, and the Turkish Cypriot had requested changes that Greek Cypriots are not willing to fulfill. All attempts have failed even after Cyprus became a European Union member on 2004; the island remains divided and occupied by Turkey.